Antioch University

AURA - Antioch University Repository and Archive
Dissertations & Theses

Student & Alumni Scholarship, including
Dissertations & Theses

2014

Addressing Global Threat: Exploring the
Relationship between Common Purpose and
Leadership
Charles R.H. Powell
Antioch University - PhD Program in Leadership and Change

Follow this and additional works at: https://aura.antioch.edu/etds
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons,
Leadership Studies Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Politics and Social Change
Commons, and the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Powell, Charles R.H., "Addressing Global Threat: Exploring the Relationship between Common Purpose and Leadership" (2014).
Dissertations & Theses. 166.
https://aura.antioch.edu/etds/166

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student & Alumni Scholarship, including Dissertations & Theses at AURA - Antioch
University Repository and Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations & Theses by an authorized administrator of AURA - Antioch
University Repository and Archive. For more information, please contact dpenrose@antioch.edu, wmcgrath@antioch.edu.

ADDRESSING GLOBAL THREAT:
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COMMON PURPOSE AND LEADERSHIP

CHARLES R. H. POWELL

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Ph.D. in Leadership and Change Program
of Antioch University
in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

November, 2014

Copyright 2014 Charles R. H. Powell
All rights reserved

This is to certify that the Dissertation entitled:
ADDRESSING GLOBAL THREAT: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COMMON PURPOSE AND LEADERSHIP
prepared by
Charles Powell

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Leadership and Change.
Approved by:

Philomena Essed, Ph.D., Chair

date

Carolyn B. Kenny, Ph.D., Committee Member

date

Anne Perkins, Ph.D., Committee Member

date

Steve Chase, Ph.D., External Reader

date

Acknowledgements
My utmost gratitude goes to my family. My wife, Paula, deserves immeasurable credit
for her patience, support, and sacrifice . . . not to mention timely doses of humor; this would not
have come about without her unceasing contribution. My sons—Jeff, Corey, and Garrett—who
provide me with ideas and encouragement when I am stuck, seemingly imponderable questions
that I sometimes get right, and the deep satisfaction derived from their ongoing growth. I am
most fortunate that Donald Robert Powell and Bob Hipple instilled a desire in me for lifelong
learning, furnished lessons on fatherhood, and, of course, provided me with all those books. My
admiration and appreciation deepens for Jennifer Butler and Donald Earl Powell who work to
make it better for the last, this, and the next generation.
During each phase of my life, I have been able to learn from and be inspired by selfless
and, by extension, effective leaders: Michael Burke, TSgt. Henry, Dr. Gary Krasicky, and Mike
Mason. Vicki Escude powerfully demonstrated how the power of insight could enhance
leadership. Dr. William Torres, through his compassion and support, reinforced the value of
patience. During my physical and virtual academic absences, Jane Vitali and Greg Pennington
led in my stead and while doing so became even better for that experience. Jay Spinale always
listened, questioned, and reinforced with perfect timing and measure. I want to acknowledge
John Schiereck for helping me to see, think, and act in new ways.
I have not lacked for academic assistance and direction. Dr. Philomena Essed, my Chair,
challenged, advised, and encouraged me every step of the way and always with a gentle
persistence. Dr. Carolyn Kenny kindly and effectively taught me about phenomenology and
always had the perfect answer to any of my questions. Dr. Mitch Kusy furnished support, but
also discipline. On the shortest of notice, Dr. Anne Perkins has given me her time and attention

i

along with invaluable input around common purpose and leadership. Dr. Steve Chase has also
offered his time and invaluable suggestions. From day one in the Antioch program and
thereafter, Dr. Dick Couto has provided me meaningful concepts, leads, and contacts to facilitate
this study. Dr. Peter Vaill’s classroom work and writings transformed my leadership thinking
and approach. Dr. Robert Thomas embodied his words through his equanimity and effective
direction. I want to thank Dr. Gill Robinson Hickman for her writings on common purpose
leadership and a most helpful suggestion at a critical moment. All of the aforementioned have
accomplished the articulated aim of promoting enhanced understanding of leadership and
research.
Finally, I wish to recognize those who engage in pursuit of common purpose. If not for
Hal Jones, who first made me conscious of the simple wonder and efficacy of a common purpose
approach, I may have never considered (let alone practiced and researched) such a course. My
thanks and best wishes go to Dr. David Krieger for opening the door to the world of nuclear
weapons abolition. Both Donita Crockett and Cathy Gwinn were beyond helpful and patient in
facilitating key conversations. Above all, I wish to express my deep appreciativeness to all who
participated in the interviews for this study and to all who continuously engage in efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons—may they achieve their (our) aims in time.

Dedication
To Sarah (Sally) Hipple:
Whenever I became lost or tired, your lights of compassion and perseverance
have always shown the way.

ii

Abstract
While the mention of common purpose is prevalent in leadership studies, there are few attempts
to explore the relationship between common purpose and leadership. This study delves into the
questions of if and how common purpose and leadership inform one another. How leaders adapt
purpose and leadership approaches in response to evolving and turbulent conditions may foster
the depth and sustainment of immediate and subsequent accomplishments. Through
phenomenological research in the venue of nuclear weapons reduction, a common purpose that is
both globally pervasive and imbued with a sense of urgency, the lived essence of those engaged
in common purpose can be illustrated. Exploring the symbiosis of the nuclear weapons reduction
common purpose and associated leadership may have theoretical implications or provide lessons
that can be utilized within other common purpose settings. The electronic version of this
dissertation is available through the OhioLink ETD Center at http://ohiolink.edu/etd
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Chapter I: Introduction
The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a
world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about
peace, more about killing than we know about living. (Bradley, 1952, p. 114)
The Question(s)
This research emerges from my fascination, born from readings and life experience, with
a particular phenomenon: Leadership for a common purpose. History harbors many examples:
From the abolition of slavery to the independence of colonial nations; from the struggle of
democracy to the stemming of fascism and communism; and from the quest for human equality
to animal rights. My assumption is that there is something extraordinary and potentially useful
about the affiliation between common purpose and leadership. Leadership around common
purpose is vulnerable to the changing understandings and expectations of the common good.
Conversely, perceptions of what constitutes common good can change under the leadership
involved. Common purpose, in itself, is not static—global and local events, technological
change, ideological emergence, and societal shifts may call for leadership adaptation. The
(possibly) symbiotic relation between common purpose and leadership is the topic of this
dissertation.
My research aim is to seek out and explore the relationship between common purpose
and leadership. I will accomplish this aim by examining nuclear weapons reduction which is not
only a national, but a global common purpose. After an examination of related literature, I will
interview various leaders involved in nuclear weapons reduction work. Yet there are those who
feel the absence of nuclear weapons conveys greater or equal threat in terms of conventional,
biological, and chemical warfare (Helprin, 2011). Besides being globally pervasive, there is a
further consideration that sets nuclear weapons reduction apart from many other common
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purposes—the aspiration to protect life; whether human, animal, or vegetative. The only other
international undertakings intent on comprehensive biological welfare that immediately come to
my mind are those of environmentalism and medicine (a field has its grey areas such as profit
motive or animal research). At first glance, common purpose appears to be neither unwavering
nor clear-cut. By extension, leadership around common purpose is subject to change and
interpretation.
This research will occur through a phenomenological journey into the common purpose
setting of nuclear weapons reduction. Several initial questions come to the forefront. What is the
relationship between the common purpose of nuclear weapons reduction and respective
leadership? Arising from the first question: Is there a mutually in-forming (influencing)
relationship between common purpose and associated leadership? A related (or intertwined)
question involves the degree of influence by external conditions upon the adaptation of common
purpose and leadership. I will examine the lived experience of the common purpose participants,
which poses two more questions. First, are there transferrable lessons for other common purpose
endeavors and their leaders? Second, are there theoretical implications or explanations from the
findings?
What is the relevance and significance of a foray into the relationship between common
purpose and leadership? Our world—and I purposefully speak of ‘our’ world to indicate global
concerns—demonstrates an increasing proportion and rapidity of information. The pace and
impact may differ by region, but we are in the midst of heightened technological
preponderance . . . with opportunity and danger. According to Kegan and Lahey (2009), the rise
of technology, increased competition, the mushrooming import and amount of information, and
globalization requires an ability to manage rapid change. Additionally, our world is seeing the
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reemergence of long-stilled voices and their accompanying viewpoints; ways of thinking that
may not necessarily coincide with predominant Western or corporate views and aims.
The ultimate significance of this particular study lies in the potential of transferrable
lessons to others engaged in enterprises of common purpose. Through an examination at the
outset on the literature involving common purpose, leadership, and nuclear weapons reduction,
some information might come to light that could facilitate other common purposes or enhance
adjoined leadership. A dedicated phenomenological foray into nuclear weapons reduction might
unearth additional or more defined guidance for common purpose leadership. More specifically,
answers may emerge that instruct and empower leaders to navigate past the barriers that inhibit
commitment to common purpose; especially amidst rapid change. Another possibility comes in
the form of inclusiveness; to hear and apply the voices of those impacted by common purpose
that were previously ignored and perhaps became disaffected.
Through our alternating internal and external circumstances, common purpose provides a
beacon to guide us around the rocks and shallows of our dynamic world. Through this sea of
unceasing change, leadership acts as a pilot to reach the aimed for harbors of purpose. It is true
that many leaders seek to inspire and guide towards a common (or shared) vision or purpose, but
in this research common purpose literally implies ‘common’ to be all-inclusive and pertain to
questions concerning the future of life on earth. Leaders who employ the concept of common
purpose guide all concerned to stay anchored and focused amidst challenges and distractions
(Covey, 2004). As conditions change, it is often necessary for purpose and/or leadership to adapt.
The lack of adaptation holds implications for groups that live and work together. “The
predominant trend in human society has been the replacement of smaller, less complex societies
by larger, more complex ones” (Diamond, 2005, p. 281).
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There are various reasons why nuclear weapons reduction is well-suited for a theoretical
examination of common purpose and leadership. The reduction of nuclear weapons is
compelling. “The unity thread we call charisma of purpose and its powerful effect on group
members comes from the worthiness of the purpose itself” (Sorenson & Hickman, 2002, p. 8).
Nuclear weapons have the potential capacity of touching any or all life; thus elevating the
purpose of reduction and the potential to attract and retain others to the cause. A related
consideration is that this particular common purpose can, in effect, mitigate potential harm to any
area on the globe. That harm may come in a direct manner or indirectly (a systems
consideration). This common purpose under consideration has a perception of importance that
precludes inactivity, induces action, brings others to the table, and invites innovative and
collaborative leadership.
Equally important for this research, I wanted the common purpose at hand to have
evolving conditions as backdrop. External pressures call for either adaptation of the purpose
itself or associated leadership. There is an urgency and change in conditions that drive the need
to be innovative…to adapt aims and leadership. Vaill (1996) pointed out that we had entered into
a time of continuous turbulence known as white water and the conveyance to successfully
navigate the rapids of our existence was continuous learning. I will say more about this in
Chapter II.
The world of nuclear weapons has undergone constant change since the end of the Cold
War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left a plethora of unsecured atomic weapons. The
subsequent securing of those arms, nuclear material, and technology was followed in quick
succession by the “rogue” nations (notably North Korea and Iran) bent on obtaining nuclear
war-making capability and an expanded terrorism threat. Even with the culmination of the Cold
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War, a semblance of the old nuclear dyads—United States/Russia, United Sates/China,
China/Russia, and India/Pakistan—remain in existence.
A last (but certainly not the last) question relates to the commonality of purpose.
Common purpose, upon closer look, is not so simple or common. This tension is inherent in the
nuclear weapons reduction movement. Former US government officials with a history of
hardline positions on American military policy—Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn,
and William Perry—are actively promoting international efforts geared towards the common
purpose of a world free from the risk of nuclear weapons. Another prominent international
organization, Global Zero, is advocating total abolition of nuclear arms. Ironically, the two
groups have not been completely in sync on methodology—Global Zero pushes for an
international treaty to eliminate nukes, a pathway that Shultz and others feels could drag on
indefinitely (Taubman, 2012). The ability to reflect on the mistakes of the past and then to
change course is crucial for sustaining and achieving common purpose. The need and willingness
for leadership to change under the backdrop of very principled questions forms a driving
assumption and motive for my research. Then there is the paradoxical consideration of power
and bias. Traditional atomic powers, the United States (US) and Russia, possess over 95% of the
world’s nuclear weapons (Norris & Kristensen, 2010).
How then to offset or at least account for this uncommonness of purpose and the
preponderance of Western thought and aims? The first step is to enter into this research with a
consciousness of the role of American power and the imposition of American views (both on the
world and upon myself). Reviewing the purpose of nuclear weapons reduction is the next step;
again this intention has global implications. Talking with individuals involved in nuclear
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weapons reduction organizations with global approaches and global solutions is a leg further
along the path to inclusiveness.
Through readings and experience, I have seen firsthand how common purpose solidified
focus, united diverse groups, and empowered leaders. There is literature that speaks to the power
of common purpose upon all concerned (Follett, 1923). There is literature that speaks to power
of leadership upon common purpose (Rost, 1993). Still, there is much left unsaid. The gaps
within the literature are twofold. Foremost, there does not seem to be any qualitative studies
dedicated to examining the reciprocating effects of common purpose and leadership. Yukl (2006)
asserted that the behavioral aspects of leadership were frequently studied, but usually from a
quantitative standpoint and there was the alternative of qualitative or mixed methods study.
Secondarily, there is mention of the evolving relationship between the respective leadership of
nuclear weapons reduction, yet no concerted effort. The literature and corresponding gaps will be
outlined in Chapter II.
At the core, I am most desirous of unearthing the mutual influences that common purpose
and leadership have on one another. Associated with those influences is any necessary adaptation
to carry the purpose towards fruition . . . be that adaptation to purpose or to leadership.
Additionally, I wish to view a purpose that has global (worldwide or systemic) implications and
a purpose that is beset by the forces of urgency and external change—where the heat is set on
high. Thus, associated leadership is challenged, in varying context, to adapt and to take action.
Inaction or fixed courses may yield undesired consequences. And from those considerations
comes a more singular focus, the effort to mitigate nuclear war making capability.
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enslaved back to the African continent, an attitude that he carried into the White House in 1861
(Shenk, 2005). What altered Lincoln’s course so significantly that less than two years later he
signed the Emancipation Proclamation? Abraham Lincoln’s transformation as leader was forged
by private, local, national, and international factors. By the second year, the war between the
Union and Confederacy had assumed a savagery and scope that few had foreseen. Lincoln, his
cabinet, and others recognized that the South would not be subdued easily and that the Northern
war effort required a much deeper and broader intensity. Freeing those enslaved in the South
would bring a new source of manpower to the Northern forces and inhibit the South’s ability to
provide food and fortifications to rebel armies. Politically, Lincoln had to balance the opposing
views of the radical wing of the Republican Party (unremitting abolitionists) and the politicians
from the slaveholding Border States; the Emancipation Proclamation allowed such a
compromise. Lincoln’s thinking on the slavery question had been influenced by others. Secretary
of State Seward paralleled Lincoln’s pragmatism on slavery issues and Secretary of State Chase
was a staunch abolitionist. Frederick Douglass and other black leaders gave Lincoln a new
awareness and regard for African Americans and the black perspective. Emancipation would also
lessen the likelihood of European intervention on behalf of the South. Finally, Lincoln was able
to resolve some of his own constitutional dilemmas on how to implement emancipation
(Goodwin, 2005).
The meaning, the reverence, which Abraham Lincoln gave to the signing of the
Emancipation Proclamation, is evidenced by an antidote: On the date of the document’s
signature January 1, 1863, Lincoln had attended a reception that required him to shake the hands
of hundreds of people . . . a task that left his own hand trembling. Because in no way did he wish
his signature to be viewed as if he hesitated or to provide an interpretation that the Proclamation
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was not of the highest importance to him, Lincoln signed the document only after his hand was
free from tremor (McPherson, 2009). Lincoln had transcended in thinking so that he was no
longer content with just stopping the spread of slavery, he instead initiated an executive order
that freed all slaves in the rebellious South. Lincoln’s bold stroke eroded European support for
the Confederates, mollified the radical elements of his political party, enlisted black soldiers into
the Union army (while also reducing the Confederacy’s forced labor pool), avoided significant
alienation to the key border states between North and South, and initiated a process that
legislatively and effectively ended slavery in America (Thomas, 1952).
Contrasted with his speeches and writings from the 1858–1861, President Lincoln
showed an adaptive capacity from the years 1862–1865 in regard to race; evidenced by
meaningful discourse with key black leaders, resolving the inequity of pay between black and
white soldiers, and a strong push for the 13th Amendment to prohibit slavery in the United States
(Goodwin, 2005). Foner (2000) succinctly and aptly traces the path that presidential candidate
Lincoln traversed to become a successful president:
He did not favor immediate abolition before the war, and held racist views typical of his
time. But he was also a man of deep convictions when it came to slavery, and during the
Civil War displayed a remarkable capacity for moral and political growth. (para. 19)
Lincoln’s and the Union’s path during the American Civil War portray an example of
what I wish to research and bring to light—the possible symbiotic evolution of leadership and
purpose. For not only was there change in Lincoln’s world view and leadership, but the United
States’ common purpose of saving the Union incorporated the abolition of slavery.
Relating to nuclear weapons reduction, examples of actual or potential common purpose
and leadership adaptation exists. Senator Sam Nunn, a very strong proponent of American
defense efforts, has modified his thinking and innovatively tailored his approach (and the
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approach of others) so effectively that he has been able to secure or reduce numerous nuclear
weapons around the world (Taubman, 2012). I will delve deeper into this and other examples in
Chapter II with my review of literature.
Researcher Stance
An awareness and disclosure of where am I situated on the signature elements of this
study—common purpose, leadership, nuclear weapons reduction, and lived experience—will be
key to the research process for research participants, readers, and self. Awareness of my
predilections and aversions accompanied by the wisdom to know when to withhold or employ
my background holds implications for ethics and efficacy.
A commitment to common purpose has informed my professional and, lately, academic
life. My time in the military demonstrated how the espoused common purpose of national
defense could unite and hold the attention of diverse peoples from across the United States. A
very powerful attractor and motivator I share with many of those I serve with in the field of
healthcare is the higher purpose of caring for our patients. Yet, I see the tension inherent in my
vocation of healthcare where the desire to make profit often supplants the common purpose of
healing. Many individuals or groups inhabit or hover on the fringes of medicine seeking a
continuous enhancement of the “bottom line.” That financial wherewithal can be earmarked for
the ongoing medical advancements of care, service, research, and education. Others propose that
those dollars be utilized as financial incentives to enhance productivity and derive greater
income. While the two elements, care and income, are not mutually exclusive, the term
healthcare indicates which aspect is paramount. Senge (1994) succinctly made a point about this
disorientation of aim: “To confuse one essential requirement for advancing in the game with an
organization’s purpose is a profound confusion” (p. 303).
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Much of my memories of nuclear weapons are of events that took place in the
lengthening and then receding shadow of the Cold War. I have ingrained pictures from Time
Magazine covers and television images of the proxy wars fought in Vietnam, the Middle East,
and Afghanistan. Being a child of the 1960s and 1970s, I, along with countless others, grew up in
the presence of the nuclear threat of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Many can relate
(either through actual experience or film clips) to the images of children practicing nuclear drills
by crawling under their small desks and covering their heads; an inadequate response to weapons
with the energy capacity of a small sun. I also recall my parents telling me about the collective
fear of the country and the frenzied run on their Marine Corps grocery store during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
As a young adult and a new member of the United States Air Force, I underwent two
events that left lasting impressions. My first tangible contact with the threat of nuclear war came
one morning in 1980 when I was 18 years old and six months into my first Air Force enlistment.
As I was preparing to go in for an early morning shift, a base-wide siren began to wail . . . not a
drill, the actual signal for an incoming attack. It was a weekend and many people were out of
town, but the rest of us poured from our rooms into the halls. This was in Southern California
leading us to believe that nuclear missiles were incoming (the only indefensible mode that would
penetrate the continental United States without significant prior warning). The alarm went off for
several minutes and abruptly ended. During the brief interval of that repetitious wailing, I cannot
accurately convey the mounting terror that I felt and saw reflected in those around me. Not being
the most transparent of organizational entities, the military never communicated why the
mechanism for an actual threat was sounded, leaving us with the impression that somebody made
a mistake or instigated a very nasty prank. Not too long after that disconcerting episode and

12
during one of my medical training rotations, I met a retired Navy man who was riddled with
cancer. He recounted how he and others were sent into the Marshall Islands after nuclear
weapons testing; their assignment was to clean up the radioactive contaminant with nothing more
than mops and buckets.
Almost a decade later, I had the instructive and often surreal experience of being a
nuclear missile launch officer with co-responsibility for the safety, security, and potential launch
of up to 150 atomic warheads. Those weapons, combined with appropriate directives and code
sequences, were designed and targeted to destroy the military and urban centers within what was
then the Soviet Union. I began to develop an aversion to the thought of being the initiator of that
kind of destruction—so much so that I consulted others for advice. The feedback was
sympathetic yet practical: I could follow my conscience, but there would likely be adverse
effects to my career (prosecutorial and monetarily) and my family would suffer by extension.
Plus, the Air Force would have no problem in getting someone else to do the job. I grasped these
points, attitudinally recommitted to my job in missiles, and went back to healthcare when a
fortuitous opportunity arose two years later. This would be my first of many conflicts between
pragmatism and principle; a price and reward to leading and living. While my war-making
vocation never resonated with me, it would be untruthful to say that I would have forgone
turning the launch key if properly ordered to do so. The termination of the Cold War helped ease
my inner horror at the prospect of having to unleash a holocaust upon all kinds of life, but this
turmoil stays with and helps to fuel my interest in nuclear weapons reduction. My continued
discomfort is partially offset by being witness (and I like to think contributor) to the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the freedom of Eastern Europe, and partial reduction of Soviet and American
atomic arsenals. I can reflect back upon one period of real fear during my tenure as an Air Force

13
officer and it related to whether Russian President Boris Yeltsin would be able to retain power
against the military and former Soviet secret police apparatus. Had he been overthrown, we
believed real war may have ensued. Sanity prevailed, the nuclear powers faced away from their
almost fifty year dance along the brink of annihilation, and our globe took a significant step onto
a higher road. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons are still in vogue and we have a new set of
adopters, rogue states and terrorists.
With each passing year, the Socratic concept of wisdom (realizing how absolutely little I
know of the world) becomes innately stronger. Therefore, despite personal experience, I have no
strong opinions on what are the best courses regarding nuclear weapons other than to feel that the
status quo holds great risk . . . I sense that it is an adaptive issue that cries out for systemic
thought, multi-directional (all points on the globe) interventions, and creativity. Not having firm
convictions about my research area assists in the research stance; as I can stand back, let the
stories emerge, listen with an open ear, and portray accounts with more objectivity. Because
nuclear weapons reduction holds a facility to touch all corners of the globe, there is the
possibility of unearthing unique and efficacious information when studying this distinct common
purpose. Moreover, there is an inherent passion to study the topic of nuclear weapons reduction
as it is an unfinished chapter in my own leadership odyssey.
My leadership and my views on leadership have been informed by the common purposes
of healthcare and nuclear weapons. I have witnessed the effectiveness and lack of personal
consideration inherent in the military practice of directive leadership; particularly when it comes
to nuclear weapons. I have experienced the wellspring of power, but have been made uneasy by
the seeming slowness of the collaborative leadership methods of medicine. In the end, I have
come to feel that there is no one right answer when it comes to leadership; the formula is
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dependent on, among other things, the individual(s) involved, the surrounding culture, the
purpose (along with purpose scope and urgency), and external factor . . . all colored by
perceptions. A study by Sims, Faraj, and Yun (2009) held that the type of leadership might be
determined by participant expertise, goal exigency, and task complexity; in other words, a
situational approach—an approach I deem personally utilizable. Still, I see a higher version of
the situational approach, an avenue tinged by what is best for those who lead or are led: Prosser
(2009), advocated a different type of circumstantial leadership, one where the method chosen is
predicated on its ability to best serve those at hand. Most relevant to this dissertation inquiry, I
view leadership as organic; an activity imbued with continuous shared learning. However, I have
no intent to export my views on leadership. Quite the contrary, I am excited by the prospect of
others’ new and valuable insights that can imaginably enhance leadership in our fast-paced,
chaotic, and frequently dangerous world.
When it comes to qualitative inquiry, there is a strong personal affinity. My best
leadership has and will continue to use a qualitative approach: Placing preconceived notions to
the side, listening to multiple accounts, finding and verifying themes, and operating from that
composite (as opposed to my singular viewpoints and approaches). I find great value in
quantitative data, but more as a harbinger or validating source rather than a path to my in-depth
individual understanding and subsequent employment or evaluation of leadership efforts. That is
not a critique of quantitative inquiry, but a personal limitation. When I came across a supporting
article on the need for qualitative studies of leadership, it deeply resonated. Conger (1998)
asserted, “Leadership involves multiple levels of phenomena, possesses a dynamic character, and
has a symbolic component. Quantitative methods, by themselves, are insufficient to investigate
thoroughly phenomena with such characteristics” (p. 109). Those multiple levels of phenomena,
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dynamic character, and symbolic component are what I will strive to explore in a qualitative
study of nuclear weapons reduction and leadership. The qualitative path I employ involves
phenomenology. I will go into greater detail on phenomenology and my planned methodology
later in this chapter and in Chapter III.
Concepts
The theoretical framework of this research effort involves key concepts—common,
purpose, and leadership—and the applied construct for each. Williams (1985, p. 71) proposed,
“Common can indicate a whole group or interest”– applications I wish to pursue. Purpose can
denote the reason(s) for existence, resoluteness, and an end or aim. For what I am investigating,
all three meanings play a role, but purpose as an end or aim is central and overarching. Common
purpose may be wielded in a variety of ways: To unite, to destroy, to supplant, to transform, to
pervert, to gain or hold power, for greed, for altruism, and for the betterment of world conditions.
It is the common purpose that reaches to all corners of the globe and undertaken for the large
scale common welfare to which I gaze; as opposed to efforts to subjugate others for gain or
benefit select segments of society. There is also the latent power of common purpose endeavors
that seek to better conditions or understanding. “Common purpose is what turns me into we”—it
creates inclusiveness, unity, understanding, desire and direction; qualities that allow not
inconsiderable enterprises such as a human walking on the moon (Kurtzman, 2010, p. xxi). The
concept, relevance, and import of common purpose will be discussed at length in Chapter II.
Leadership and, by extension, common purposes have four overlapping considerations:


A traditional definition of leadership by Rost (1993) showed that leaders and
followers were in an influence based relationship to mutually develop purposes
intended to bring forth real change.
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Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey (2007) provided a description of complexity
leadership, “Leadership that enables the learning, creative, and adaptive capacity of
complex adaptive systems…for coordinating formal organizations and producing
outcomes appropriate to the vision and mission of the system” (p. 304).



Heifetz (1994) furnished a component of adaptive leadership, “We talk about the
leader of the gang, the mob, the organization—the person who is given informal or
formal authority by others—regardless of the values they represent or the product
they play a key part in producing” (p. 13).



Senge, Heifetz, and Tolbert (2000) related his “core experience of leadership—people
with a real collective capacity to create something they truly value. This is a very
challenging definition of leadership because we are so used to the individualistic
view” (p. 64).

I would make the case that all four considerations, at one time or another, have validity. Rost’s
(1993) and others’ notion of followers may becoming passé in many settings, but his other points
regarding influence, mutual purposes, and real change remain relevant. Complexity leadership
captures the landscape of our chaotic fast-paced worlds and the need for education, innovation,
and adaptation while Heifetz showed that leadership comes not only from the one at the top of
the hierarchy or those with titles, but the many—irrespective of race, nation, religion, gender, or
position. Senge reinforcing Heifetz’s (and Rost’s) contention, captured the aspect of common
purpose, and offered an alternative to leaders who take the solitary road. These various
definitions of leadership denote evolution in response to alternating conditions—in the form of
decolonization of societies, democratization of workplaces, or the facilitation of individual
choices—an evolution not dissimilar with organic elements that manifest change in order to stay
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existent. From the previous definitions, a sense emerges that common purpose and leadership are
interdependent and mutually uplifting. That is not to propose that common purpose is present or
even desired in all endeavors. Furthermore, common purpose may be wielded or accomplished in
doubtful manners. Literature in the upcoming second chapter provides examples of purposes that
retrospectively appear to be confined to a select group of individuals, of harmful enterprises that
were sold under the guise of a common purpose, and of common purpose leadership
accomplished by questionable means.
Within the literature, there are more explicit links between common purpose and
leadership. Northouse (2007) provided one instance, “Leadership involves influencing a group of
individuals who have a common purpose” (p. 3). And Kurtzman (2010) gave another, “What is
common purpose? To me, it is that rare, almost palpable experience that happens when a leader
coalesces a group, team, or community into a creative, dynamic, brave, and nearly invincible we”
(p. xii). For this research, I make the same distinction about leadership that I earlier made about
common purpose: It is leadership associated with common purpose that reaches to all corners of
the globe and undertaken for the large scale common welfare—that is my focus.
Conceptually, my research venue requires clarification. Formerly, I would have applied
the term nuclear weapons nonproliferation. But I have found from my trial research that
nonproliferation does not fully describe the work being done. Instead of nonproliferation, I
would advance the notion of reduction, Nuclear Weapons Reduction (NWR). For the various
efforts are leading to reduction—just at differing levels; some advocate zero tolerance for atomic
devices while there are traditionalists who still strive for arms control.
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Methodology
The final point involves methodology. At the most abstract phenomenological level, I am
interested in the essence of common purpose leadership: What happens in the way leadership
shapes and is shaped by the evolution of a common purpose? A phenomenological framework
seems most suitable for examining, portraying, and understanding this question. In order to
access what happens in the relationship between common purpose and leadership, I focus on the
experience of those who lead while engaged in meaningful and global common purposes. A
fruitful way of doing that is through narrative inquiry, that is, through the analysis of (life) stories
or (autobiographical) stories of leaders active in organizations within the broader movements of
NWR. Phenomenology is the study of lived experience, a honing in on a specific phenomenon,
the extraction of consequential themes, in order to bring forth the essence of the phenomena
under examination (Giorgi, 1997; Van Manen, 1984). It is those “consequential themes” that
may hold promise for my leadership and the leadership of those who are exposed to my research.
Laverty (2003) and Van Manen (2007) opined that Husserl (phenomenology) operated
more from an epistemological stance (knowledge based) while Heidegger (hermeneutical
phenomenology) moved towards an ontological basis (nature of existence or being). Specifically,
hermeneutical phenomenology is the segment of qualitative research I plan to employ.
Hermeneutical phenomenology utilizes a holistic approach to garner and interpret data. Laverty,
in an article on hermeneutic phenomenology wrote, “Interpretations arose through a fusion of the
text and its context, as well, as the participants, the researcher, and their contexts” (2003, p. 21).
A hermeneutical phenomenological approach, to my mind, can most fully portray the ontology
of the common purpose/leadership relationship. A hermeneutical phenomenological approach
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aligns with my (optimal) approach to the world—gaining and incorporating multiple
perspectives from diverse sources—therein is personal authenticity.
From a Husserlian attitude, bracketing renders past knowledge non-influential (Giorgi,
1997). Bracketing from the hermeneutic phenomenology perspective has the researcher, through
self-reflection, accounting for but not setting aside biases and assumptions; rather the researcher
is encouraged to consider how personal experience relates to that which is being researched and
their influence on the interpretive process (Laverty, 2003). Kvale (1996) echoed this take on
personal experience and knowledge: “Phenomenological reduction does not involve an absolute
absence of presupposition, but rather a critical analysis of one’s own presuppositions” (p. 54).
Bracketing throughout, in a hermeneutic phenomenological manner, helps to account for this
researcher’s assumptions and consider what roles, if any, my experience plays.
A hermeneutical phenomenological study of the interplay between common purpose and
leadership requires a long view. Laverty (2003) proposed, “Hermeneutic research is interpretive
and concentrated on historical meanings of experience and their developmental and cumulative
effects on individual and social levels” (p.16). Van Manen (1990), past, present, and future play
a role in phenomenology. Bennis (2003) talked of the roles that time and experience played in
forging leaders while also emphasizing how the same informed an approach to future endeavors.
Correspondingly, the world of nuclear weapons—in terms of technology, quantities, and
doctrine—has undergone massive changes since their inception in 1945. Viewing the NWR
setting over a sufficient period of time enhances the opportunity to assess development of
purpose and/or leadership.
Imagine being able to ask those engaged in the past common purposes of slavery
abolition, Indian independence, or American civil rights about their experiences. Based on their
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individual and collective sojourns, valuable lessons on adaptation to aims and approaches might
ensue. Interviewing those immersed in the globally pervasive cause of nuclear weapons
reduction has the potential to bring forth powerful learning as well. My intent is to interview
several individuals, representative of formal and informal leadership, from several organizations
involved in the causes of nuclear weapons reduction. A condition for the parent organizations
would be to operate on a global scale for at least a generational time span. I will return to
Williams (1985) when I convey the applicable (for this study) connotations of generation: A
period of thirty years and as a term to describe a succession of manufactured items, for example,
nuclear weapons. Given time, place, and culture, I do recognize that a generation is not a static
period that remains unchanged. For instance, Meacham (2012) recounted how Thomas Jefferson,
in the late 1700s, viewed a generation as being a term of 19 years. Utilizing the vantage of
multiple interview sources and a semblance of a generational span, I can heighten the likelihood
of garnering themes that have been fostered by the conditions of time, individual and
technological development, and social (de)evolution.
In order to elicit the experience, the essence, of the aforementioned common purposes
and their respective leadership, I will seek the biographical narrative, as it relates to the common
purposes, of each respondent. Shamir, Dayan-Horesh, and Adler (2005) promoted the idea that
life stories influence the development of leaders and those they influence. By extension, I would
conjecture that life stories influence common purpose and common purpose influences life
stories—as this research unfolds, that conjecture will be, in part, supported or not. Denzin (2001)
talked of epiphanies that came in an immediate or cumulative fashion. It is such insights that
may prove valuable and transferrable. At the end, I will make use of theoretical overlays to assist
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in the explanation of findings. An in-depth framework, utilizing hermeneutic phenomenology,
narrative, and ongoing reinterpretation, will be provided in Chapter III.
Summary and Next Steps
This chapter has proposed some initial questions around the relationship between
common purpose and leadership. The relevance and the significance of the common purpose
leadership relation were provided. The adequateness of, for this exploration, nuclear weapons
reduction was explained. A singular example, in the form of Abraham Lincoln and the American
Civil War, was provided to illustrate an evolving common purpose and leadership relationship.
Researcher stance was explored and related terms were furnished. Lastly, an overview of the
methodology was covered.
There are accompanying ethical risks to this study:


Prejudging in advance of what I may find; a behavior that may inhibit the portrayed
accuracy or thoroughness of accounts;



Trying to impose my views of common purpose, leadership, or anything that may
materially alter the interviewees’ experience;



The physical application of what I hear or learn in one venue of research to another;



Violating preexisting conditions of anonymity.

Ongoing bracketing at the outset, in the midst, and at the culmination of my research will
aid in keeping me conscious of and to preclude ethical pitfalls. Accounting for my stance in these
areas is a critical first step in the bracketing process; bracketing is endemic to the qualitative
research approach (Ahern, 1999). I will go into greater detail in my methodology chapter on the
ethical risks of this study and my specific bracketing efforts. I will use a journal as a specific
means to safeguard the sanctity of the various interview settings. Meaningful aspects of such an
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ongoing accounting will be emplaced in the dissertation when appropriate. Furthermore, the
hermeneutic process of pausing for reflection and consideration will offset impulse and
prejudice. My last wish would be to compromise the trust of those who allowed me to tell their
stories.
The ensuing chapters will round out my proposal and culminate with research findings.
Chapter II will be a review of literature around common purpose, leadership, the link between
common purpose and leadership, and the common purpose and leadership around NWR.
Relating to my research aim, gaps in the literature will be discussed. Chapter III will provide an
overview of phenomenology along with the justification for its utilization as a methodology in
this instance, and an outline of the specific questions and research procedures for this study.
Chapter IV will provide the findings of the study while Chapter V will furnish interpretations of
findings and associated theoretical aspects. The sixth and concluding chapter will discuss
implications for other common purpose leadership venues, implications for my common purpose
leadership, and gaps and opportunities in my research.
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Chapter II: Review of Literature
This review of literature opens with a high-level overview of common purpose. A
narrower examination of the links between common purpose and leadership follows. Next, the
role of surrounding conditions on common purpose and leadership along with related adjustment
is covered. A nuanced look at the common purpose of nuclear weapons reduction ensues.
Specific case examinations of nuclear weapons reduction leadership are furnished. In closing,
themes and gaps in the literature relating to nuclear weapons reduction are highlighted.
While my research focus is not on a common purpose dedicated to national interests or
corporate aims such as profit, learning exists in the culmination of these common purposes or
when their attempts go awry. My assertion would be that learning can come from varying
common purposes; be they of a lesser or higher nature.
Common Purpose
The notion of common purpose spans time, crosses cultural and geographic divides, and
applies to multiple settings. Connectivity serves as an antecedent to common purpose. There are
those who advocate the notion of an inherent connection and dependency between various
organic entities. Mebratu (1999) offered a meta-observation,
An in-depth look at the different religious teachings, medieval philosophies, and
traditional beliefs as the major repositories of human knowledge besides modern
science reveals that, aside from the variation in semantics, most of them contain a
strong component of living in harmony with nature and with one another.
(pp. 517-518)
Hawken (2007) thought the web of life connects us all. Wheatley (2002) added interdependency
to Hawken’s assertion: “Relationships are all there is. Everything in the universe only exists
because it is in relationship to everything else. Nothing exists in isolation. We have to stop
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pretending we are individuals who can go it alone” (p. 19). On a more narrow scale, Burke
(2008) echoed Wheatley: “Any human organization is best understood as an open system. An
organization is open because of its dependence on and continued interaction with the
environment in which it resides. Closed systems exist only in the world of nonliving matter”
(p. 49). Globally, Fry (2009) compared the Brazilian Upper Xingu River basin tribes, Aboriginal
Australians, and the European Union and came away with similar findings for each around the
promotion of interdependence, the implementation of common ties, and an aim of peaceful
coexistence.
Furthermore, these connections hold potential to foster mutual development. Follett
(1923) succinctly conveyed the collective growth that arose from coaction, “Individuals are
created by reciprocal interplay” (p. 19). This coming together holds the capacity to remedy
matters and holds the potential for actualization. Macy (2013) described our current state, “The
hyper-individualism of competitive industrialized culture has isolated people from each other,
breeding conformity, obedience, and an epidemic of loneliness” and immediately followed with
an alternative: “Team undertaking. It evolves out of countless spontaneous and synergistic
interactions as people discover their common goals and different gifts” (p. 8).
The concept of common purpose has been a constant throughout recorded history. The I
Ching, dating from 1,000 to 2,000 BC, simply stated, “GATHERING TOGETHER, Success”
(1987, p. 174). Following the wake of a savage World War, Follett (1923) said, “A genuine
community means the correlation of interests” (p. 354). After another World War punctuated by
concerted attempts at genocide, Frankl (1984) illustrated how in the bleakest of conditions, a
concentration camp, the inmates were energized and given a better chance at survival when they
had the collective aim of living for one another along with the accompanying realization that
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such a purpose was transcendental. Frankl further asserted that engagement in common purpose
was underutilized and that ill will subsided when embarking upon a common purpose. At the
dawn of our current millennium, Wheatley (2002) related that working across the spectrum of
society for a common purpose was a sublime experience and should be a standard.
The practice of common purpose generates positive energy and innovative thinking. “In
essence a sense of shared purpose and shared values creates a container within which individuals
self-organize and, through dialogue, find creative solutions” (Bujak, 2008, p. 65). “Great
organizations have a deep and noble sense of purpose—a significant purpose—that inspires
excitement and commitment” (Blanchard & Stoner, 2004, p. 24). Kurtzman (2010) stated
common purpose organizations tend to be more productive and harmonious. And common
purpose may be a relevant approach for today’s workplace:
We are inevitably drawn into an endless spiral of superficial quick fixes,
worsening difficulties in the long run, and an ever-deepening sense of
powerlessness. In organizations, articulating the primacy of the whole as a
guiding idea may be the first step in helping people break this vicious cycle.
(Senge, 1994, p. 25)
Duhigg (2012) gave such an example at Alcoa where an overriding focus on worker
safety (a counterintuitive move to shareholders) resulted in across the board performance
improvement to include financial return.
There is reciprocal growth, gestalt, and resultant force in common purpose. Burns, “By
pursuing transformational change, people can transform themselves” (2003, p. 25). Follett (1923)
wrote:
Out of the intermingling, interacting activities of men and women surge up the
forces of life: powers are born which we had not dreamed of, ideas take shape and
grow, forces are generated which act and react on each other. This is the dialectic
of life. But this upspringing of power from our hidden sources is not the latent
power of the mass but of the group. (p. 149)
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Covey (2004) maintained that synergy among a group’s members made the whole greater than
the sum of its collective parts. Kurtzman (2010) made a similar point, albeit in a different
manner: “Since it is about individuals aligning themselves together to achieve goals, common
purpose leadership is also about making up for each other’s weaknesses” (p. 160). Burns (2003)
reinforced the notion of strength in a group focus: Collective efficacy drives participation;
participation drives efficacy.
Finally, there appears to be a systems component to common purpose. Senge (1994)
suggested, “A system is a perceived whole whose elements hang together because they
continually affect each other over time and operate towards a common purpose” (p. 90). When
the system is unbalanced, common purpose deteriorates. Kim (2010) elaborated that system
fragmentation (parts of the whole not working or working in disharmony) was more impactful
than ever and when parts of a system viewed themselves a separate from the whole, they acted in
a manner detrimental to the whole. Kim went further and provided a partial antidote for system
dysfunction—a leader, who thinks and acts in terms of what is best for the whole, can ensure that
their part supports the whole.
Systems’ thinking plays a role in common purpose and nuclear weapons. Lurking among
the worse-case systems’ scenarios is the specter of terrorists detonating an atomic weapon. Think
of the aftermath of September 11, two wars and thousands of deaths resulted—the cost to life is
still ongoing. Now consider the retaliation upon the hosting country and/or the supplier country
of a terrorist detonated atomic weapon. The costs of the initial attack, while catastrophic alone,
might be infinitely dwarfed by the nuclear reign of terror launched by the US, France, Great
Britain, India, China, Russia, Pakistan, or Israel.
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Concerning my research inquiry, the aforesaid themes—connectivity, utility, gestalt, and
systems—may be validated or augmented by the examination of the NWR common purpose.
Contrastingly, the absence or underutilization of such themes may demonstrate opportunity in
relation to nuclear weapons.
Common Purpose and Leadership
A relationship seemingly exists between common purpose and leadership. “There must
be a human leader to serve as the center of the group . . . only collective moral force can unite the
world. Such great times of unification will leave great achievements behind them” (The I Ching,
1987, p. 175). The literature intimates that common purpose and leadership may impel one
another. “Leadership involves influencing a group of individuals who have a common
purpose . . . by common, we mean that leaders and followers have mutual purpose” (Northouse,
2007, p. 3). As Senge (2002) termed it, “Leadership is the capacity of a human community to
shape its future” (p. 358). Common purpose attracts and gathers strength through that attraction:
Effective and committed leadership not only creates momentum in favor of a
movement, but also sets forth a greater possibility of its success, to which
followers will respond by jumping on the bandwagon. This, of course, increases
the possibility for ultimate success (meaning the achievement of the common
purpose). (Cho, 2002, p. 221)
The common purpose leadership relationship is apparent around our globe. Bary (2004)
provided an Eastern interpretation of leadership: To do what was right on behalf of common
humanity or in advancing the common good. Northouse (2007) proposed common attributes of
strong and poor leadership from across the world: “Clearly, people from most cultures view good
leadership as based on integrity, charisma, and interpersonal ability. Conversely, they see bad
leadership emerging from leaders who are self-focused, dictatorial, and asocial” (p. 324).
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Common purpose can provide a moral guidepost for leadership. Heifetz (1994) attributed,
in large part, the attraction and common purpose achievements of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin
Luther King to the moral authority they exercised. Kurtzman (2010) related that there is a danger
in blindly following a leader just for the leader’s sake; common purpose mitigates this danger.
Still, common purpose’s torch, while very bright, can sometimes illuminate an ill-fated path such
as fascism . . . or it may be that the leader is choosing to redirect or play tricks with the light of
common purpose. Towards that end, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) determined the end pursued
helps to determine the ethical level of associated leadership. Blanchard and Stoner (2004) further
described what occurred in the absence of common purpose at an organizational level—
leadership did not matter because people had no direction and leaders without greater purpose
saw those around them as a means for accomplishment of the leader’s individual purposes. Burns
(1978) described (and then prescribed as solution for) the common purpose leadership dilemma:
“Original purpose may become blurred…purpose and power are comingled . . . motive is, or
should be, central” (p. 438).
Common purpose plays a recurring role within various leadership theories.
Transformational leadership writings often mention the import of common purpose (Burns,
1978). Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership makes use of common purpose, albeit
in different ways according to Bedell-Avers, Hunter, Angie, Eubanks, and Mumford (2009).
Servant leadership focuses on the best interests of each individual which, by extension, fosters
common purpose (Greenleaf, 2002). Invisible leadership makes common purpose the central
point of its approach (Hickman & Sorenson, 2014).
A transformational approach can aid in overcoming challenge and enable embarkation
upon courses involving successful outcomes. Burns (1978), the progenitor of transformational
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leadership, declared, “Leaders and followers are engaged in a common enterprise; they are
dependent on each other, their fortunes rise and fall together, they share the results of planned
change together” (p. 426). Transformational leaders clearly communicate purpose and mission
while forging a strong identity with followers (Bass, 1990). “Transformational leaders work by
inspiring the higher motivations of followers” (Sinclair, 2007, p. 23). And, “A resonant frame
can liberate a person from the isolation of frustrated, unacknowledged wants into the realm of
new and shared meanings . . . a mobilizing and empowering faith in the collaborative struggle for
all change” (Burns, 2003, p.169). Burns provided the common purpose of Indian independence
as an instance of transformational effectiveness amidst common purpose: Mohandas Gandhi had
the task of uniting many millions of people, separated by caste, religion, and geography into a
force that could meet and mitigate the might of the British Empire; a task that, in terms of
primary aim, reached culmination.
There are also limitations to the employment of common purpose in a transformational
approach. Yukl (2006) made mention of the dark side of the transformational leader and that
their ability to attract others to causes was partially offset by tendency to alienate others and
create strong oppositional elements. Although he advocated for higher values and the common
good, Burns (1978) conceded that transformational leadership might be best suited for achieving
common purpose in organizational settings due to an emphasis on entity outcomes. An
appreciative glance at the course of Martin Luther King portrays a transformational leader who
championed a transparent and relatively unchanged common purpose, employed personal
charisma as an advocate of nonviolent protest, and fostered and enhanced the leadership of
others in the Civil Rights movement (Gardner, 1995). Even so, King’s success contains a
cautionary note as to the subsuming power of a transformational leader or as Gardner stated,
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“His message inhered primarily in his own person rather than in an enduring organization”
(p. 220).
Former US Secretary of State now turned nuclear weapons opponent Henry Kissinger
(1966) described three types of leadership: “(a) The bureaucratic-pragmatic type, (b) the
ideological type, and (c) the revolutionary-charismatic type” (p. 514). Over 40 years later
Mumford, along with others, proposed three types of leadership: Charismatic, ideological, and
pragmatic (Mumford, Antes, Caughron, & Friedrich, 2008). Each typology handled common
purpose differently. Examining the early years of the American civil rights struggle,
Bedell-Avers et al. (2009) provided examples of all three leadership approaches to bring about
racial equality for African Americans—Frederick Douglass (charismatic style), W.E.B. DuBois
(ideological), and Booker T. Washington (pragmatic). Douglass, through powerful oratory
articulated, in multiple venues, his view of a better future for African Americans. Furthermore,
Douglass tied the vision of racial equality to the betterment of America as a whole . . . most
evidenced by his successful efforts at getting former slaves to fight in Union armies during the
American Civil War. DuBois utilized activism and an ideology based in part upon African
Heritage (an infusion of pride based on the past and desire to bring about former glory) to bring
about a society where African Americans had a strong identity and equal rights. Washington
encouraged African Americans to focus on vocational education and hard work with a goal of
prosperity while at the same time appealing to white Americans to provide educational and
vocational opportunities for African Americans. Over time, Washington believed that his
approach would bring African Americans to a level where they would be viewed more equally
(Bedell-Avers et al., 2009). All three leaders desired and worked towards the common purpose
of racial equality, but each employed a different tack. On their own, a charismatic, ideological, or
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pragmatic type may not be able to appeal to sufficient followers to achieve an end; it may take a
combination of two or more types to effect real change (Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001).
Greenleaf (2002), an early and long-term proponent of servant leadership, wrote, “A team
builder is a strong person who provides the substance that holds the team together in a common
purpose towards the right objectives” (p. 80). As an example of servant leadership’s impact on
common purpose, Greenleaf (2002) provided an account of John Woolman, a Quaker preacher
and early abolitionist: Through gentle, persistent, and widespread persuasion over the course of
many years, Woolman convinced other Quakers that slavery was inconsistent with the Quaker
philosophy; the end result was abolition for those enslaved by Quakers.
Rather than concentrating on overarching missions, servant leadership seeks to meet the
best interests of those involved in the common purpose. Keith (2008) made this point when he
emphasized that a servant-leader be servant first: “The difference manifests itself in the care
taken by the servant-first to make sure that other people’s highest priority needs are being
served” (p. 9). Spears (1998) agreed as well when he wrote, “Servant-leaders believe that people
have an intrinsic value beyond their tangible contributions as workers. As such, the
servant-leader is deeply committed to the growth of each and every individual in their
institution” (p. 7). A servant leader places the needs of the individual foremost and can use the
leadership approach that best serves each individual. “A servant leader can adapt most leadership
styles and remain faithful to the principles and practices of servant leadership (Prosser, 2009,
p. 23). The focus on individual needs through alternate styles has efficacy per Van Dierendonck
(2010) who stated that servant leadership made effective teams, optimized organizational
performance, and facilitated the meeting of causes. Servant leadership has an incompatibility
with institutions (involved in some form of collective purpose) where stratified models of
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leadership are employed. Greenleaf (2002) espoused that these flawed organizations where
leadership came from the few or the one were “abnormal and corrupting” (p. 76).
Servant leadership displays some limitations in common purpose and other applications;
especially as it relates to inclusiveness. Van Dierendonck (2010) provided that servant leadership
can be too idealistic and prescriptive. Furthermore, he suggested that the term servant may prove
off-putting to some leaders or that servant leadership could foster the manipulation of leaders by
others. Eicher-Catt (2005) intimated that servant leadership perpetuated a hierarchical style of
leadership and those organizations espousing a servant leadership philosophy with an
accompanying gender-neutral stance did not reflect gender equity at senior leadership positions.
Invisible leadership, originally inspired by Mary Parker Follett, furnished the notion that
common purpose was a force that inspired leadership and collective action—“The purpose is the
leader and motivating force for all aspects of the enterprise” (Hickman & Sorenson, 2014, p. 6).
The purpose assumed a paramount and ongoing guiding presence while individual leaders
exerted prominence only when necessary. Sorenson and Hickman (2002) suggested that invisible
leaders engaged in unified action with others; a consolidation achieved by the attraction of the
common purpose. The invisible component came from a worthy purpose (unseen) and those who
aided in the accomplishment of the purpose had no overriding concern to be seen. Leaders
exercised charisma when necessary, yet it quickly faded when not required. Shared power was
the preferred method (Sorenson & Hickman, 2002).
Common purpose, within the invisible leadership construct, has an ability to empower
and bring about extraordinary change. Common purpose is a life calling that attracts and retains
participants, promotes self-agency and selflessness, and leads to best effort (Hickman &
Sorenson, 2014). Sorenson and Hickman (2002) used the invisible leadership example of Wilma
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Mankiller, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, and the Cherokee people whose collective
leadership and action enhanced economic wellbeing, reduced the high school dropout rate, and
increased overall self-sufficiency.
Regarding invisible leadership, there are potential limitations. First, there are the external
forces of those outside the invisible leadership entity. “There are groups who consciously oppose
or compete with another group’s common purpose” (Hickman & Sorenson, 2014, p. 35). Second,
there are inherent risks for an organization that practices invisible leadership. It may be difficult,
especially in a Western society, for individuals to forego credit for accomplishments and at the
same time, groups that are already marginalized may be politicized for gain or rendered more
invisible (Sorenson & Hickman, 2002).
Factors Influencing Common Purpose and Leadership
Factors that influence and sometimes challenge common purposes and leaders are
variable, yet can be grouped into two broad categories. The first set is social in nature and are
found at the societal, organizational, and group levels. The second grouping, technology and
communications, show growing import.
Social factors. Some plausible points have been made on how surrounding context
colors common purpose and leadership. A. George (1969) proposed that leaders and their end
purposes were shaped by religion, political systems, or manifesto. One example is illustrated in a
democratic system. N. E. Long (1949) made the case that the only time democratic government
was integrated in purpose were times of large-scale war or depression; this separation arose from
bureaucratic entities and their subsets placing their own welfare and survival over a common
national interest. Another example comes in a totalitarian system. Solzhenitsyn (1990) described
the Soviet system, “Our entire outlook, in terms of both material objects and emotional actions
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and reactions, was previously designed” (p. 627). As the external world became apparent to
Solzhenitsyn, he and others realized that it was not what they were led to believe and the
capacity for doing became much more manifest (Solzhenitsyn, 1990). Not only do leaders use
national ideologies to secure their own countries, they export their thinking to secure other
countries as well (Bugelski, 1989). Evidence of Bugelski’s assertion can be found in Napoleonic
Europe, British, French, Dutch, and German colonialism, the Third Reich, Japan’s Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and US policies in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Hofstede (2006) drew a distinction between societal
and organizational culture.
Organizational and group dynamics act as a determinant on purpose and leadership. A
study of the Israeli Army showed that purpose was differentiated by the level at which
individuals stood within the organization: Enlisted personnel were most motivated by the welfare
of their immediate team while officers were more focused on the overall mission (Shamir,
Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998). The generalizations that flowed from this study were twofold.
First, within organizations and societies, subsets of individuals, while ostensibly having much in
common, have various overriding priorities. Second, leaders must consider the levels and
varieties of purpose, potential conflicts, and how to craft messages that speak to different needs
yet are able to motivate all to completion of enterprise wide endeavors (Shamir et al., 1998).
Lewin (2006) maintained that autocratic led groupings tended to fall apart over time while
democratic groupings sustained momentum over longer periods, a suggested reason was that an
autocratic leader determined purpose and goals while a democratic approach involved joint
determinism which, in turn, generated pervasive and deep engagement. Furthermore, democratic
ensembles were allowed to creatively and independently problem-solve; skills that provided

35
value thereafter. Finally, laissez-faire entities were poorly performing because the purpose was
poorly and loosely defined (Lewin, 2006).
Group composition and size impacted the likelihood of purpose attainment. Lewin (2006)
stated that the membership of a collective endeavor may splinter if made up of different
economic and social strata. Bujak (2008) discussed how education and background prevented
those with high expertise from viewing processes and outcomes from the same vantages as those
with lesser expertise. Bugelski (1989) emphasized that common purpose can be significantly
different given the types of participants at any given time. Hawken (2007) said that small groups
are more efficient than corporations . . . small groups achieve because they have to and bring
about great change even when opposed by large entrenched institutions. McRaven (1996) made a
similar point—small groups, if supremely focused, were more adept at carrying through and
meeting their purpose, largely because they were not subject to the complexities, confusion, and
frictions of larger groups. However, it is not just the interactions of humanity that that must be
considered, but the inventions and innovations of humanity as well.
Technology and communication factors. Our ever-expanding ocean of technology
informs common purpose and leadership. Vail (1996) talked of leaders being “confronted
constantly with new methods and technologies . . . burgeoning social problems” and systems
complexities (efforts taken to combat or offset problems beget new challenges). Greenstein
(2000) conveyed that revolutions in technology and changes in world circumstances made
necessary a new kind of leadership. Technology, as will be further described in an upcoming
section, has become increasingly impactful for NWR.
The transparent, innovative, and continuous nature of communications accelerates the
desire for societal revolution and accompanying changes in leadership. Clinton (2011) “Because
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given social media, given the pervasion now of communications technologies everywhere, no
leader is any longer able to ignore his people” (p. 33). A study by Al-Jenaibi (2011) reinforced
Clinton’s declaration; speaking of social media’s role in the Middle East and beyond, “Residents
were also well aware of its potential as a platform for making business and government practices
more transparent, and its usefulness as a mobilizing platform for political change” (p. 94). Events
of two years ago in the Mediterranean, European Union, and America provided tangible context:
In the Middle East and North Africa, in Spain and Greece and New York, social
media and smart phones did not replace face-to-face social bonds and
confrontation but helped enable and turbocharge them, allowing protestors to
mobilize more nimbly and communicate with one another and the wider world
more effectively than ever before. And in police states with high Internet
penetration—Ben Ali’s Tunisia, Mubarak’s Egypt, Bashar Assad’s Syria—a
critical mass of cell-phone video recorders plus YouTube plus Facebook plus
Twitter really did become an indigenous free press. (Anderson, 2011, p. 82)
Given the aforementioned passages and the social protests of the last few years, the advent of
cellular communication and social media provides an impetus to common purpose and a medium
for leadership (formal or informal). Communications are one facet of the ever increasing trend of
globalization. “People are becoming more interconnected. There is more international trade,
cultural exchange, and use of worldwide telecommunications systems” (Northouse, 2007,
p. 301).
However, there still exists the issue, probably greater with faster and more pervasive
mediums, of what communication to attend to and also what communication may be biased or
misused.
In a world where a good number of us think being connected means having our
cell phones, Blackberries, and iPhones charged, it is likely that we forget about
and become disconnected from our immediate environment beyond the
technology at our fingertips. (Wildcat, 2009, p. 61)
Over twenty years ago, Senge (1994) made the point,
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While increased access to information may be a step in the direction of learning,
more information is not always better. It can overwhelm and paralyze decision
making; it can direct attention to highly visible but highly misleading facts; and it
can place greater control in the hands of information systems designers. (p. 530)
During the intervening time since Senge’s statement, communicated information, in
terms of technology and access, has, if anything intensified.
Adaptation (and Lack Thereof) of Common Purpose and Leadership
We cannot always anticipate specific changes in our world, but we can expect change;
despite technological innovation and evolving lifestyles, there are aspects of human nature that
remain somewhat constant (Bugelski, 1989). It is the human natures of opportunism (collective
and individual), stagnancy, growth, and actualization (collective and individual) that are touched
by, and in turn, touch purpose. Reflecting the mutually reciprocating nature between leaders and
purpose, Burns (1978) stated, “They both exploit purpose and are guided by it” (p. 432). Durant
and Durant (1968) advanced the idea of interplay between purpose and leaders: “A Pasteur, an
Edison, a Morse, a Ford, a Wright, a Marx, a Lenin, a Mao Tse-tung are effects of numberless
causes, and causes of endless effects” (p. 35).
There are instances of purpose corrupted by blighted leadership bent on the acquisition or
maintenance of power. Dostoyevsky’s (1990) story The Grand Inquisitor (a chapter from The
Brothers Karamazov) shared, through parable, how the original truth of Christianity was
co-opted by a select few who then redefined and masked the original purpose of Christ’s
message of universal love so completely that even the physical reemergence of Jesus was
suppressed . . . all so the overwhelming power of the church would be sustained. Fulop-Miller
(1935) paralleled Dostoyevsky’s observation, “The Catholic Church…exhibited no less mastery
in confining hopes of the second coming of the redeemer within the limits of the hierarchical
system” (pp. 71-72). Fulop-Miller noted early on (when some outside Germany were still
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singing praises of Adolf Hitler) what came to possibly be the ultimate perversion of the common
purpose leadership affiliation—National Socialism—where people were gradated according to
racial composition and the leader and his cadre were placed in an exulted status and kept there in
the interest of the state. The French Revolution, born as a response to an alternately oppressive
and then apathetic monarchy-church partnership degenerated into a reign of terror that consumed
the movement’s own leaders (Fulop-Miller, 1935). What begins as national blight expands
outward: “The expanding needs of rulers or leaders led them to look as their neighbors as needs
satisfiers” (Bugelski, 1989, p. 78). Hickman and Sorenson (2014) described unethical common
purpose:
The organizing group’s intent is to deny rights and privileges to target groups, or
to claim perceived entitlements or superiority that result in banning, excluding,
restricting, or persecuting other groups. Examples of this prototype are extremists,
terrorist groups, supremacist groups, and repressive regimes. (p. 3)
There can be a very dark undercurrent to a misdirected common purpose. Hoffer (1951)
wrote that, “HATRED IS THE MOST accessible and unifying of all unifying agents”
(p. 85).
Sometimes individual desire hijacks or enervates common purpose. Leaders are seen as
representative of a group’s interests and when leaders are bent on promoting self-interests, those
around the leader falter or are alienated (Studer, 2003). “Much of the evil of our political and
social life comes from the fact that we crave personal recognition and personal satisfaction; as
soon as our greatest satisfaction is group satisfaction, our many present problems disappear”
(Follet, 1923, p. 31). The distractions of us vs. them mentalities (internal as well as external) and
star employees who put personal gain, be it power or monetary, over organizational common
purpose are impediments to achievement (Kurtzman, 2010).
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Inflexibility of leadership or common purpose holds the potential to bring unintended
consequences. Yukl (2006) suggested that when purpose becomes unalterable and/or a leader
assumes invincibility in their ideas and course, opposition solidifies and the potentiality of
disaster heightens. Heifetz and Lansky (2002) described leaders who get so caught up in the
cause that they get taken unawares. Leaders become over reliant on the quality, personal
judgment, that brought them into power and they tend to fall back on that judgment when under
extreme pressure (Jervis, 2010). Keller (2009) offered a further take on leader intransigence:
Rigidity can be internal, a result of a leader’s self-talk, or external, communication from those
around the leader or public opinion. Because of changes in circumstances, leaders must be able
to pivot and get others to alter direction as well (Senge et al., 2000).
When purpose and leadership are pure, aligned, and organic, transformation ensues.
“Mutual purposes have an impact on the changes that leaders and followers intended. The
intention changes when the mutual purposes grow and develop. The changes that are intended
themselves change when the mutual purposes themselves grow and develop” (Rost, 1993,
p. 122). “With the union the purpose comes into being, and with its every step forward, the
purpose changes” (Follet, 1923, p. 58). Adaptation of and even an end to the pursuit of common
purpose can come into play:
What distinguished Gandhi from other protestors in other parts of the world was
his gradual evolution of an innovative philosophy and an original set of methods.
Most important, Gandhi abjured violent confrontation and began to develop a new
form of protest. (Gardner, 1995, pp. 272-273)
“Such rare leaders as Lincoln and Gandhi not only try to curb the evil inherent in a mass
movement but are willing to put an end to the movement when its objective is more or less
realized” (Hoffer, 1951, p. 145).
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Enhancing Common Purpose and Leadership
Per the examined literature, there are several components that foster development (of
both common purpose and leadership) and the culmination of collective aims. These themes fall
under the concepts of assessment, shared understanding, encompassing leadership, adaptation of
purpose, adaptation of leadership, the ascension of purpose and leadership.
Assessment. Gauging the related landscape initially and continuously appears to
facilitate common purpose. Prior to embarking upon the campaign for self-rule, Gandhi spent a
year analyzing India’s political and social problems (Burns, 2003). Kouzes and Posner (2007)
said in order to develop common purpose leaders should listen to find “the common thread”
(pp. 118-119). Studer (2003) recommended the use of measurements and shared stories to stay
on purpose and bring others into the fold. Part of the assessment process involves looking
inwardly and outwardly. “Self-awareness is necessary for effective change leadership” (Burke,
2008, p. 286). A leader who is immersed cannot see and might not be able to adapt as opposed to
a leader on the balcony (removed from the fray) who can see and can adapt (Heifetz, 1994).
Associated with assessment is the idea of patience. “There is a period of waiting in the wings—
often a very long time—for all the great leaders whose entrance on the scene seems to us a most
crucial point in the course of a mass movement” (Hoffer, 1951, p. 104).
It is not enough to take the temperature of surroundings; one must also consider the
context(s) and means of assessment. “It is now well accepted that an understanding of leadership
requires careful attention to the contextual aspects of the process” (Wren & Swatez, 1995,
p. 245). Asking a set of questions at the outset around environmental factors—who is invested,
what are their interests, what is the historical background, what is the influence of prevailing
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values and culture, and how can the aforementioned be utilized—to all concerned (including
those in opposition) can preclude issues and facilitate mutual aims (Wren & Swatez, 1995). So as
not to be biased, the methodology of assessment must be effective enough to capture all relevant
data, be it good or bad news (Senge, 1994). Such an assessment, especially in long-term
enterprises, could identify who was engaged, who was excluded, and the resulting ramifications.
For instance, Fletcher (2004) pointed out that gender or power linked aspects influenced
participant behavior and leadership theory. As prevailing conditions evolve and efforts flag, the
need for new allies and fresh thinking comes into consideration. Fitzgerald and Kirby (1997)
argued that for leaders to be more effective, they must broaden the ways they see, think, and
operate. Shifting those perspectives comes by way of self-recognition of strengths and
weaknesses, acknowledging the value of others, seeking alternate views (outside the usual circle
of intimates), trusting various preferences, and integrating differing perspectives into day to day
work, decision making, and planning (Fitzgerald & Kirby, 1997).These considerations around
assessment hold implications for the ongoing relevance and inclusiveness of common purpose.
Shared understanding. A common awareness serves as a buttress for common purpose.
Denning (2007) suggested that leaders use indirect narrative in a way that listeners can relate to
the subject and also be transported into an ideal setting where purpose has been satisfied.
Another solution was to align the goals of the skeptic with the purpose of the organization in
such a way that the outsider can see where their support of the institution “serves her
self-interest, then synergy and magic can happen” (Bujak, 2008, p.4). Northouse (2007, p. 88),
“Mother Theresa linked her vision of serving the poor and disenfranchised to followers’ beliefs
of personal commitment and self-sacrifice”—a clear example of leader establishing the purpose
and tapping into the broad desires of others to meet the specific purpose. Another requirement
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may be that leadership stays engaged throughout and enables participants to stay committed to
the purpose. McRaven (1996) made three points on how to get others to adopt and retain the
purpose: (1) Draw upon shared experience to shore up or comprise a common purpose;
(2) Clearly define the purpose and ensure mutual understanding of that purpose; and (3) Ensure
commitment to the purpose. Vaill (1996) provided a prescription for getting and keeping
everybody onboard during turbulent times, “Stay with a clear mission and purpose,
despite . . . daily crises and disasters, and to articulate this clarity to all involved” (pp. 187-188).
Attracting and retaining others for common purposes requires reinforcement; reinforcement that
involves familiar rewards, changes personal situations, and even negative avoidance (Bugelski,
1989). This is where the reintroduction or modification of story is made necessary.
Stories speak to both parts of the human mind—its reason and emotion. And I
suggest, further, that it is stories of identity—narratives that help individuals think
about and feel who they are, where they come from, and where they are headed—
that constitute the single most powerful weapon in the leader’s literary arsenal
(Gardner, 1995, p. 43)
Diverse motivations induce and retain individuals to the causes at hand; depending upon that
audience, story must range from simple to sophisticated (Gardner, 1995). Because of the power
to awaken and coalesce, story is germane to the undertakings of our age. “In these challenging
times, we need stories that engage, enchant, inspire, and, most of all, stories of practical changes;
stories of community action; stories of changing hearts and minds. Real stories” (Reason &
Newman, 2013, p. 10).
All lead, all need lead. For purpose to truly be common, it has been suggested that
leadership can come from (and may be required) from a variety of sources. “Mutual purposes
become common purposes because followers and leaders engage in leadership together. Mutual
purposes are common purposes held by a community of believers” (Rost, 1993, p. 123).
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Kurtzman (2010) recommended a break from the past when it comes to leadership and common
purpose:
In my view, we no longer need managers in the traditional sense—those who
organize and execute on behalf of leaders. What we need instead are leaders who
can create a sense of common purpose so everyone executes and everyone leads.
(p. 193)
The concept of a singular or all-knowing leader potentially emplaces a drag upon
common purpose attainment. Again and again, the literature provides examples of what can be
achieved by an aggregate approach instead of an undiffused leadership style. Utilization of a
common purpose pathway facilitates a collaborative rather than a controlling leadership style,
one that benefits from collective capacity as opposed to individual effort (Hickman & Sorenson,
2014). Too often leaders hold the misconception that they are solely responsible for the rise and
fall of an entity’s fortunes—recognizing that fallacy reduces the leader’s internal burdens and
asking others for help optimizes group performance (B. George, 2009). It may not be enough for
hierarchical leaders to relinquish control, empowerment of others is critical as well. Follett
(1923) advised, “We do not get the whole power of the group unless every individual is given
full value, is giving full value” (p. 342). Duhigg (2012) said Martin Luther King and many other
movement leaders achieved success by transitioning common purpose from their individual
control to that of their followers. Heifetz (1994) and Hickman and Sorenson (2014) offered the
specific concept of informal leadership as an alternative to formal leadership. However, there is
the accompanying recognition that positional and non-positional leaders have differing
approaches. One study showed that different leader types can work against one another and it
was critical to recognize that formal leaders interact differently with one another than they do
with those who are not in formal leadership positions (Bedell-Avers et al., 2009).
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Given the intricate and systemic nature of our modern challenges, the furnishing of
leadership from many sources may offer the most rational and efficacious choice. And it may be
that in order for new leadership to emerge and thrive, existing leadership will have to assume
non-traditional thinking and parts. There seems to be great value in informal or non-positional
leadership—“It generates the desire and willingness to assume leader or follower roles in pursuit
of the purpose and inspires willingness or courage to take action” (Sorenson & Hickman, 2002,
p. 8). For a purpose to be of a common and successful nature (especially around nuclear
weapons), it may be that since many are affected, many may need to lead.
How then to facilitate leadership from the many as opposed to the few? At the outset,
efforts can be made to widen the scope of involvement. Sinclair (2007) argued, “An important
part of leadership is inclusiveness” (p. 179). Besides inclusion, investment in the growth of those
tasked to lead is warranted. Fletcher (1999) made the point that it was not enough to provide
authority for others to make decisions or effect change; the provision of ongoing development
needed to accompany the granting of authority. Further, Fletcher (2004) suggested that
individuals, as leaders adopt a vantage of interdependency instead of independency and in order
to do so, systems or practices devoted to individual achievement should be deemphasized.
Finally, Hofstede (2006) offered that to study leadership only from the eyes of those in
leadership positions was a flawed premise.
Adaptation of purpose. The literature shows that leadership may have to do more than
maintain a static purpose. Ireland and Hitt (2005) advised leaders to “revisit purpose regularly to
verify its authenticity” and be cognizant of future conditions and challenges or accomplishment
of said purpose is at risk of defeat (p. 68). Heifetz (1994) provided a similar sentiment: “Over
time, specific purposes may no longer capture current reality or account for the ways values have
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evolved” (p. 274). Heifetz (1994) further maintained that it was not enough to define the
existing reality, it was also necessary to clarify values and work through accompanying conflict:
“People with competing values engage one another as they confront a shared situation from their
own points of view” (pp. 31-32). Values clarification and associated conflict, “in the absence of
better methods of social change,” can, at worst case, contain elements of violence, but the failure
to accurately and deeply confront the reality/values relationship has the capacity to undermine
the very existence of societies (p. 32). Failure to adapt purpose can be found in organizations and
societies. Due to an inability to fully embrace digital technology (even when said technology was
grasped firmly in its corporate hands), Kodak, the world’s preeminent force in photography and
medical imaging, was able to snatch financial defeat from the jaws of victory (Hiltzik, 2011a).
Similarly, Xerox provided computer technology to the founders of Apple and missed out on the
PC revolution (Hiltzik, 2011b). Fascist Germany and Soviet Russia held on to their ideologies
and expansionist aims up right until their respective downfalls (Axelrod, 2009).
Rather than adaptation of purpose, a more nuanced approach around story might be
necessary. Or as Fletcher (2004) opined, “The result may be a simple reconstitution of the old
model with the new language” (p. 658). Gardner (1995) said that audiences have competing
stories from a multitude of sources and it is incumbent upon leaders to “transplant, suppress,
compliment, or in some measure outweigh the earlier stories, as well as contemporary
oppositional counterstories” (p. 14). Above all, the story must be apropos to the moment at hand,
the participants past, and the future orientation (Gardner, 1995).
Adaptation of leadership. Not only does purpose need to be malleable, so does
leadership. Bennis and Thomas (2007) offered the concept of a leadership crucible whereby
leaders, through triumph and tragedy, become more adept and develop fortitude for greater trials.
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Burns (2003) stated that events changed leaders and held Presidents Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt,
and Reagan out as examples. B. George (2009) posited that early recognition of crisis brings an
opportunity for leadership and organizational transformation. Bennis and Thomas (2007)
asserted that adaptive capacity, the ability to learn from adversity and undergo successive
transformation, was a prime component of sustained leadership performance.
How do leaders foster development for self and others? B. George (2011) emphasized the
role of instructive practice and open exchange in leader evolution, “The missing link in
leadership development is having a safe place where people can share their experiences, their
challenges, and their frustrations, and get honest feedback.” Increased mental capacity and
flexibility is required—we no longer require minds of conformity but those that can transform
(Kegan & Lahey, 2009). Kegan and Lahey went further: It is not enough that a leader grows or
that the organization achieves, it is also necessary for a leader and organizational to provide
developmental opportunities for all.
Higher purpose, higher leadership. Northouse (2007) proposed that high character and
high purpose informed and drove one another. Moral leadership leads to higher purpose where
all can be leaders and struggle forms leaders (Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Sinclair (2007) provided
a snapshot of a bygone common purpose leadership, “Purposes such as growth, efficiency, global
expansion and dominance are assumed, not questioned, as goals of leadership” (p. 30). Instead,
she offered an opening gambit for modern day common purpose leadership: “Purposes are
questioned, asking who or what leadership is for” (p. 30). It is not just the end, but the means that
can be undertaken on an ascending road. Vaill (1996) provided a model for higher leadership in
an age of turmoil: Maintain inclusiveness where all were in touch with one another, where all felt
necessary, and all felt “the leader’s deep conviction of the importance of staying together and of
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supporting each other” where “the leader expressed love for the members of the system and
helped them to love each other” (p.188). And Bary (2004) reinforced the notion of encompassing
leadership amidst higher purpose, “The burden of humane service may be taken up by anyone; to
this extent it may be seen as a universal value” (p. 5). The upcoming literature makes several
cases where the higher purpose of NWR yielded higher leadership from formal and informal
leaders.
Social Movements
Before delving into the common purposes of a global movement like nuclear weapons
reduction, it is instructive to dive back into the literature and consider social movements. Social
movements furnish supplementary motivations and lessons in the attainment of common purpose
while emphasizing the importance of non-positional leadership in collective action.
Prior to the 1960s, social movements were largely perceived as negative, but thereafter
they assumed an increasingly positive connotation (Hickman, 2010). Individuals seem
increasingly drawn to social movements, because existing structures are insufficient in meeting
involved or changing needs. For example, both Hickman and Couto (2002) provided a number of
examples of social change efforts dedicated to increasing the scope and depth of healthcare
provision where existing structures fell short. In addition to the underperformance of, the other
condition for social movement emergence appears to be perception of threat. Yukl (2006) said of
social contagion, individuals influencing one another towards a cause, “Activation is most likely
to occur in a social crisis where the self-esteem or survival of people are threatened” (p. 256).
Burns (2003) made the point that established systems may underperform because of a
lack of recognition that systems are made up of human beings and those humans are “susceptible
to the ultimate agency of human leadership” (p. 216). That agency of human leadership figures
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predominantly in social movements. Such social movement leadership can emerge from any
quarter—
The notion that appearances by Great Men (or Great Women) are necessary
preconditions for the emergence of major movements for social changes reflects
not only a poor understanding of history, but also a pessimistic view of the
possibilities for future social change. (Carson, 1987, p. 454)
And Hickman (2010) echoed that notion of transformation fostered by those who lead
informally, “Initiatives for social change usually begin with nonconstituted leadership, a broad
category of leadership that functions without the formal authority of constituted leadership”
(p. 203). Yukl (2006) punctuated the concept of social change leadership, saying that in a social
movement it did not matter who was the leader as long as they were exceptional and had the
ability to attract others to the cause.
Social movements not only reinforce and augment the earlier covered content on informal
leadership, but also provide utilizable elements for those non-positional leaders. Hickman (2010,
p. 209) offered the use of newer technology such as the internet, social networking as a means to
identify and attract participants, the development of relationships, and thoughtful actions. Such
innovative use of technology figured predominantly in the Occupy and Arab Spring movements
(Anderson, 2011).
Each of the elements mentioned above in social movements—inadequacy of formal
structures, significant threat, informal leadership, and innovation—play predominant roles in
NWR. Utilizing those criteria, the common purpose research focus in this study might be viewed
as a social movement.
The Common Purpose of Nuclear Weapons Reduction
Subject to unceasing and telling change, fostered by technological, social, and political
upheaval, the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons may offer cogent lessons in the meaningful
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adaptation of common purpose and leadership. Since the first nuclear detonation by the US in
1945 and then the Soviet Union’s initial detonation in 1949, the nuclear club has continued to
expand (Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC], n.d.): The United Kingdom in 1953,
France and China in 1964, followed by India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa (South Africa’s
arsenal has since been dismantled). The threat has enlarged from massive superpower arsenals to
now include the possibility of atomic weapon acquisition by rogue nations and terrorists.
The potential damages from nuclear conflict are globally pervasive. A 2002 National
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) archive shows upwards of 20,000 nuclear weapons
globally; down from a high of over 65,000 nuclear weapons in 1986 (NRDC, n.d.). However,
20,000 atomic weapons are more than sufficient to make our planet uninhabitable
(Schneidmiller, 2011). Schneidmiller further described how as few as 100 15-kiloton detonations
(individually less than the Nagasaki device) could severely deplete our ozone layer, result in
nuclear winter (a debris-filled atmosphere that prevents heat from reaching our planet), and
initiate global famine…all in addition to death and damage from blast and radiation. Pakistan, an
atomic power that elicits great concern, has material for up to 100 nuclear devices (Nuclear
Threat Initiative [NTI], 2012).
Yet, there are illustrative cases that generated hope. A few countries were lured by the
seeming power of nuclear weapons programs or actual devices, and then pushed away from the
table . . . never to return. Australia, caught up in the scare of the communist threat, thoroughly
embraced the post-World War II views of the US and Britain and even hosted British nuclear
testing. However, the Vietnam War, rapprochement with China, and a right to left shift in
political party supremacy all led Australia to remove nuclear weapons and become a leading
proponent of nonproliferation. Australians ultimately felt more secure without the bomb
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(Hyman, 2000). South Korea and Taiwan, countries that by the 1970s concluded that the US
could not or would not continue to guarantee their security, both covertly embarked upon nuclear
weapon development efforts. A renewed US security commitment and a transition to a more
democratic society coupled with a desire to maintain strong external economic ties led to a
termination of South Korea’s atomic arms program. Taiwan’s rollback in nuclear ambitions
came about from world pressure and like South Korea, a wish to retain ties to the global
economy. Ongoing US military support, monitoring, and economic success have kept Taiwan
and South Korea nuclear weapon free (Hersman & Peters, 2006).
Then there is the successful culmination of the Cold War (success being defined as the
absence of a third global war or further detonation of atomic devices upon human environs).
According to Hoffman, “By 1982, the combined strategic arsenals of the superpowers held the
explosive power of approximately 1 million Hiroshimas” (2009, p. 23). The nuclear arms
expansion began to recede when Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, were
influenced by the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s to check the proliferation of atomic arms
(Redekop, 2010). Significant drawdowns in atomic weapons were achieved when Presidents
George W. H. Bush and Gorbachev signed a comprehensive strategic arms reduction treaty in
1991. Known as START I, the agreement eliminated the largest nuclear weapons and reduced
overall atomic forces by 30 percent (Hoffman. 2009). Most recently, a New START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement has been signed and ratified; an agreement that continues the
nuclear reduction momentum (a limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads for each side)
between the former mortal enemies of the US and Russia (Lee, 2011).
On the cusp of the Cold War’s terminus, Bugelski (1989) provided an inkling of what
was to come: “Perhaps the real danger lies in the development of nuclear arsenals by other
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countries whose enemies do not have a sufficient deterrent arsenal” (p. 144). These other
countries—Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran—are commonly referred to as rogue nations. There
is evidence that Pakistan may have furnished nuclear secrets to Mid-East countries, an assertion
that Kampani (2002) terms as a “barter deal that raises troubling questions about nuclear decision
making” (p. 114). Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani Nuclear Scientist, has been linked directly or
indirectly to the transfer of nuclear materials and technology to Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North
Korea (Langewiesche, 2007; Laufer, 2005). Labott (2012) wrote that since six-party talks—
comprised of North Korea, US, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea—commenced in 2003
nothing has been achieved other than additional nuclear weapons testing by the North Koreans.
Labott compares Iran’s recent reticence to genuinely negotiate while actively pursuing nuclear
weaponry with the same course of events that enabled North Korea to garner nuclear weapons:
Talks followed by commitments that were subsequently broken, all in order to buy time to
develop and then detonate an atomic warhead.
Nuclear rogue states are not the world’s only threat; terrorists are striving for nuclear
war-making capabilities. Salama and Hansell (2005), through an examination of Al-Qaeda and
affiliate documents, identified a strong willingness and less than coherent effort to not only
acquire nuclear materials and technology, but to also detonate a device be it an atomic bomb or a
“dirty bomb” (capable of radioactive contamination). Selective religious interpretation and
organizational strategic thinking within Al-Qaeda supports the initiative to gain and use atomic
weaponry. The likelihood of an existing atomic weapon being transferred from a country’s
existing arsenal to a terrorist entity was minuscule . . . the retaliation against the sponsor country
would have been massive. The danger lay in Al-Qaeda’s stated purpose of acquiring radioactive
substances and knowledge, each potentially procurable from Pakistan or nearby former Soviet
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nations (Salama & Hansell, 2005). World leaders in the nuclear weapons nonproliferation
movement are convinced that Al-Qaeda is working to obtain or make an atomic device (Goddard
& Nuclear Security Project, 2010). It may be difficult to deter Al-Qaeda from their atomic
pursuits. Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003) describe Al-Qaeda as an adaptive group with a clear and
continuous purpose. Put another way, terrorists prioritize the acquisition of an atomic weapon
over life itself (Goddard & Nuclear Security Project, 2010). Al-Qaeda’s methods, views, and
aims give weight to Northouse’s (2007) conjecture that leadership is complex and influenced by
culture—moreover, there is an ongoing need to view and realize that others around the world
view leadership in diverse ways. That disparate vantage may also apply to how nations’
leadership and peoples consider nuclear weapons.
Why the renewed appetite for nuclear weapons? The answers may be found in the speed
of technological advance and in the perceived need for self-defense. During the 40 plus years of
the Cold War, there was time to reflect upon and digest the implications of nuclear warfare.
Horowitz (2009) stated that there were clear and significant correlations between the number of
years with nuclear weapons and the likelihood of dispute reciprocation—nascent nuclear states
were more likely to engage in or receive reciprocate action than older states. Horowitz explained
this through the lens of experience: Countries with long-standing nuclear arms, particularly the
US and USSR became experienced in resolution through early conflict. Kissinger (1996) offered
a similar insight more than four decades earlier that holds implications for today’s nuclear
weapons climate: Inherited technology from Western countries is not accompanied by the
philosophy and commitment that emerged from the long-term development process. Jo and
Gartzke (2007) identified a paradox in light of the post-Cold War Soviet breakup: US
preemption may slow proliferation, but the US’s greater proclivity to engage in global contests

53
since the breakup of the Soviet Union possibly encouraged states to seek nuclear capability as a
defense in lieu of their former perceived protector, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). Mearsheimer (2011) contended that American intentions to dominate globally, be they
through military presence or international alliances or institutions, incentivized rogue nations to
acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence.
Successful efforts at reducing nuclear arms often center on the achievement of mutual
benefit and aims. Long and Grillot (2000), using the case of South Africa’s abandonment of
nuclear weapons after the Cold War, concluded that to “physically remove nuclear weapons, we
must remove economic threats” to the owners of those weapons (p. 37). The previously
mentioned instances of South Korea and Taiwan revolved around physical and economic
security. Bugelski (1989) again spoke with prescience: “The so-called superpowers may well
have to start paying attention to nuclear aspirants while their own economic and social problems
evolve toward closer commonalities that might reduce the level of animosity” (p. 144).
Clemens (2005) suggested that a strategy similar to the US approach with postwar Japan
and Germany, where reciprocal return and safeguards were the key basis for negotiation, be
utilized in North Korea. This mutual gain approach has been almost wholly absent from any 21st
century negotiations involving North Korea. Grzelczyk (2009) advocated that the goals of any
nuclear talks, no matter the number of parties, must be clearly articulated, embraced, and worked
towards in collective manner for there to be any chance for fruition.
The opponents of nuclear weapons may have to become more creative in approach. Dunn
(2006), "Countries of proliferation concern have continually sought new ways to . . . move
forward in innovative ways" (p. 485). A tangible example of an innovative method to combat
dangerous leadership and nuclear proliferation came in the form of the Stuxnet worm infiltration
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of Iran’s uranium enrichment computer systems. Reports vary regarding the damage, but the
cyber malware, reportedly an Israeli-American joint venture, slowed the Iranian drive towards
nuclear offensive capabilities without physical violence (Clayton, 2010). Key to the success of
future nonproliferation activities, champions of atomic disarmament must innovate and "build
partnerships" (Dunn, 2006, p. 488). Langewiesche (2007) made a similar point to Dunn’s:
Confronting nuclear proliferation requires the renewal of old alliances and the development of
new ones.
Creativity may also extend to how nuclear weapons are viewed. Wilson (2008) made the
argument as to why nuclear weapons should not just be controlled, but eliminated. He traced
over 60 years of history, from the detonation over Hiroshima to the present day, and evaluated
the effectiveness of nuclear bombs to deter aggressive action. He reported that human kind has
seldom learned from history’s lessons and that our capacity for slaughter continues; most
pointedly at the expense of civilian populations. Chang (2009) pointed out that, to achieve
meaningful nuclear nonproliferation results, a paradigm shift of significance was required
whereby nuclear weapons were considered as instruments of terror rather than symbols of
international status. Many organizations such as Global Zero are trending towards a solution that
offers only abolition. Still, there is often an element that questions whether the most widely held
belief is the correct path. Rather than safeguarding the globe, Helprin (2011) provided a case that
nuclear arms abolishment endangers the world by promoting utilization of biological, chemical,
and nuclear weapons by the rogue nations and terror groups we most fear.
Nuclear Weapons Reduction Leadership: Lived Examples
Stated earlier, the purpose of nuclear weapons reduction has the capacity to touch every
living thing throughout the world. This focus on two real-life examples from the world of NWR
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has epistemological and methodical relevance for my dissertation. Reading the thoughts of and
looking through the eyes of those engaged in NWR is instructive and serves as a precursor for
the type of themes I uncover when enacting my own dissertation methodology. Because I am
delving into global purpose, I feel it is important to look at leadership from within and without
my known world. Therefore, I have selected Senator Sam Nunn (US) and Dr. Helen Caldicott
(Australia). These individuals were chosen for their efficacy, but also for their diversity in terms
of geographical and social background, cause specificity, dedication, and approach. Also with
Dr. Caldicott, this is an opportunity to reframe leadership outside my American vantage. Perkins
(2009) in a treatise on global leadership espoused,
The ideal American leader steps out of his leadership heritage as do leaders in all
societies. If students are going to be successful cross-cultural leaders, they will
likely need to reassess the trusted leadership theories learned in class. These
theories have a very strong Western biases as to preferred leadership styles,
behaviors, and methods for group or organizational success. (p. 77)
Hofstede (2006) reinforced the notion of US hegemony in leadership study. This slant on
Western theory could extend to application. While the West has had a major influence (negative
and positive) on the arenas of nuclear weapons, has America (and her long-term allies)
demonstrated any lasting ability to bring about global change for this common purpose venue?
Northouse (2007) accentuated the requirement for a worldwide leadership approach, “In sum,
today’s leaders need to acquire a challenging set of competencies if they intend to be effective in
present-day global societies” (p. 302).
Sam Nunn. Taubman (2012) dated Sam Nunn’s experience as a congressional aide
during the Cuban Missile Crisis as the starting point for Nunn’s 50 year efforts to reduce the
danger of an atomic exchange: While at an Air Force base in Germany, Nunn witnessed
preparations for a potential nuclear war. A decade later and after only a short time as a senator,
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Nunn toured NATO facilities in 1974. He came away with the understanding that NATO’s
tactical nuclear weapons were poorly secured and that the use of those tactical nuclear devices
could escalate into strategic (widespread) nuclear warfare (Hoffman, 2009). Once established as
a Senator, Nunn and Senator Bartlett rejected the NATO doctrine of nuclear response to a Soviet
attack on Western Europe (Nunn & Bartlett, 1977). Improvements in Warsaw Pact nuclear
forces, strategic parity between the US and USSR, atomic risk to Western Europe, and the short
range/low yield of NATO’s nuclear forces were the basis of the Senators’ conclusions (Nunn &
Bartlett, 1977). Hoffman (2009) said that Nunn’s concerns about nuclear war increased in the
1980’s with the realization that global nuclear war could ensue from a singular third party atomic
strike on the US or USSR.
Once the end of the Cold War became a foregone conclusion, a new type of thinking was
required to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. This is where the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR), also known as the Nunn-Lugar legislation came into play. American Senators
Nunn and Lugar understood the threat that unsecured nuclear devices and technology represented
to the world and they reasoned that Russia was incapable of overseeing the nuclear weapons that
were located in their former republics, otherwise known as Newly Independent States (NIS).
They obtained funds and cooperation from a number of countries to secure NIS nuclear arms and
knowhow and greatly diminish the threat of nuclear proliferation. Hoffman (2009) summed up
Sam Nunn’s and Richard Lugar’s efforts in the following passage:
In 1992, Senators Nunn and Lugar took a gamble with history. Back then,
skeptics suggested it would be best to let the former Soviet Union drown in its
own sorrows—to go into “free fall.” Nunn and Lugar did not agree. They helped
Russia and other former Soviet Republics cope with an inheritance from hell. The
investment paid huge dividends. In the years that followed, Kazakhstan, Belarus
and Ukraine completely abandoned nuclear weapons. A total of 7,514 nuclear
weapons, 752 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 31 submarines were
dismantled. These were required by arms control treaties, but Nunn-Lugar
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provided the resources that made disarmament a reality . . . The world is safer for
their vision and determination. It was also a bargain. The yearly cost for all facets
of Nunn-Lugar was about $1.4 billion, a tiny sliver of the annual Pentagon budget
of $530 billion. (pp. 478-479)
Hoffman (2009) related how during his efforts to secure Soviet weapons in a post-Soviet
landscape, Nunn wondered how we could suddenly stop worrying about 15,000 nuclear weapons
after 30 years or not invest $1 billion after spending $4 trillion. A 1991 conversation with
Gorbachev convinced Nunn that the Cooperative Threat Reduction was necessary and despite
opposition within the US and Russia, the Senator proceeded to get bipartisan political support for
the bill (Taubman, 2012). Rogue states and/or terrorists, in the absence of those steps, might
have been able to acquire and then detonate a nuclear weapon. More recently, the measures
emplaced by the CTR need additional focus and resources; attention is waning and security
infrastructure is nearing obsolescence (Langewiesche, 2007).
Nunn (1999) emphasized that it will take partnerships among the nuclear powers to
achieve nuclear security and that it was not enough to simply control nuclear weapons; nuclear
fuel required control as well. Nunn showed real innovation by working with Warren Buffet to set
up a nuclear fuel bank so that countries could not enrich their own fuel and would not have the
opportunity to divert resources to nuclear weapons (Taubman, 2012).
Besides the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Nunn is noted for co-chairing the Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI) with Ted Turner. NTI’s mission:
The Nuclear Threat Initiative works to strengthen global security by reducing
global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons . . . The threat of
nuclear terrorism, fueled by the spread of nuclear materials, know-how and
weapons, has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. (NTI, 2012)
NTI facilitates nuclear security through global relationships on various projects of
nonproliferation and world awareness.
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Nunn gave a speech in 2007 entitled “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons.” Nunn maintained that as it related to nuclear weapons, we had passed through great
danger, but due to the number of weapons, number of states seeking weapons, and terrorist
elements (who fall outside the deterrent effect of nuclear arsenals), the danger was growing.
Nunn evoked a common purpose by comparing a world without nuclear weapons as the
mountaintop and that rather than climbing towards the summit of the mountain we were heading
down the mountain. He alluded to leadership reversing their course and getting others to do the
same. Nunn (2007) linked the success of his anti-nuclear weapons vision to the attraction and
cooperation of many nations.
Helen Caldicott. By her own account, Dr. Helen Caldicott’s life was shaped by a
seminal event: “When I was nineteen, I read a book that changed my life” (1997, p. 3). The
book, On the Beach, was written by an Australian, Neal Shute, primarily set in Caldicott’s
birthplace of Melbourne, Australia, and for her, strongly conveyed the horror and totality of
nuclear war. Later, as she was entering medical school, she became incensed by the radioactive
fallout generated by French weapons tests in the Pacific (Caldicott, 1997). As her life unfolded,
Helen Caldicott’s nuclear awareness continued to expand.
Caldicott realized that one way to inhibit the likelihood of nuclear war was to combat the
mining of nuclear materials used for nuclear weapons; moreover, there were deleterious effects
to the miners’ health. She and her associates used a grassroots approach to combat mining. It was
after meeting Randall Forsberg and hearing extensive details on atomic weaponry that Caldicott
wholly grasped the brutal scope and efficiency of nuclear warfare. Later, Caldicott helped reform
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) into an effective champion against nuclear weapons.
Caldicott would eventually become President of the PSR (Caldicott, 1997).
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Dr. Caldicott characterized 1979 as another life changing juncture. It started with a visit
to the Hiroshima commemorative site. “If anyone needed to see the horror of nuclear war, here it
was. I came out of that museum with tears in my eyes.” Caldicott’s impression of Hiroshima was
echoed by another long-term antinuclear weapons activist, David Krieger: Fresh out of college,
he was on a visit to peace movement museums when he underwent an epiphany in Hiroshima; an
event which he characterized as life changing, “A visitor could not help but be affected by the
magnitude of the tragedies, and by what those bombings portended for the human future”
(Kreiger, 2013, p. xv). Other 1979 events for Dr. Caldicott included trips to the Soviet Union,
Cuba, and an anniversary commemoration of the Three Mile Island Disaster. It was during this
period that she gave up her physician practice so she could devote all her focus to nuclear issues.
While visiting the Soviet Union in 1987, Caldicott (1997) was struck by a paradox that the
Soviets seemed more intent on disarmament while the West was making preparations to emplace
nuclear weapons in Europe.
The year after her first Soviet trip, 1980, brought about an innovative concept. The idea,
articulated by Forsberg, was a nuclear freeze—rather than a continued argument to dismantle
nuclear arsenals, the push would be to freeze current stockpiles in place. A number of nuclear
activist organizations (including PSR) and government entities took up the call for the freeze
(Caldicott, 1997; Redekop, 2010). Subsequently, Caldicott (1997) had a private audience with
President Reagan; while unsuccessful on the surface, she later felt the efforts of PSR and others
resulted in a US congressional nonbinding resolution for Reagan to negotiate a freeze. Redekop
(2010) agreed that Caldicott’s and Forsberg’s efforts aided in getting Reagan and Gorbachev
together for nuclear treaty negotiation.
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Dr. Caldicott resigned as president of PSR in 1984. Her assessment was that others within
PSR wanted to take a more conservative approach than the assertive stance she wished to employ
(Caldicott, 1997). Redekop (2010) implied that the feminine leadership—imbued with
“social-emotional and relations-oriented skills and behaviors”—of Caldicott (and Forsberg) were
best suited to transformational movements such as the elimination of nuclear weapons and in
Caldicott’s case her “greater emotional expressiveness” may have resulted in conflict with her
male counterparts (p. 290). Caldicott, while admittedly wounded at the time of her departure
from PSR, retrospectively came to realize the events of that time as insightful: “I learned that, to
a degree, I had become arrogant, that I needed to encompass humility within my life . . . and
above all I learned to recognize, understand, and analyze human behavior in myself and others”
(Caldicott, 1997, p. 293). Redekop (2010) summarized the common purpose/leadership synergy
and efficacy of the anti-nuclear weapons movement of the 1980s, “Helen Caldicott and Randall
Forsberg were visionary transformational leaders who crossed a variety of boundaries for the
common good, and as such are prime exemplars of integrative leadership in action” (p. 278). It
was not without cost for Helen Caldicott who made mention of financial challenges and divorce
due in part to her work against nuclear weapons (Caldicott, 1997).
Below I discuss how these two real-life examples of NWR leadership enriched
my understanding of the common purpose leadership relationship while at the same time
informing my approach to the research question.
Prevailing Themes of the NWR Experience
Upon reviewing the aforementioned literature around the common purpose of nuclear
weapons reduction, three predominant themes stand out. First, relationships between individuals,
groups, and conditions have a systemic connection and impact one another . . . sometimes in
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life-changing manners. Second, perseverance, fueled by strong passion, is a recurring theme in
the reviewed material around nuclear weapons reduction. Third, there appears to be an adaptive
component, driven by interaction and events, to purpose and leadership. The adaptation, in part,
seems to be catalyzed by the influence of the first two components—change is driven by
relational forces and time.
Relational. Regarding the then omnipresent nuclear standoff between the US and USSR,
Wiesner and York (1964) wrote, “It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma
has no technical solution. If the great powers continue look for solutions in the area of
technology and science only, the result will be to worsen the situation” (p. 35). Per the reviewed
literature, the awareness and employment of interpersonal relationships, rather than a technical
fix, may serve as a basis for solving the dilemma of the nuclear weapons threat. Relationships
between people, whether of brevity or extremity, seemingly advance the prospects of NWR.
Nunn, a long-term US Democratic Senator and national defense advocate worked successfully
and respectively with Gorbachev (a Soviet) Lugar (a Republican) and Buffet and Turner
(businessmen). Caldicott was informed and formed by the writings of Shute and then later by her
partnership with Randy Forsberg. The cause of Caldicott thrived through a grassroots technique.
This is not to say that technology cannot be employed as a tool within the solution of personal
relationships. Technology was a key contributor to Nunn’s and Lugar’s CTR program (Hoffman,
2009; Langewiesche, 2007). Measurements of radiation from atomic bomb tests in the Pacific
made Caldicott (among many) take notice of the health risks and overlying threat of nuclear
warfare. As well, there is a systemic relational component that catalyzes the causes of NWR.
Nunn and Caldicott (and others) saw the connection between nuclear fuels and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons; accordingly, they targeted the atomic fuel supply.
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Perseverance. Opposition to nuclear weapons requires perseverance; a courage that
withstands time, sexism, classism, and even significant danger. Some instances tell of a lifetime
avocation. Randall Forsberg, the earlier mentioned leader of the anti-nuclear weapons movement
of the 1980s, felt that it might take 50 years or more for the world to embrace abandonment of
nuclear weapons (Redekop, 2010). David Krieger (2013) has been pursuing the abolition of
nuclear weapons for over three decades. The perseverance on behalf of a common purpose may
be fueled by inner fire. Caldicott (1997), in response to someone who wondered how to find time
for a cause, wrote, “There is always time when you feel passion and care about the earth and all
living creatures” (p. 121). Regarding perseverance, one inference for these considered leaders
and those around them is that this common purpose of nuclear weapons reduction attracted and
bound on both on the intellectual and emotional levels. Clark (2008) and Kotter and Cohen
(2002) separately advocated that the gathering of others to endeavors of change required
connections with the head and the heart.
Perhaps it is the passages of time, events, and meetings (chance and intentional) that spur
change. For without continuous and challenging engagement, what is the impetus for change?
Kegan and Lahey (2009) pointed that any meaningful change takes time; time utilized for human
development and evolving mindsets. Kotter and Cohen (2002) and Clark (2008) provided that
significant and sustained change required measured steps and often those engaged in change
were willing to settle for much less than carry through a protracted process. A lengthy process
may play a part in the seasoning of leadership. Gardner (1995) talked of exemplary leaders and
the factors in their making: Travel outside their home country, an understanding of others,
challenge to authority, an ongoing concern with moral issues, at least 10 years of practice within
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their domain of interest, effective use of institutions, and an ability to see the big
picture . . . factors present in the previous cases of Nunn and Caldicott.
Adaptation. Adaptation came into play partly as a result of looking at people and things
differently and then effecting change accordingly. Caldicott (1997) saw Ronald Reagan as a
significant impediment to the mitigation of nuclear weapons. However, Krieger (2013), a
long-term nuclear weapons abolitionist wrote “President Reagan was a nuclear abolitionist”
(p. 71). Sam Nunn was able to pivot from the traditional Cold War view of nuclear weapons to
the newer and more relevant threat of acquisition of nuclear arms, fuels, and technology by rogue
nations and terrorists. Caldicott, raised in a Western society, was able to see the nuclear threat
from the perspective of the Soviets. Much later, she retrospectively realized the need to adapt her
approach. Even whole countries must and can adapt: Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, and South
Africa on nuclear weapons per the earlier referenced writings.
The dangers in adaptation appear to be several-fold. The first is employing measures of
adaptation in such a way that individual and/or group values are compromised. Keenan felt that
the greatest danger to the US was that in its attempts to battle the Soviets it would become like
the Soviets; that corollary could be extended to battling Al-Qaeda as well (Purdum, 2012). The
end justifies the means . . . and in the end, a people may be in danger of losing their national soul
(so to speak). The literature refers to the adaptive nature of Al-Qaeda, North Korea, and Iran, so
there is a potential of adapting in kind. The next risk involves not really adapting at all; rather
employing a façade of change to satisfy internal or external forces related to the common
purpose.
From a methodological standpoint, the two biographical accounts of Nunn and Caldicott
were effectively powerful in terms of insight and advancement. The sample knowledge gained
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via biography augers well for my proposed method (expounded upon in Chapter III) of
interviewing those engaged in nuclear weapons.
And Gaps
Several gaps exist in the previously considered pieces on NWR. Those unfilled or
partially filled spaces reside around the leadership for the studied common purpose, the mutual
impact between the common purposes and leadership, and the potentiality of transferrable
concepts to other venues of common purpose and leadership. Within the reviewed literature, I
have not found any dedicated studies for the express purpose of assessing the relationship
between NWR and leadership. Additionally, leadership is largely represented from the singular
and hierarchical viewpoint rather than from a collective perspective.
Other than the Redekop (2010) and Taubman (2012) pieces, there is a dearth of focused
work around NWR leadership. For the common cause of nuclear weapons, thorough examination
of leaders and leadership has largely been made for those in a level of prominence; not at the
grassroots…or even the grass tips (Redekop being the exception). Crafting of purpose was
apparent among the two profiled leaders. Nunn (Taubman, 2012) showed an ability to shift
purpose and Caldicott (1997) showed a capacity to expand purpose. Again, there is not a general
feel for how associates or others impacted or adapted common purpose. Regarding the impact of
common purpose to leaders, there is evidence of growth and personal cost to Caldicott. Nunn,
possibly due to his previously established position and operating structure, did not seem
adversely affected and outwardly appears to have changed and been changed by his chosen
purpose. A deeper look at the gender and background for each of the two leaders might help to
more fully explain the challenges and development for each individual. While helpful to assess
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the reciprocal effects between purpose and leadership, none of the studies on NWR and the two
leaders were undertaken (or stated to be undertaken) to determine those effects.
Transferrable concepts from NWR leadership for purposes and conjoined leadership
were not great in scope or depth. Clemens (2005) and Grzelczyk (2009) provided the
requirement for mutual security and mutual aims. Dunn (2006) and Langewiesche (2007)
challenged those involved in NWR to think in new ways and collaboratively partner. Taubman
(2012) gave several examples of collaboration and adaptation by senior leaders in the nuclear
weapons arena. However, there was limited specificity on how to employ each of these
suggestions. Other writings only infer lessons for common purpose and leadership.
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Chapter III: Methodology
As stated in Chapter I, I am focusing on the nature of the relationship between common
purpose and leadership. Specifically, I am examining a common purpose phenomenon, nuclear
weapons reduction, that is globally pervasive and life preserving. Furthermore, I am intrigued by
the possibility (in no way a certainty) of finding any transferrable lessons for those engaged in
other endeavors of common purpose and of unearthing any theoretical implications. I am
exploring this relationship through a qualitative means. McMillan and Wergin (2006) wrote
(bolded annotation is from authors):
In a qualitative study the research problem is formulated as the foreshadowed
problem or question. It is more general than specific questions or hypotheses
found in quantitative studies. The foreshadowed problem or question provides a
broad framework for beginning the study and is reformulated as data are
collected. (p. 8)
These last words correlate to the organic nature of my research problem and my research
methodology. This chapter’s intent is to provide the basis for my methodology, describe
methodology fit with subject matter, outline the research process, and discuss any
potential ethical issues and associated means for the mitigation of ethical shortfalls.
Ontology and Epistemology
A variety of literature suggests that ontology and epistemology influence the direction
and shape of research. Creswell and Clark (2007) provided that ontology (differing views on the
nature of reality) and epistemology (how we gain our knowledge) influenced a researcher’s
course. Specifically relating to qualitative inquiry, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offered that the
combination of epistemology, ontology, and methodology helped to determine the researcher’s
questions, approach, and interpretation. Schwandt (2007) stated, “Epistemologies provide much
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of the justification for particular methodologies (i.e., the aim, function, and assumption of
method)” (p. 88). In regards to this dissertation, I start from a general qualitative stance, narrow
to a phenomenological course, and settle on a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology. Van
Manen, from a phenomenological perspective, wrote this definition of the term ontological:
“Ontological inquiry is concerned with what it means to be, with the Being of things or entities”
(1990, p. 183). Laverty (2003), traversing from qualitative to a phenomenological and then to a
hermeneutic phenomenological stance, espoused that epistemologically a relationship existed
between the knower (researcher) and the known. Hermeneutically, Van Manen (1990) wrote,
“The epistemology of experience and perception has been moved over somewhat to make space
for the epistemology of language and text” (p. 38). The hermeneutic phenomenological method
allows for inclusion and interpretation of interviews, other related texts, and my own pertinent
experience. Methodologically, ontological and epistemological factors have transported me to
where I am at this moment and will continue to influence my hermeneutic phenomenological
research process—this initial awareness along with a continued recognition regarding the
varying nature(s) of reality and the multiple paths of knowledge acquisition foster impactful and
humane inquiry.
Taking a measure of where I stand at the outset and throughout—a maintained
consciousness—helps to ensure my research is conducted authentically and efficaciously. My
way of knowing comes through a language expressed in written text, verbal interchanges,
symbols, and events; each of which assumes new and deeper meaning upon reflection and
incorporation of the disparate elements. Gathering these perspectives requires one to seek out the
nature of what is—the phenomenologist does not ask, “What causes X?” but, “What IS X?”
(Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 99). The humanistic side of me knows that I best serve when I seek
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and reflect with a degree of patience and exactitude. Schwandt (2007) mentioned the concept of
“epistemological nihilism . . . no one interpretation, and no single judgment are decidedly better
than any other” (p. 88). So I realize from a research sense that a possibility exists of no long-term
or applicable in every sense right answer. Laverty (2003) proposed, “Hermeneutic research is
interpretive and concentrated on historical meanings of experience and their developmental and
cumulative effects on individual and social levels” (p. 16). The concept of accumulating and
evolving knowledge (and adapted approach) resonates deeply within me and has brought me,
after a lifetime of experiences, to this research. Gadamer (2008) made a contention that holds
implications for my phenomenological research, common purpose, and accompanying
leadership:
What seemed the same is not the same. It makes a difference whether a limit is
experienced from out of the subjectivity of the act of meaning and the
domineering character of the will or whether it is conceived in terms of the
all-embracing harmony of beings within the world disclosed by language. (p. 81)
Flowing from Gadamer’s assertion, my aim is that the parallel courses of my research and my
studied common purposes are, ideally, both accomplished from a global perspective, with
unadulterated motive, and through nondirective means.
Phronesis, praxis, and power are in play with a phenomenological approach. “Phronesis
is a model of the problems of hermeneutics—the model helps to destroy the notion that
knowledge (known as techne) has authority or sovereignty over being (praxis),” stated Schwandt
(2007, p. 244). Flyvbjerg (2001) gave a practical application to that notion: “That is why some
people who do not possess theoretical knowledge are more effective in action (especially if they
are experienced) than others who do possess it” (p. 58). Per Greenwood and Levin (2005), praxis
is deployed in a way so that outcomes are determined from the collaboration between researchers
and participants. Furthermore, phronesis factors into how I conduct and consider my research,
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especially in relation to power. Flyvbjerg (2001) provided these concepts as starting points
around phronesis and power:


Power can be seen as both empowering and disempowering.



Power is complex; residing in a number of entities and in different forms.



Power is dynamic; emerging, waning and reemerging; acquired, lost, and reacquired.



Knowledge generates power; power yields knowledge.



Central questions revolve around how power is used, why it is used, and who uses it.

These points come into play in the researcher’s world, the participants’ world, and the nexus
between researcher and participant.
The concept of bias and prejudice, its presence and its role, calls for attentive thought in
the employment of research. Schwandt (2007) gave several examples of bias within a qualitative
context: Overreliance on particular respondents, imposition of researcher thoughts or actions that
are disruptive to field sites, and preconceptions around data interpretation. Yet per Schwandt
(2007), bias or prejudice may not be wholly negative or hinder the acquisition of genuine
knowledge; especially when it comes to philosophical hermeneutics:
Building on the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Gadamer argued that
prejudice (“prejudgment”) can be neither eliminated nor set aside, for it is an
inescapable condition of being and knowing. In fact, our understanding of our
selves and our world depends upon having prejudgment. What we must do in
order to achieve understanding is to reflect on prejudice (prejudgment) and
distinguish enabling from disabling prejudice. (p. 21)
Turning to Gadamer’s (2008) own writings around prejudice: “It is not so much our judgments
as our prejudgments that constitute ourselves” (p. 9). And, “In fact, the historicity of our
existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness
of our whole ability to experience (p. 9). Through stepping back, reframing, and reflection, I can
remain cognizant of my bias and account for it. Van Manen (1990) speaking of keeping open to
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possibilities during a phenomenological exploration, “Is this not the meaning of research: to
question something by going back again and again to the things themselves until that which is
put to question begins to reveal something of its essential nature” (p. 43). Or as Gadamer talked
about hermeneutical reflection as the path to deeper to understanding amidst our conditioned
prejudice: “It is the untiring power of experience, that in the process of being instructed, man is
ceaselessly forming a new preunderstanding” (Gadamer, 2008, p. 38). Rather than having the
unrealistic goal, for myself, to eradicate my prejudice (for as Gadamer said, it has formed how I
see/experience the world), it is the recognition and accounting of my prejudice and the
alternately mitigating or empowering nature of that prejudice that holds the pertinent import.
Method
At this point, I will delve deeper into related methodological concepts. These
constructs—phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology, the hermeneutic circle, biographic
narrative, and bracketing—will serve as a foundation for my research approach.
Bentz and Shapiro (1998) offered that phenomenology is best suited for “when there is no
established understanding of the phenomena and nothing closely related enough from which to
make valid inferences or when there is a change in prevailing culture that calls into question our
old ideas and assumptions” (p. 98). The measures of no established understanding and change
in prevailing culture are at play with NWR: an evolving global scope, rogues, and terrorists.
Within a phenomenological context, McMillan and Wergin (2006) placed emphasis on gaining
the vantages of those who are actually living the studied experience: “Purely phenomenological
studies describe and interpret the experience of people in order to understand the essence of the
experience as perceived by those studied. Thus, participant perspectives are the focus of the
research” (p. 95). Talking directly with those who actively practice leadership in NWR, a pure
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phenomenological effort per McMillan and Wergin offers a path to understanding of the
phenomena, but it is not all encompassing.
The idea of hermeneutic phenomenology brings me closer to a useful tool that has
potential to generate a myriad of awareness. And it does it in a way that does not subsume the
accounts of participants, but rather enriches and supports their stories. Van Manen (1990) made
its utility apparent:
Hermeneutic phenomenology tries to be attentive in both terms of its methodology: it is
descriptive (phenomenological) methodology because it wants to be attentive to how things
appear, it wants to let things speak for themselves; it is an interpretive (hermeneutic) because it
claims that there is no such things as uninterrupted phenomena. (p. 180)
Having the potentiality to generate a rich and nuanced image, a hermeneutic approach is
akin to the many colors of a palette. “A hermeneutical approach involves an interpretive
listening to multiple horizons of meaning involved in the interviewees’ statements, with an
attention to the possibilities of continual reinterpretations within the hermeneutical circle of the
interview” (Kvale, 1996, p. 135). This hermeneutic variant of phenomenology captures the many
textures of language. Hermeneutics, from a phenomenological stance, comprises literary texts,
but also language and symbols that can be interpreted (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998). Kvale (1996),
“There has been an extension of “text” to include discourse and even action” (p. 47) This last
piece hints at the potentiality to transfer common purpose findings.
Becoming more defined in my research approach, I move to the hermeneutic circle. The
circle encompasses both integration and process. Schwandt (2007), “The circle signified a
methodological process or condition of understanding, namely, that coming to understand the
meaning of the whole of the text and coming to understand its parts were interdependent
activities” (p. 133). Kvale (1996), “In principle, such a hermeneutical explication of the text is
an infinite process, while it ends in practice, when one has reached a sensible ending, a valid
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unitary meaning, free of inner contradictions” (p. 47). “Said somewhat differently, the
interpreter can, in time, get outside or escape the hermeneutic circle in discovering the ‘true’
meaning of the text” (Schwandt, 2007, p. 134). Schwandt (2007) offered a further take on the
hermeneutic circle: The researcher brings interpretations to the object of research and those
interpretations evolve based on interaction with the object; in turn this enhanced understanding is
carried forward by the researcher to future settings. This influence between subject and
researcher is somewhat synonymous to what I have conjectured regarding the effect between
common purpose and leadership followed by generalized learning.
I have come to appreciate the efficacy of bibliographic narrative. Looking at the two
activists from my literature review in Chapter II—Caldicott and Nunn—and their inherent
narrative power lends supports to my approach of interviewing those engaged in common
purpose. Narrative fosters leadership efforts. Gardner (1995) noted, “The ultimate impact of the
leader depends most significantly on the particular story he or she relates or embodies, and the
receptions to that story on the part of audiences (or collaborators or followers)” (p. 14). Narrative
and phenomenology coalesce nicely. “Research based on phenomenology is descriptive in
nature, relying primarily on narrative and story” (McMillan & Wergin, 2006, p. 6). Van Manen
(1990) discussed phenomenological exploration in a temporal (lived time) sense and provided an
example of how past, present, and future comprise an individual’s temporal existence. And
narrative works with the hermeneutic process:
There is a lot of recent hermeneutical work that comes under the rubric of
narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is not a culture of inquiry but rather a range
of techniques for interpreting the meaning of texts with the structures of stories.
(Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 115)
In effect, narrative derived from eclectic participants is envisioned as a means to gather
texts for this narrative inquiry.
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The last area involves personal consciousness throughout the research process. This
consciousness, an awareness of my related thoughts and feelings via bracketing, is endemic to
qualitative inquiry, critical at the outset, in the midst, and upon the culmination of this
hermeneutic phenomenological journey. “There is the phenomenological ideal of listening
without prejudice, allowing the interviewees’ descriptions of their experiences unfold without
interruptions from interviewer questions and the presupposition they involve” (Kvale, 1996,
p. 135). For me, that ensuing openness provides a space where stories may be more faithfully
told, related, and examined. However, per Gadamer’s earlier assertion, prejudice may still be
present and it is incumbent upon me to reckon whether it is an enabling or disabling prejudice as
I move forward. Moreover, I, the researcher, must consider Flyvbjerg’s aforementioned points
about knowledge and power as it relates to my interaction with the study participants and their
interactions with their worlds.
Fit
Why is hermeneutic phenomenology a best fit for my examination of nuclear weapons
reduction and accompanying leadership? Generally, hermeneutic phenomenology is a good fit
for me in terms of personal authenticity, because my life approach is one of listening, then
reflection followed by collective action . . . associated with such a personal course is my need to
withhold or incorporate my experience as appropriate; along with the ongoing presence of
consciousness to reflect on that appropriateness. Generally, hermeneutic phenomenology is a
good fit for the forthcoming inquiry, because it allows for the phenomena to unfold and then be
interpreted with the aid of contexts (theirs, the worlds’, and mine) along with subject literature
(NWR, common purpose, and leadership). Following are the in-depth reasons around why
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hermeneutic phenomenology is relevant and effective for this researcher and that being
researched:


From my experience and from the aforementioned literature, leaders can abjectly fail
when they routinely operate with preconceived notions of what is and what should be.
There is a common notion of a discovery phase in both research and leadership—
several illustrations ensue. Leaders and researchers are attuned to “what is,” a
phenomenological notion (Smythe & Norton, 2011, p. 8). Referring to
phenomenology, Applebaum (2011) related, “Results present themselves through the
course of analysis rather than being preconceived, and findings are not arrived at until
the end of the research process. The method aims at discovery not validation of a
predetermined hypothesis” (p. 11). Listening to others and providing their accounts
helps us examine pitfalls and solutions (Bruner, 2002). My best leadership and my
truest humanity come to the forefront when I uncover prevailing themes and
understand the needs of the whole . . . that is when I can take the better courses or as a
leader prevail on others to do the same. Such perspectives, as the hermeneutic
phenomenological approach advocates, are gained through the multifaceted lens of
interviews, observation, and the perusal of text. Finally, I am realizing that the taking
into account of my background and the role it plays (rather than shunting it aside) is
not only the type of research I desire to practice, but the type of leadership as well.



Yet it is not enough to seek information, we must attempt to extract sense and
meaning as well. Heideggerian phenomenology “is to draw one into thinking, to
meditate on what has already been thought, what is still to be thought, and what is yet
nowhere near our thoughts” (Smythe & Norton, 2011, p. 3). Stopping to reflect and
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then to move forward once again, reinforced by a deeper knowing speaks deeply to
me. The gift of reflection so often goes missing in our leadership and our living as a
whole. Reflection allows emotions and assumptions to recede, like fog clearing from
glass, so that we see clearly, take our bearings, and proceed. A reflective stance also
allows for new perceptions to come forth and take their rightful place for
consideration and employment (Jarvis, 1999). Additionally, the premise of cause and
effect in a continuous cycle of mutual reciprocation fascinates and inspires me. My
personal research stance is that leaders impact settings and settings in turn impact
leaders…adapting back and forth. Smythe and Norton (2011), who focused on
leadership from a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, stated that leadership
was always in play, in the moment, and uncertain.


As previously mentioned, I proposed that all have the capacity to lead and should be
given opportunities to lead. Furthermore, I feel that all can contribute, all can play
key roles, and leadership can flow from titular and non-titular individuals.
Lawrence-Lightfoot (2000) portrayed the asymmetry of relationships in the world:
“Contrasts in power, knowledge, and control between participants” (p. 10). I see it as
necessary, in leadership and the research I seek to undertake, to sound out and capture
these asymmetric voices.



There is another element that is integral to leadership—meaningful relationships. I am
beginning to see how such relationships are also essential to the practice of
phenomenology. As Lawrence-Lightfoot (2000) related: “Much of my own research
over the past two decades has depended upon making connections with people that
allow them to feel safe and trust me; that encourages storytelling, revelations, and
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reflection; and that honors boundaries and silences” (p. 131). The other aspect of
leadership (and being human), an epistemological consideration, that I am
continuously reminded of involves the timing and manner of individual awareness—
not all arrive via the same course, at the same speed, and to the same conclusion as I
do. Or as Smythe and Norton (2011) most aptly provided, “Each has their own
interpretive moment of understanding” (p. 3). Soggie (2009) placed importance on
what we do with said understanding, “The existential ethical life involves an
acceptance of life as a relating that necessitates a series of choices. These choices
inevitably result in anxiety as we attempt to live a life of authenticity” (p. 3).
Gauging, relating, and examining this anxiety seems such a vast opportunity to
portray life in way that informs many, if not all, and potentially aids others caught in
struggles for truth and good. Soggie (2009) proposed that “the difference between
doing evil and being evil can be found in the small but important flow of thinking,
relating and choosing” (p. 4). Soggie’s emphasis on relational contemplation and
choice (as well as doing and being evil) dovetails with the common purpose of NWR.


There is a phenomenological fit with my interest in common purpose leadership.
Martell (2010) discussed the concept of joint attention whereby for there to be a
common experience, there must be overlapping empathy and what follows is
connection and joint attention from which flows collective interest and group effort (a
gestalt). Moreover, phenomenology fits with nuclear weapons reduction—important,
meaningful, and having a requisite of joint attention/effort. I also do not think it is a
story that has been realized per Bentz and Shapiro’s (1998) earlier referenced
requirement of no established understanding of the phenomena along with a changing
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culture . . . a changing global culture. Lastly, I see this endeavor as a way to
positively influence; an interview/narrative/analysis interplay that holds the
wherewithal to benefit all: Subjects, writer, and reader . . . and those they touch
within their subsequent hermeneutic circles.
Throughout, there is an overriding aim of congruence between researcher, common purpose,
leadership, and hermeneutic phenomenology.
Ethical Considerations and Structure
“Research ethics typically is thought of as an avoidance of doing harm to human
subjects” (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998). Schwandt (2007) talked of potential breaches in ethics
relating to subjects: Acting in a deceptive manner, putting them at harm or risk, treating
interviewees as means instead of ends in the research process, and breaching guarantees or their
confidences. Schwandt then went on to say that the likelihood of ethical issues can be lessened
through a contractual agreement with subjects that clearly explains the purpose of research, the
subjects roles, research procedures, potential risks and benefits, confidentiality, and the
availability of further information. Undergoing the IRB approval process and provision of
informed consent to my study’s participants provides a foundation. Employment of the
previously said steps of my research process and ongoing consciousness assist with an ethical
course. For instance, the gaps of reflection before and between the interviews can be used as way
to monitor and reinforce my ethical way. Part of the periodic utilization of reflexive bracketing
will be to examine my motives and actions as I gather and relate data. My journal of events and
thoughts will play an important role in maintenance of an ethical path.
Another way to pave the ethical path is through a research structure that takes into
account validity and reliability. Both Schwandt (2007) and McMillan and Wergin (2006) cited
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triangulation, the use of different sources that provide similar findings, as a way to provide study
validity. The hermeneutic circle compliments the quest for triangulation by interviews, other
related texts, and possibly theory. McMillan and Wergin (2006) prescribed: “Validity is
enhanced by establishing rapport with interviewees, unobtrusive observation (so that participants
are unaware of being observed), appropriate selection of participants, repeated patterns
illustrated by the data, and sufficient detail in the data and depth of analysis” (p. 96). Schwandt
(2007) also provided that reflexivity, critical self-reflection, “is held to be a very important
procedure for establishing validity of accounts of social phenomena” (p. 260). Again, this
reflexivity is a central measure of my approach. The criterion of reliability, study replication, can
be strengthened by how well I make clear my procedures from beginning to end of the study.
Schwandt, in regards to reliability, talked of documentation for the generation and interpretation
of data.
In terms of phenomenological rigor, Laverty (2003) suggested two measures. First, the
researcher should keep an account or a decision trail throughout the process that states why the
researcher took the steps they did. Second, the researcher focus should be to provide a faithful
and credible account of the lived experience. Utilization of a journal, interview steps interspersed
with reflective pauses, coding, and hermeneutic triangulation will assist in meeting Laverty’s
measures. Van Manen (1990) added this phenomenological guideline: “Be constantly mindful of
one’s original question and thus to be steadfastly oriented to the lived experience that makes it
possible to ask the ‘what is it like’ question in the first place” (p. 42). Phenomenologists advised
judiciousness when it came to collecting and paring data. Eisner (1998), “Bias occurs because of
omission as well as commission, and since there is no form of representation that includes
everything, in this particular sense, all forms of representation are biased” (pp. 239-240). The
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bias can be offset, in part, through analysis of what has and has not been measured. Without such
an analysis, the researcher makes the mistake of assuming they adequately measured the subject
(Eisner, 1998). As before, there is the question of reliability. Aspers (2009) asserted that the
knowledge obtained through phenomenological study should be scrutinized at a later date and
that the methods of any study are subject to scrutiny as well.
The Research Process
Before the research process commenced, I needed to make a conscious and thoughtful
choice about the research population. Based on the advice of my research committee, and in line
with an ongoing personal ambivalence, it was decided that I focus on one particular area, NWR,
for my initial focus and then my interviews. A singular area would allow me to provide utmost
focus and mitigate unwieldiness (important, due to my propensity to engage in a myriad of
subjects). I chose NWR and did so for several reasons that largely pertained to my research
ability. The area of nuclear weapons reduction is somewhat narrower in scope as opposed
healthcare or environmentalism (my other considered areas). Secondly, NWR (for me) was more
readily accessed from a global vantage. Most of all, I had experience with nuclear weapons and
had been researching the topic for almost five years—my knowledge base of another common
purpose like environmentalism was insufficient to engage initially or continuously with people
who were deeply invested in that common purpose. I had a confidence and enthusiasm to engage
in interviews on the subject of NWR; whereas with environmentalism, I was unsure of whether I
would be able to give the subject what it deserved and with healthcare, I am too emotionally
invested and by extension, might not account for or incorporate my bias effectively. Kvale
(1996) gave credence to the notion that one should have an understanding of their topic prior to
the interview process: “The interview process may, for both parties, be characterized by mutual
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intellectual curiosity and a reciprocal respect” (p. 35) followed by, “Knowledge of a
phenomenon is required to be able to pose significant questions” (p. 96). However, there exists
another reason for my dedicated focus on NWR. Previously I had been immersed in the subject
of nuclear weapons from the aspect of their deployment; now I had the benefit of seeing, hearing,
and contemplating the prospect of their removal. Bentz and Shapiro (1998) noted that research
topics arose from a desire to resolve or complete a chapter in the researcher’s experience. It
would be disingenuous for me to say that I have not sensed wholeness and beauty from the
prospect of travelling through a generation to experience another side of this topic.
My aim was to gather diverse perspectives of those actively engaged in ridding the world
of nuclear weapons. I researched a number of organizations immersed in nuclear weapons
reduction work and decided upon ten different entities for initial contact. In order to gain a sense
of generational, social, and technological change, I looked for NWR organizations that had been
in existence for at least 30 years (in accordance with William’s definition of a generation). Save
for two outliers, groups that had exerted tremendous global force over the last decade, every
organization has been active from before the end of the Cold War in 1992. Each organization’s
mission strived for global impact. The differing entities provided a mix of formal and informal
leadership positions.
Many of my opening communications involved direct contact with the actual participants,
some involved intermediaries, two came about through a professional contact, and one
interviewee recommended another. One interview came about through a serendipitous event.
Some leads, promising at first, dwindled due to schedules or lack of response. From the outset, I
apprised each individual of my interest in exploring a relationship between common purpose and
leadership with nuclear weapons being the specific common purpose venue. Those who decided

81
to participate were immensely helpful and flexible in arranging dedicated times to have
uninterrupted talks.
The participants in a study should have pertinent lived experience, are willing to disclose
the experience, and are diverse enough from one another to provide a rich and unique account of
the experience (Kvale, 1996; Laverty, 2003; Van Manen, 1990). Following those dictates, I
chose eight participants from five organizations (two of those organizations had two
representatives with differing roles and backgrounds) based on availability, background, and
level of interest. Wertz (2005) and Kvale (1996) asserted, that given the right person and if
appropriate to the phenomenology study, one participant could be enough. However, a singular
account may foster inaccuracy or mistaken assumption and fail to capture a range of viewpoints.
Or as Bruner (2002) exclaimed, “It is our good fortune that we are forever tempted to tell
different stories about the presumably same events in the presumably real world. Let many stores
bloom” (p. 103). Giorgi (1997) supported the idea of a plurality of interviews, yet also argued
for consistency: “It is desirable to use several subjects” (p. 11), yet, “for the sake of simplicity, a
researcher should always try to derive a single structure (synthesis) for all of the subjects in the
study” (p. 11). In the end, eight participants provided a chance to look at NWR from a number
of angles, yet manage such a synthesis.
Three women and five men participated. The interviewees’ ages ranged from early 20s to
late 60s. I do not have associated data to say whether the gender mix or age range is
representative of NWR participants as a whole. The participants—physician, lawyer, physicist,
scientist, campaign strategist, student activist, international security expert, and second career
activist—all came at the challenge of nuclear weapons in varying and sometimes overlapping
ways. All but two of the participants had been engaged in the particular vocation of nuclear
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weapons reduction for a good portion of their lives. For six of the individuals, they engaged in
NWR as a profession; the other two participants volunteered. One individual left the field for a
few years and came back to the work. One participant had become fully ensconced in the work
after retiring while another had recently took up the effort as a student leader at college. They
were representative of both formal and informal leadership.
Because of a diverse geographical representation, interviews were conducted by
telephone and audiotaped. As Bentz and Shapiro (1998) related, recording the data through a
mechanized means protects the integrity of the data and is another way to preclude researcher
bias. A copy of the IRB approved study information (Appendix A) and a copy of the consent
form (Appendix B) is attached at the end of this study. Each participant was provided the study
information and consent ahead of the scheduled interview and at the same time invited to raise
concerns or ask any questions.
Using an inverted pyramid method, I interviewed all eight individuals initially. Four of
those participants had a second interview. One person had a third interview. Those accounts are
portrayed in a phased manner. The phased approach allowed me to adequately consider and
reflect on next steps before proceeding to the next phase. Such a stepped process could, as per
Bentz and Shapiro (1998), create a “deeper and richer understanding both of the phenomenon,
problem, or question, of yourself as a reflective, mindful inquirer” (p. 43). Throughout the
process, each participant was open to participate, readily transparent, and willing to be
re-interviewed. Often, they were intrigued and thankful that their calling was being examined. I
conducted the interviews during the period from February to April, 2014.
Each interview opened with me asking them if they had read the study information I had
sent them and if they had any questions. Some questions revolved around anonymity and the use
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of quotes. However, some were unconcerned about the anonymity. Retrospectively, I do feel the
condition of allowing them to remain anonymous aided in the flow and depth of information. I
reminded them it would be an audiotaped interview. I then offered them the option of written or
verbal consent to be interviewed—in all cases, they assented verbally. We then proceeded to the
interviews.
McMillan and Wergin (2006) provided an overview of phenomenological information
gathering: “Typically, a series of extensive, in-depth, unstructured interviews with the
participants provides the data for the research” (p. 95). The subject of question makeup is a key
consideration. Van Manen (1984) proposed that the questions be unequivocal, understandable,
and begin with the premise of discovering what something is like. In order to find out what an
experience is like, one may have to explore events or persons to their fullest by asking an
opening question and a series of follow-up questions (Van Manen, 1990). Conversely, silence
has an appropriate use at times to elicit recollection and recommence storytelling (Van Manen,
1990). This framework of questions was utilized in the initial eight interviews:
1. What attracted you to the purpose?
2. What retained you to the purpose?
3. What conflicts or difficult decisions have you faced in relation to the purpose? To
what degree and how were these dilemma’s resolved?
4. Can you describe how national and global politics and policies help or hinder the
accomplishment of purpose? How do you work with or through these politics or
policies?
5. What benefits or drawbacks have you noticed from a common (collective) effort
towards your purpose?
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6. As a leader, what strategies have you found most effective in facilitating the
accomplishment of your purpose?
7. Can you describe how social/cultural factors help or hinder the accomplishment of
purpose? How do you work through these factors?
8. How has commitment to the purpose impacted your leadership and your life?
9. Over time, what, if anything, has changed about the purpose? How do you feel about
these changes?
10. What were the external and internal conditions that changed the purpose or changed
the approach to achieving the purpose?
11. What was your role in changing approach or purpose?
12. Over time, what has changed about you and your practice in relation to the purpose?
How do you feel about these changes?
In all cases, I worked to provide a setting that allowed them to range freely, tell the story
in their way and at their cadence. I did this through patient reflective listening upon the
individual and their respective story. I employed sufficient silent space to allow for interviewee
narrative and insight. Relating to Kvale’s (1996) “Qualification Criteria for the Interviewer” and
the specific tenet of “interpreting,” I would often seek clarification to avoid misunderstanding or
assumption and to also extend meaning of what was said by the interviewee (p. 149).
Periodically, the interviewees would travel into areas without me having to pose the specific
questions. My overriding intent was to allow for the telling of their story; rather than being
deeply wedded to the idea that I had to follow an exact course of questioning. If something
remained unanswered or unexplored, I would circle back or prompt after the respondent was
done with that portion of the account.
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While each account was powerful and instructive in its own right, and all participants
communicated willingness to interview again, criteria existed for follow on interviews. A few
accounts were succinctly and effectively delivered to the point that there was not as much room
or opening for subsequent exploration. The predominant factors for second interviews (and the
third interview) figured upon strength of perceived emotion around their work along with a sense
of near-term availability, avidity, and ability to go deeper into key articulated points related to
common purpose and leadership. I go into greater depth on the criteria for follow on interviews
in Chapter IV.
I transcribed each interview myself. I did this to honor the guarantee of anonymity and as
an additional opportunity to hear the words, the inflections, and better understand context.
Listening and typing at different paces also made me realize that impressions of lived experience
may arise through verbal interaction and/or come through other senses. Van Manen (1990) noted
that data can be gained through a variety of means—self-reflection, texts, observation, and
interviews. The value of being able to listen to these accounts anew through the transcription
process cannot be overemphasized. McMillan and Wergin (2006) suggested that study reliability
and credibility could be enhanced by participant verification of accounts. Each interviewee
viewed their transcripts and was encouraged to let me know of any revisions or deletions.
Several made corrections. Kvale (1996) suggested that to protect participant privacy (to include
the changing of names) “requires altering the form of the information without making major
changes in meaning” (p. 260). For the purpose of maintaining anonymity, all were given the
option of choosing a pseudonym or for me to assign one; most left the assignment up to me. I
kept a secure log with a table to track furnishing of study information, progress of consents,
interview schedules, transcript progress, transcript sharing with interviewee, and pseudonyms.
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Via a journal, I kept notes at all junctures—initial contacts, interviews, and transcription—
reflecting upon and using those written thoughts as an adjunct for the way forward. As I
portrayed these stories, I worked to balance privacy without impairing truth. I periodically
sought the input of faculty; with their aid, an ongoing examination of transcripts (visual and
auditory), unceasing reflection, and consideration of extant influences, a more nuanced picture of
the participants’ stories emerged.
Paramount to the qualitative research endeavor is an effort to identify and put personal
biases to the side. As an aide in tempering my subjectivity, the concept of reflexive bracketing
resonated most. Ahern (1999) and Gearing (2004) said that reflexive bracketing required time
and attention to take stock of assumptions—additionally, the bracketing effort should commence
at the onset of and continue throughout the phenomenological effort. Ahern (1999) provided a
guiding statement on reflexive bracketing: “The process of bracketing is therefore an iterative,
reflexive journey that entails preparation, action, evaluation, and systematic feedback about the
effectiveness of the process” (p. 408). As I engaged in an initial attempt at reflexive bracketing
prior to my effort, three categories of personal assumptions came to the forefront—common
purpose, nuclear weapons reduction, and leadership—all directly relating to my research focus. I
used one of Ahern’s (1999) key suggestions, my journal, to gain (and monitor) self-awareness
related to the three categories along with any other arising topic that may preclude the emergence
of the phenomena or that may obscure the accounts of others. For the reflexive bracketing to be
efficacious, my journaling activity was continuous (in terms of writing and referencing) and
deeply introspective.
Between each phase of interviews, and consistent with the hermeneutic spiral, there were
periods dedicated to examination, reflection, and planning. Bentz and Shapiro (1998) advocated
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making space between steps of the hermeneutic phenomenological process for reflection; having
such spaces allows the uncovering and emerging of critical information internal and external to
the researcher. From a research standpoint, Schwandt (2007) proposed reflexivity as a means to
examine bias, modify the research process, assist in writing, and outline strategies for moving
forward. Again, there was congruence here between myself, the research method, and the subject
matter. From the NWR common purpose standpoint, reflection may well have kept (or will keep)
us from destroying the world. As in my optimal practice of leadership, it was important that I
mark these periods of pause with great productiveness. My time in the reflective spaces was
spent in the proceeding activities:


I embarked on an initial and ongoing self-examination of my presuppositions or
emerging assumptions. I did this though the combination of texts—my journal,
interviews, published writings, and contemporary events (what may be happening in
all worlds)—and reflection. I sought (and held as my purpose) an opening of my
mind, so all had a chance to come forth and be considered. The spaces between were
prime for reflective consideration and future orientation.



These interludes were also ideal for composing. Per Van Manen, “Hermeneutic
phenomenology is fundamentally a writing activity” (1990, p.7). Similar to Ahern’s
emphasis on journaling, Van Manen (1990) recommended keeping a log to aid in the
reflective and rewriting processes. The reflective gaps were where I began to deeply
write about what I was hearing in the interviews and to begin thinking about their
meaning in the contexts of common purpose and leadership. These writings provided
a basis for next steps and, later, the final analysis.
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Based on what emerged during the previous interviews and subsequent reflection, I
planned the next interview phase. The nature/essence of what was found, relevance to
the focus of the common purpose/leadership symbiosis, transferrable lessons, and
theoretical implications, in part, factored into the drive forward. Also the need for
clarification or further exploration prompted repeat interviews. Finally,
expressiveness and desire to participate drove further conversations. “Individuals who
become participants are selected on the basis of their experience with the phenomena
being studied, and on their willingness to be interviewed and observed” (McMillan &
Wergin, 2006, p. 95).

After the interviews and the spaces came analysis. Organization of data and what
determined inclusion played a role. Phenomenological writing can be organized around themes,
examples, time, space, body, or other phenomenological writings (Van Manen, 1984). Creswell
and Clark (2007) advocated a thematic examination. Wertz (2005) suggested a comparison with
prevailing literature and also reinforced the notion that in the advanced stage of analysis garnered
data could be looked at against theoretical writings. I made use of thematic findings in the
interviews and theoretical writings. However, I also adapted, based on the findings, the evolving
nature of NWR, and emerging literature. “It should be clear that the approach one takes in the
phenomenological description should be partly decided in terms of the nature of the phenomenon
being addressed” (Van Manen, 1984, p. 27). I considered how to best portray the information in
a way that effectively and faithfully captures the storytellers’ accounts. Or as McMillan and
Wergin (2006) provided, “In summarizing phenomenological studies, the researchers are careful
to suspend their way of describing and use the participant’s language, terms, and phrases to
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Chapter IV: The Stories
Chapter III provided the structure up to and around the interviews. Now it is time to
furnish the content of the interviews themselves. Based on earlier discussed literature, my
questions/prompts outlined in Chapter III, and the overarching posed question of the relationship
between common purpose and leadership, the ensuing conversations largely centered on four
general areas. First, what attracted and retained the person to the common purpose of nuclear
weapons reduction? Second, what specific approaches did the participant utilize to accomplish
their aims? Next, what challenges did they encounter in their work? Finally, what has changed
about the common purpose of nuclear weapons reduction and the leader? Depending upon
responses, additional clarifying questions were asked around their responses. Because of
diversity in their stories and so as not to also inhibit or unduly influence their responses, their
stories did not always run linearly through the categories of attraction, approaches, challenges,
and change; nor in all cases, could they be cleanly categorized due to intricate relationships.
Stories—Opening Phase
James.
Attraction and approach. James (not his real name) was the first person I interviewed.
He has been working on nuclear weapons issues since the 1970s. From my first email to our
initial telephone interview and thereafter, he has been immensely forthcoming. He is a practicing
physician and was initially attracted to working against nuclear power. He and other physicians
came together in 1978 to form an entity for the express purpose of addressing nuclear power
concerns. After talking with more physicians who had previously been concerned with nuclear
warfare and reading recommended articles on the impact of atomic devices, James and his group
realized that nuclear weapons were a more critical peril, or as he put in his own words, “It was
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just the enormity of the threat to public health that was made clear by this medical literature.”
Given that immensity and immediacy, James and his group reoriented their main focus from
nuclear power to nuclear weapons. When asked what kept his interest and retained him to this
cause, James replied,
One, this is really a threat to human existence and secondly, that we can do
something about it. That this is not an insurmountable problem, as difficult as
progress has sometimes been. And I would have to say there were times, both in
the 80’s when we just thought the world was going to end because events were
moving so rapidly that we thought there was going to be a nuclear war and in fact
as it turns out, our fears were fully justified; we came so close on so many
occasions. And then again in the 90’s for different reasons because things were a
little cooler, but people stopped paying attention to this issue. At this time, there
was a real sense that this was a bit of a fool’s errand. We are not going to achieve
what we mean to achieve, the elimination of these weapons. But you have to try
anyway because you can’t look at yourself in the face if you don’t try to avert this
danger.
Throughout the long and cyclical period from the 1980’s until now—potential world-ending
escalation, lull punctuated by external disinterest, and the progress in recent years—James and
his organization had times “when basically we were just doing this because it was the right thing
to do.”
Since his time as a medical school graduate until the present, James has used education,
of first himself and then others, as a way to get the message about nuclear power, and later
nuclear weapons, across. As a physician, James likened getting people to eliminate nuclear
weapons to getting people to stop smoking. In terms of smoking, he said,
Most people who are smokers know that smoking is not good for them. As you
give them an article that talks about it, it has some impact. But what you really
need to do is have a conversation with them in which you get beyond the point
that this is abstract data and get them to understand what this means for them if
they don’t stop smoking.
In terms of nuclear weapons, he stated,
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The idea is if you just tell people what is going to happen, because most people
really don’t understand what is going to happen if there is a nuclear war, and also
point out to them that there are concrete steps that people are taking that you as an
individual can support—that you will get people to take action and the movement
will grow.
Later in the interview, he went into the level of content and emotional depth surrounding nuclear
weapons education efforts. He has seen that people have discounted the possibility or
consequences of nuclear war and the best way to get them to understand the gravity is to talk
directly with them. For nuclear weapons education, he sees fear accompanied by solutions as
necessary: “You have to frighten people, because they have to know how bad the danger is. But
you also have to present to them things they can do to alleviate the danger.” He emphasized the
need to provide hope by outlining the specific steps that were being taken to reduce the danger
and how they can personally take part. James then reiterated, “So it’s a combination of the two
and if you just use the fear, it doesn’t work, people shut off, and if you don’t scare people, it
doesn’t work.”
Challenge and change. Dilemmas and/or barriers for those participating in anti-nuclear
weapons work were expressed by James in several forms. On a personal level, he has wrestled
with how much time, sometimes at the expense of those close to him, to give to his work against
nuclear weapons. This time away from others was balanced in part by the knowledge that he was
working to safeguard them. While not facing political pressure himself, James described
instances of those facing danger in other countries. The head of his organization’s Iraqi affiliate
was murdered. For the Russian affiliate, there was greater scrutiny by the Putin government than
there was under the Communist regime. The intense rivalry between India and Pakistan coupled
with each nation’s national pride in being a nuclear power makes for difficult environments to
advocate for a drawdown of nuclear war making capabilities; not dissimilar from the US during
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the Cold War. Per James, Pakistan was the more difficult of the two countries, “Our group in
Pakistan is always nervous: Are they going to run afoul of extremists more than the government
for advocating Pakistani nuclear disarmament?”
However, the most prevalent challenge seemed to revolve around the waxing and waning
of interest in the ongoing threat of nuclear weapons. During the 1980s and more recently in 2010
with the New START treaty, James and others found success. As of late, there has been little
progress. He attributed this challenge in part to US government inertia:
They keep telling us we need to be building a movement to oppose nuclear
weapons. And we keep telling them it’s very hard to do this when you are not
doing anything that people can look to as a potential step forward. They don’t
seem to get that.
He added media disinterest to the absence of political leadership. He characterized it from a
“chicken and egg” perspective: “If the administration started pushing the nuclear thing, the
media would pay more attention to it. If something horrible happens in the world, the media will
be all over that.” I sensed frustration at this point in the interview, particularly with US media
coverage, “The bigger problem now is the threat still exists, but it’s not talked about very much
in the media. I think they bear incredible responsibility for this.”
We embarked on the subject of change. Although his organization has purposely
remained “lithe” to take advantage of evolving climates (in terms of openness to doing
something about nuclear weapons) and there has been incremental change made on nuclear
weapons, the enormity of threat remains and James and his group have kept their central
approach constant. “We’ve continued with pretty much the same model, although we are starting
to get a little more savvy about using things like media, videos, Facebook, and Twitter.”
His group has also become more strategic in its approach; especially in partnering with NGO’s
(Nongovernmental Organizations). He is hoping that the American Red Cross will emulate Red
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Cross efforts in Australia and Norway whereby public education about the detrimental effects of
nuclear war was rolled out on a large scale—“The Red Cross has huge organization, enormous
credibility, enormous resources, and a very powerful message; which is the one that has been
articulated by the Red Cross that is you got to know that if there is a nuclear war we can do
nothing to alleviate the suffering and therefore the weapons must be abolished.” James
emphasized the potential efficacy of the Red Cross collaboration, “Really could be a game
changer I think.” The other NGO that holds promise is Rotary International. Rotary is the second
largest NGO in the world and had previously worked on the nuclear weapons issue in the
1980s—that interest has been reignited. James summed up the goal, “We are trying to
specifically approach groups that we think might, in an organized way, take on the issue
themselves.”
The other innovation around his work involved content. Most recently James published
a scenario involving limited nuclear war and the resultant catastrophic public health impact the
put billions of people at mortal risk. The report was distributed and well received on an
international level. However and to the earlier point about American media, there has been little
US focus on this particular report. James and I had a second interview largely centering on the
aspect of disinterest.
Robert.
Attraction and approach. It was during the Cuban Missile Crisis and before he was ten
years old that Robert (not his real name) first became cognizant of nuclear weapons and their
destructive power. This newfound awareness remained, “I was really very acutely conscious of
all out nuclear war as a child and a teenager.” He continued to think about nuclear weapons on
into college, but became actively involved through a protest against a Trident submarine base in
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the 1970s (the Trident carries submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads). That
protest informed his approach to the issue of nuclear weapons: “In the course of sort of justifying
the action or defending the action, including in court but not only in court, it became clear to me
that international law provided a good framework for understanding and critiquing the problem.”
His PhD revolved around international law and nuclear weapons. Over time, Robert became
deeply embedded in legal means—judicial action, writings, leadership positions, and
partnerships—as a way to address nuclear arms. When asked what had kept him interested and
involved in subject of nuclear weapons over several decades, Robert offered, “Basically I
thought it was a very, very serious threat to the United States and the world. I still do.”
Robert and his group proceeded from the premise that nuclear weapons are illegal, “They
can be used to commit crimes against humanity.” His organization, founded by lawyers and legal
academics, emerged in the 1980s amidst Reagan Administration rhetoric around nuclear war and
popular movements advocating nuclear disarmament. Many of the individuals involved at the
inception are still active as board members and advisors. Robert and his peers closely work with
other entities throughout the US and the world. He attributed this shared effort as a way to
maximize and sustain drive, “Being able to collaborate is a major amplifier of our work.” This
collaboration took place in a non-hierarchical manner, “Somebody will take the lead, but it
doesn’t mean they’re the decision-maker.” The use of e-mail has facilitated and quickened the
pace of collaboration. Alluding to staff involvement at his organization, Robert stated, it’s
essentially a collegial consultative approach.”
By focusing extensive time and study to the challenges and perils of nuclear weapons,
Robert came to see that international law and institutions were necessary instruments for
elimination and prevention efforts:
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In some ways, I think that the problem posed by nuclear weapons is really only
soluble if we have strong and effective and viable international law and
international institutions. Because even if they are verifiably eliminated, well,
they could be rebuilt if there was competition and division among the nations of
the world that caused them to think they should resort to it again.
Robert and his organization see US and international cooperation as a key component to
achieving nuclear arms reduction:
My organization and the ones we work with are working for less US reliance on
nuclear weapons, US cooperation and multilateralism regarding nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation, and generally for cooperation and a
multilateral approach of all countries that possess nuclear arsenals to achieve their
global elimination.
Challenge and change. Yet, getting the US to break their nuclear habit is a
significant hurdle— “To the United States, to lessen their reliance on nuclear weapons is
something that runs against the grain of decades of intense reliance on nuclear weapons,”
Robert provided. He also views Russia and Pakistan “as governments now which are
posing pretty significant obstacles to progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament.”
The other impediment to progress related to time and policies: “Policy developments are
aligned over decades and it may take decades for countries to change their positions.”
Robert offered organizations and governments as an antidote to change the long-term
fixed thinking of countries. This remedy was evidenced by global chemical and nuclear
weapons treaty activity in several arenas during the 1990s. As Robert put it, “there was a
surge of multilateralism.” Global events muted progress and the multilateralism was
eroded by the September 11 attacks and the subsequent Iraq invasion. Per Robert, the
Obama administration has been working to reverse the trend and seek nuclear arms
control. Robert offered a recent innovative development and further example of the
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potential of governments as a means to bring about reduction in the world’s levels of
nuclear weapons:
One thing we do is work within the context of an international civil society
coalition—the Middle Powers Initiative. The Middle Powers Initiative holds
meetings once or twice a year with governments that don’t have nuclear weapons,
but because of their size, economy, and their general political influence or their
interest in the field, exert some influence in the nuclear disarmament
nonproliferation sphere. The way these meetings work is the Middle Powers
Initiative (MPI) will organize a program over two days or so and twenty or thirty
governments may show up. Governments from the global south, South Africa,
Brazil, Mexico, some governments from Europe, Ireland or Switzerland or
Sweden, New Zealand, Japan, Germany. We put on speakers to talk about hard
issues. Say issues with Iran or bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into
force, there’s a whole set of possible issues.
In contrast to the US, Russia, and Pakistan, Robert portrayed the middle power representatives
“to be quite straightforward to work with, very interested in advancing objectives of arms control
and disarmament.”
Isabel.
Attraction and approach. Isabel (not her real name) was very enthusiastic about assisting
in this study and even provided a referral to another participant. She started her career working
against nuclear weapons during the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s. She was influenced
by a combination of fellow students wanting to educate the public around nuclear weapons and
then senior physicists calling for the reduction of nuclear arms—“It was nurtured by other
physicists. And then the thing that made me really want a career in this was the Reagan Star
Wars Program.” Concerned about the dangers and infeasibility of Star Wars (ground and space
based systems to defend against nuclear ballistic missiles), she became very active in organizing
an effort to have scientists refrain from taking money for missile defense research.
I asked if we could delve deeper into the comment, “Traditionally there had been interest
among the physicists’ community in trying to undo the damage that was done by physicists in
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inventing the bomb.” I wondered if physicists were motivated to work against nuclear weapons
as a way to redress a perceived wrong from an earlier time. “I think it is more of a feeling that
this is something physicists have, they have some special expertise on and hence—I mean
responsibility is slightly maybe too strong a word, but something along those lines,” Isabel
clarified.
I asked her what retained her on the path to rid the world of nuclear weapons. She
answered in a way that conveyed the up and down nature of the work:
Well, the problem hasn't gone away. Progress has been made, but I feel like there
is a lot of work left to be done. There is a way in which progress is slow and
sometimes it is pretty demoralizing, but the fact that the problem is still there, I
think is very motivating for me. This is a problem that still needs fixing and I
have a lot invested in terms of the amount of time I already spent.
We discussed her organization’s approach: “It is to combine technical analysis with
making arguments that are accessible to the public or members of Congress while also having
more of an insider conversation with people in Washington; doing it at both levels.”
Collaborating with specific individuals is a key facilitating element in conveying those
arguments:
We have scientists on staff who do analysis and research, but we often will
partner with people on the outside who have - by virtue of their previous
employment—a lot of credibility and that helps us gain access to policy makers.
That credibility has afforded opportunities to directly brief members of the US Congress and
presidential administration. On a larger scale, Isabel emphasized the importance of collaboration
with the organization’s overall membership.
I think we really put a premium of getting our members to weigh in. I think that
something that we have is this membership base that we can use; which is not true
for all the organizations that work on this. I think among them, we have one of the
largest membership organizations, and so being able to do that has made a big
difference. So that is sort of on the other end of the spectrum - using our members
to help us change policy.

99

That membership participation was instrumental as part of the successful lobbying of US
Senators to ratify the New START Treaty (treaty between the US and Russia to further
reduce and limit nuclear weapons).
Challenge and change. We went over the barriers that slowed or prevented
accomplishment. Isabel referred to the “bureaucratic inertia” in Washington,
I think one barrier is—and I don't quite know where this comes from - but there is
a real clinging to the status quo on the part of policy makers. Even Obama, who is
at one level quite committed to making changes, has been stymied by the nuclear
security community within the Administration—in the Department of Defense,
Department of Energy.
She emphasized the public’s role in influencing their representatives and the presidential
administration, “Ultimately without public pressure, things are not really going to change.”
However the public has their eyes on competing problems and nuclear weapons are “no longer
really on the radar screen.”
The US superiority and deployment of conventional weapons made it problematic to
engage Russia and China in the types of relationships and dialog that facilitates work on nuclear
weapons and other issues. Isabel described the complex systemic nature of nuclear weapons,
It is hard to just pull out the issue of nuclear weapons from the overall relationship
between countries and that in part depends on their military relationship or the
potential conflict militarily more generally. Ultimately, I think to get rid of nuclear
weapons will take a very different world.
Having the means to do the work and competition, direct and indirect, presented a
significant challenge. “Another sort of perennial barrier was not having enough resources and
money to do the work we want to do. Say there were ten times as many of me or of our group
here, we could do a lot more.” That lack of resources was compounded by those who want to
maintain nuclear weapons—“Lot of folks lobbying on the other side.” Further straining the

100
ability to garner necessary backing were the competing narratives of issues like climate change
and cyber security. “I think people get tired of working on something for a long time and
foundations want to get into something new,” she related. Because it was “new and exciting,”
Isabel understood how the cyber threat would be attractive for funding, but she maintained that
the threat of nuclear weapons is “real and continuing.”
What transitions have occurred in the intervening years? One enabling change involved the
US executive branch. Speaking of Barack Obama’s presidency, “It is probably more because of
that change in administration that I and my colleagues have been more interactive with people in
the administration.” Another type of ongoing and exciting change consisted of bringing
awareness and possibly career opportunity to burgeoning scientists:
One thing I should tell you about, especially because you are interested in this
question of how people get into this business, one thing we've done for 25 years
now is organize a meeting for young scientists who are interested in having a
career in security issues. It's a meeting that goes on for eight days and has about
40 people and everybody has to give a talk. We find that year-in and year-out we
have people who come who have not really a good idea of what this means. Then
they get very excited and basically want to work in this field. There are still
people out there who are committed to this kind of work and are entering this
field now.
Isabel gave personal meaning to the program, “So that’s sort of inspirational, actually to me, that
there are people coming along behind us and that there are still young people interested in this
work.”
One evolution had mixed and somewhat unfulfilled results. Even though the Cold War
has ended and weapons levels have come down, the US and Russia still maintained postures that
invite danger:
The intensity of the nuclear standoff between the US and then Soviet Union and
now Russia has dropped a great deal, but the policies have not changed in a way
that reflects the new relationship. There are these inherent risks associated with
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having missiles on high alert and so there is still the very real threat that these
weapons will be used; which would be pretty devastating.
A new type of threat has emerged as well—“Then on the other side, I would say that the
risks of terrorists gaining access to material have increased.”
David
Attraction and approach. David (not his real name) has a slightly different experience
than many of the other participants. He started his professional career in nuclear weapons
reduction, left for a period and then came back to the work. He was initially inspired by his
relatives, one a congressman who called for nuclear weapons testing and another who as a peace
activist was arrested for breaking into nuclear facilities as a way of protest, “So I had that family
orientation of wanting to work on peace issues and nuclear weapons.” Going to college, taking a
class entitled Responding to the Nuclear Threat, and completing a senior thesis on the Reagan
“Star Wars” ballistic missile defense program cemented his aim to work on nuclear weapons
issues. Right after college, he went to Washington DC and took a job in nuclear arms control.
We talked about David’s leaving the nuclear weapons arena to work in advertising and
his eventual return:
So I got out of it, but I came back to it. Because if there has been one consistent
thing in my professional life, it has been my desire to really address this issue and
the fact that there is still a lot to be done.
He characterized it as “strong pull” to get back to being a public policy advocate.
In terms of an effective strategy, David offered the New START initiative as a positive
example of collective effort resulting in the desired endpoint, “There was a very concrete thing
that we were working on or toward.” He cited the efforts as “all hands on deck”—retired military
personnel, diplomats, politicians, scientists, and activists—influencing senators towards START
ratification by the disparate means of phone-banking, letters, media pieces, and grassroots
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measures. “What was nice about that was we had a very tangible goal—ratification of the New
START Treaty,” David observed. Followed by, “We need that kind of thing to attract interest.”
Here we went much deeper into the attraction of a central theme or idea. David harkened
back to the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s, “A massive multifaceted campaign effort
around this simple notion of just stop and don't build anymore of those things. It was really quite
impressive of kind of a rallying cry.” He said the New START replicated that feeling and effort
to a degree, but then David wondered, “What’s the next big thing?” And later, “In the absence of
this rallying cry, for lack of a better term, how do we get traction?”
The other aspect that fostered his chosen movement centered on credibility. It was
important to be seen as having individual and group credibility; not to be marginalized or
categorized in way that the message is just ignored:
So, how do you be seen as legitimate in the eyes—particularly (again to use one
of these terms that bounces around) in the eyes of The Persuadables? It's not so
much your base, but we need our success on this issue and a whole range of
issues: How do we get to the middle and the people who can be persuaded?
It was also important to evolve in terms of message. With the aid of consultants and
polling, David and his group shifted in their communication, “Since that time, we have been
talking a lot about nuclear weapons as a liability, as a national security liability and not an asset.”
For David, an aid to that message and to credibility is having individuals like Sam Nunn and
George Shultz saying, ‘You know what, these things really are not as helpful as they used to be.’
Challenge and change. David said the adversarial climate in Washington
precluded progress, “It is a real hindrance to public policy writ large that there is this
divisiveness and polarization and nastiness within the public political sphere.” Some of
this he ascribes to the “24/7 information age” that was not an inherent factor in the 1980s.
He also felt that today’s relationship between Russia and the US lessened the likelihood
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of movement on nuclear weapons issues. Competing issues held back implementation of
policy changes. Lastly, there was, for him, the dismaying issue of apathy,
This is really difficult work if you think about it. I have been doing it a long time
and it's disheartening to think that we still have this—what is arguably—the only
truly immediate existential threat to humanity hanging over our heads and there is
virtually no concern about it.
I sensed frustration when he asked, “What’s it going to take to get people to care?” Yet, in his
following statements, I could hear what seemed to be deep commitment to keep at it, “It feels
like we are just a bit stuck, particularly on this issue that I work on. I am thinking about how to
get it unstuck. I haven't come up with any great epiphanies yet.”
David’s hiatus from nuclear weapons offered a unique frame of reference. We were able
to talk about what had changed between his initial efforts and his current endeavors. “I think a lot
changed and, unfortunately, it feels to me that the urgency has definitely diminished since the
threat posed by nuclear weapons is far from most peoples' minds,” David first offered. He went
on, similarly to some of the other interviews, to point out the fear brought on by Ronald
Reagan’s rhetoric and the uncertainty brought on by the Cold War during the 1980s. However,
that chilly climate also brought about change; a success due in part to an investment by the
public and policymakers. That is not the case today:
If anything has changed, it is this sense of urgency. People don't even know how
many nuclear weapons we have and no one seems to care. That is what's changed
and that is our biggest problem: Is how to get people to continue to be concerned
and to do something about it.
Rather than acknowledging that the US and Russia still have the biggest nuclear arsenals in the
world, the media, the public, and the policymakers have shifted their focus to North Korea, Iran,
and terrorists. David felt that we had become somewhat mired “into the weeds” in attempts to
stave off new nuclear weapons systems as opposed to nuclear weapons reduction,
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We're kind of fighting those smaller battles but that's not the kind of thing that is
going to inspire a nation or a world to say, “Let's get together to really make some
progress in reducing the number of these weapons on the planet.”
Brian.
Attraction and approach. Brian (not his real name), a scientist, started his career doing
basic science work. Later, working in a national laboratory, he was exposed to a national security
focus. There he became aware of “not just national security, but global security and peace, and
all the things we aspire to—I think there can't be probably a more important thing to do, right?”
The broad goal and a work environment characterized by talented people and challenging ever
evolving problems have kept him invested in this work for approximately twenty years.
Brian’s group is an NGO. One approach involved the use of “pilot projects” where they
modeled an approach that governments could then follow. Brian gave two examples of projects
his organization had recently concluded. The first was an international ranking (index) of each
nation’s ability to secure nuclear materials. The hope was that these rankings would impel
countries to take action to improve their security. The second, “a joint American/Russia tabletop
exercise,” looked at the scenario of a “loose” nuclear weapon being smuggled. That exercise was
designed to assess cooperation in a time of crisis. Credibility of his organization’s leadership
assisted greatly in receptiveness of the NGO’s message. The other factor that gave believability
to their work was the perception that his organization had no hidden agenda, “but is genuinely
trying to make the world a safer place.”
In contrast to trying to convince everyone in the world on the need for nuclear security—
“There’s just not enough hours in the day to take that path”—Brian worked by finding “leverage
points or amplifiers.” He went back to the international index as an illustrative product to change
key minds in various governments. “I think sometimes we have to just show people what needs
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to be done rather than just telling people and trying to convince them.” And the countries have
freedom to implement changes in their own way, “We leave it to them to do whatever they think
makes sense.” Brian used their newest foray into cyber-threats as an “And so we think that just
characterizing the threat will have this ripple effect that will lead to all these other actions and so
that's where we're focused.”
Challenge and change. We discussed what had changed over his twenty years of
experience. He stated that the topics had changed and security was in reality a broad topic
comprised of the interchanging facets of “biological threats, chemical threats, nuclear threats and
now cyber-threats.” The political landscape, especially in the US, has altered. “Whereas maybe
twenty years ago, although I was at a much different stage in my career, people set aside their
political differences when they talked about national security and I think that's less true today.”
He provided a specific example of how politics stunted discourse:
There are certain topics like missile defense where people have rigid views that
are based typically on what political party they are in. And these are people who
don't actually take the time to understand the substance of the issue, understand
the broad repercussions of their position and so on, so we end up not having
substantive discussion on important topics like that because of the political
overlay.
Educating congressional leaders and staff in such a climate was an ongoing organizational
challenge.
Despite the aforementioned credibility and intent on global welfare, some countries, due
to differing cultural viewpoints, have been unhappy with their ranking in the NGO’s index.
Additionally, the preponderance of US and Russian nuclear devices made countries like China,
who say they are for disarmament, unlikely to take further action. Pertaining to the US, Brian
stated, “There's no question that we often go out and tell others what to do and don't sometimes
reflect as to how we are being perceived.”
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While other countries, Russia and China, made occasional pushes to look at related or
other areas besides nuclear weapons, the US has not:
A lot of what the United States does is perceived as just trying to maintain our
position in the world in terms of being the only super power and so on, so while
nuclear security is fairly safe in that regard, the others aren't.
Historically, the US has preferred to deal with one issue at a time. However, issues are tied
together and to move forward, issues like conventional forces had to be considered in addition to
nuclear security: “On a practical level that then makes negotiations even harder, but we believe
that's the only way to make progress on some of these thorny issues.”
We went over again how the nuclear issue did not/could not stand readily on its own.
Brian talked of how sometimes the economic needs of smaller countries took precedence over
nuclear security. There was clear understanding of the importance of nuclear security, yet it was a
secondary priority when people were starving. He gave an actual example of a smaller country
that was being asked to secure a small research reactor with nuclear material. The country’s
representatives politely heard the request, but replied that they had larger and more pressing
issues. Brian empathized, “And it's hard to argue with it, right?”
Leigh
Attraction and approach. When asked what attracted her to the work, Leigh (not her real
name) replied, “The short answer to that is that I grew up terrified of nuclear weapons.” As a
child in the 1980s, she was aware of Cold War rhetoric and stayed informed through newspapers
and other means. That early engagement brought an accompanying fear of nuclear weapons.
Later, studying international relations, she gravitated to the topic of nuclear weapons. The
changing threat and the shifting approaches to the threat have kept the work interesting:
Once you start peeling the onion there are actually lots of different angles you can
take and there are a lot of different pieces that one can work on. I've been lucky
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enough to be in places where, while the overall topic might have stayed the same,
what I've worked on specifically has varied.
One attribute that Leigh thought necessary in her work was the ability to present technical
information in a straightforward manner that others could comprehend. She has witnessed times
when a “really great idea” was buried under “technical minutia.” She added, “It’s more than just
a communications issue, it's an ability to break down the problem into its component pieces and
see exactly what you are trying to influence.” She also cited credibility, both on the institutional
and individual levels, as especially important in combatting stereotypical thinking. That
credibility came from a proven track record, a willingness to listen to contrasting views, and
ability to modify approach. Furthermore, it derived from an ability to provide how one came to a
conclusion as opposed to just stating absolutes. She communicated the difficulty of the task and
not necessarily knowing the solutions at the outset. However, “What you need to do is convince
people of what the problem is so you can get people to coalesce around an interest in, and
commitment to, finding that answer.”
I inquired what “coalesce” looked like for her. She emphasized the need to set priorities
in lieu of tackling multiple issues; this reduced the impact of competing interests. Then she
elaborated,
I think it looks like having individuals and institutions organized around processes
by which you can get to answers. That means having the right people in place, the
right leadership authority, political space to move, budgets, drawing in of outside
expertise where necessary, and engaging in a broader discussion.
That “right leadership authority” needed to be sufficient, “secretariat level to guide the
bureaucracy to solve the problem.” She said the greatest success came from the articulated
message “where the nuclear issue has been seen as a national security priority: ‘The security of
our citizens and country are at stake unless we solve the problem.’ That’s a pretty strong
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imperative.” The absence of such a clear imperative invited issues and thus, allies, industry, and
public were uncommitted. Leigh reiterated: “I think that clear direction is really an umbrella
under which effective actions can be undertaken. It's not that senior guidance is absolutely
prescriptive; it's just that the challenge was issued. I think that's where we've seen real success.”
Challenge and change. Because of her international background, we were able to talk
at length about enablers and the disablers in the national and international environments. Leigh
pointed to President Obama’s Prague speech as having a profound impact. She said there were
many more countries now interested and desiring to be involved in the many facets of nuclear
security. She highlighted arms control, previously confined to the US and Russia, as an example
of expanding interest: “Now there are a number of countries who don't have nuclear weapons
who say, ‘It is our confidence in your reductions that will matter, so we need to be involved in
verification also.’ That's an interesting change.” She saw this newfound global interest as a
catalyst to moving forward.
The primary hindrance to progress was the lack of international capacity in bureaucratic
and governmental organizations and civil society. The NGO presence, as it exists in the US, was
not as established in other countries. When considering participants from developing countries to
speak on these issues, “There is a pretty small list.” Often, there were one or two people working
multiple issues. Furthering the problem, “There is also a waning capacity in the United States as
and limited capacity in other countries.” Given the earlier mentioned international desire to be
involved in verification, there were not either the tools or the organization to immediately bring
about such an aim.
On the surface, it was easy to get people to agree that nuclear weapons should not be
detonated, but then the hard work ensued: “When you get to the nuts and bolts of, ‘How do we
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develop and implement policies and practices that will reduce those risks’, there are always other
competing priorities.” Challenge was not from without (competing sectors like the environment),
but from within,
In our space, the biggest challenges are from other parts of the nuclear agenda. It's
the people who feel very strongly that the US national security interest is hurt and
not helped by any discussion of further of nuclear reductions, for example. Or, we
can't talk about nuclear security internationally because security is a sovereign
responsibility and we need to keep all security information secret.
Rather than being a real source of conflict, the nuclear energy industry instead offered the
prospect of synergism—“To ensure it is used only for peaceful purposes.”
I asked her if she could talk more about what has varied. She responded, “I think there is
also a more sophisticated view of nuclear threats now than there used to be.” Previously it was
the US, the Soviets, and the nations trying to get nuclear capability. That has expanded, “I think
that because there is a much more diverse view in the field, there are a lot more opportunities for
diverse work. There is an interest in nuclear security and nuclear terrorism that wasn't there
before September 11th.” With that expansion, “There are evolving views of the roles of industry,
of government, of policy, of civil society.” Per Leigh, the landscape of nuclear proliferation and
the role of security are far different than twenty years ago.
One of those changes involved what she termed the “the levers of influence.” There has
been a shift from a public focus: “I think there has been an ebb and flow as to the role of the
public, and the role of influencing the public and public opinion.” The emphasis has moved to
those who are more likely to make decisions: “Decisions are being made really at the highest
levels of government, and in some cases the private sector. Unless you can influence that
thinking, you can't really have an impact.” It was not just a question of right and wrong (“moral
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absolutist statement”), but of complexities (“important logistical and mundane considerations”)
that permeated large issues.
Edwin
Attraction and approach. I made contact with Edwin (not his real name) in a fortuitous
manner. After reading an interview (in one of another organization’s publications) with an
elderly nun facing jail for a civil resistance action, I wanted to know more. The ensuing research
led me to Edwin. While Edwin’s organization has been in place for a number of decades, he has
been doing this particular type of nuclear weapons activism for about ten years. During those ten
years, he has, in essence, transitioned from a fulltime paid vocation to the fulltime volunteer
vocation of eliminating nuclear weapons.
Edwin’s career prior to his work around nuclear weapons reduction was rooted in a
preventive approach to occupationally and environmentally caused disease. While he was
working on his graduate studies, he took a course on radiological health. The knowledge base in
the course derived from the aftermath, victims’ health states followed over decades, of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. He recalled, “As I listened to all of this information from my
professor, it really kept kind of bearing down on me. That was really my first eye opening
experience into the atomic problem.” That newfound knowledge “kind of sat and simmered for a
number of years.” During the intervening decades, Edwin took on different social justice work
ranging from hunger, homelessness, peace, and most recently antinuclear weapons activism.
The NWR organization Edwin joined is near his home and has been in existence since the
1970s. The organization’s inception arose from efforts to prevent submarine based nuclear
ballistic missiles becoming a presence in their community. He began to work with this particular
organization “because I understood the effects of nuclear weapons and it really led me to believe
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that we had to work as hard as hard as we can, to abolish nuclear weapons globally.” He
described his decision to do NWR work as an intentional direction taken over time. Edwin’s
group gave off a sense of working egalitarianism: “Here I am today, some years later, an integral
part of the organization and each of us has our part and every role is just as important as every
other role in that sense.”
Edwin contrasted working to alleviate hunger and homelessness against the issue of
nuclear weapons. He characterized the former causes as “accessible, they were easier for
people.” However, the latter was more charged, “People can become very alienated by the issue
of nuclear weapons. They can be immediately turned off by doing this kind of work.” From his
experience, he has also seen that it easier for people to donate money or sign a petition to deal
with an issue. Instead, Edwin felt that it was necessary to get out in the world and do the work.
Edwin furnished one viewpoint that the world’s people’s pressure on leaders, rather than
the leaders themselves, reduced the likelihood of nuclear conflagration. He then recalled the
level of public dialog around nuclear weapons between the period from1950s to the 1970s: “It
wasn’t dinner table discussion if you will. It was something so dark and so removed from
people’s ability to even comprehend the issues surrounding it. People would not touch it.” While
it was still a difficult subject to open up to public examination, he felt there had been progress in
the last few years. For people to become engaged and move the issue of nuclear weapons
forward, Edwin pointed out that discussion and education were necessary prerequisites.
Edwin discussed some of the differences in his organization as opposed to other
antinuclear weapons entities. They have never incorporated under 501c3 status; the reason being
was a “countercultural” stance. For independence and moral sakes, “They don’t believe in taking
money from the government or anyone where they have to answer to someone.” “It’s a very
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horizontal structure . . . we kind of rule by consensus,” he explained. Their techniques involved
vigils, leafleting outside the military bases, and occasionally arrest for blocking access to
government facilities. The impact of the arrests was twofold. Initially, there would be the
symbolic action at the site and later the opportunity to speak in court, to defend the act. Above
and through all, the behavior would be conducted in a nonviolent manner. Edwin, learning from
his previous professional career, has intentionally taken a course of observation, listening, and
learning since he joined this organization ten years ago. What continued to empower each of the
members was what Edwin termed “a deep spiritual basis.” This spiritual basis was not confined
to a particular religion or even necessarily, but more to the aim itself:
Whether its secular humanists or religious background, there is a spiritual depth to
the work that goes on there and this very deep belief in humanity and what we are
capable of and that nuclear weapons are just so wrong. We must do whatever we
can to try to raise awareness and consciousness and try to abolish them.
Edwin’s organization collaborated with other groups, such as military veterans, to
generate that consciousness of nuclear weapons. They have experimented with creative ways to
get their message across at public events (i.e., a realistically sized replica of a submarine
launched nuclear missile). And they recently held a strategy session that examined what they
were doing and ways to increase their effectiveness, largely for the purpose of expanding
awareness. He asserted that those efforts and the organization as whole were organic in nature,
“Trying to honor the fact that we are all different and we are all individuals and we approach
things from different places.”
Edwin recently proposed a specific campaign to oppose the US Navy’s program to
replace its aging fleet of nuclear launch submarines. He felt we were immersed in a Cold War
paradigm, “We're still using the old mindset of nuclear deterrence and saying we need a whole
new fleet of nuclear submarines.” He found it slow going at first in getting people to agree, but

113
he kept working at it: “Over the course of the year, the past year, I slowly but surely talked about
it and I put together a plan.” And others began gravitating to the plan. Edwin expressed nuclear
weapons progress as something that will take years, even generations, to resolve. He personally
recognized a need for immense patience to do the work, “The one thing I've learned is there is no
overnight sensation. This is not like working for Microsoft where you expect overnight results.
You have to have extraordinary patience and faith in peoples' ability to make things happen.”
Challenge and change. We began to talk about the challenges Edwin faced. On a
personal level, he has had to make a decision about how much time and energy he can give to the
work. Being deeply motivated by what he is doing has aided him in “gladly” devoting a good
part of his time. The biggest challenge he faced was getting others to see the threat of nuclear
weapons and then commit to working against that specific threat. Edwin has dealt with various
environmental organizations and environmentalists did not see the immediacy of the nuclear
weapons issue; they were most concerned with climate change, “To them that's something
tangible and it's a very real thing, whereas nuclear weapons are out of sight and very much out of
mind.” Yet, Edwin made the point that even one nuclear explosion would be horrendous in
human and environmental terms:
The amount of devastation of just one city, the immediate deaths the radiation,
you cannot clean that up. It's not like going in and cleaning up a super fund site.
There's absolutely no way to clean that up and to even deal with the burn victims
and everything else. It would be such a major catastrophe; economic and human
catastrophe, even looking at one weapon.
Another significant roadblock that Edwin noted involved the intricately and deeply
imbedded economic ties between nuclear weapons and livelihoods. A number of companies and
communities depended on the jobs and dollars that the funding of nuclear weapons generated. He
said we would have to be really creative to create sustainable jobs if and when weapons
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elimination was achieved. Getting people to see that the nuclear weapons arsenal was an
outdated concept provided an associated challenge. Edwin stated that the nuclear weapons
systems and support infrastructure was implemented when the aim was deterrence of a parallel
atomic force in the Soviet Union. Terrorists, North Korea, and Iran called for a different
conversation and approach, “So the old arguments that were developed decades ago for
deterrence really don't stand any test of logic anymore.”
Listening to Edwin, I had a sense of focused engagement fueled by a high level of
passion. I asked him how he was able to maintain this level of passion and investment in his
work. He acknowledged that his passion was deep-seated and it came from his belief in
humanity’s ability to deal with the issues we collectively face. He also believed that he could not
do it alone and that he needed to engage and work with others to make a difference. Knowing
that he was working for the benefit of future generations greatly motivated Edwin. He also
credited balance, in terms of family and varied interests (to include fun), as an important
component in maintaining effort. Edwin talked again of how there were no overnight successes
in their work, but he derived satisfaction at the incremental positive results he’s witnessed. His
last inspiration came from others who have done and were doing the work. In some cases, these
were octogenarians who had spent time in prison for protesting nuclear weapons and in Edwin’s
words, “They are willing to give up everything for what they believe in.” Those were people that
gave him something to aspire to in his work and fueled his dedication, “That's one other thing
that really helps me keep going. I figure if they can do it, I can do it—what I'm doing.”
Cheryl . Cheryl (not her real name) is unique to this study in several aspects. Being in
existence slightly more than five years, her organization is an outlier from the other groups that
have been around from before the end of the Cold War. However, I knew from my studies of the
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last few years this group was a strongly emerging global force. My inclination to talk with
someone from this nascent yet powerful association was cemented when, as I interviewed others,
I was told about this particular entity with cutting-edge approaches and received accompanying
recommendations to check them out. Additionally, Cheryl is similar to her support organization
in that she has only recently got involved in the work of nuclear weapons reduction. Cheryl’s
later entry along with her college undergraduate background offered the prospect of a differing
perspective from the others who had made NWR their lives’ work.
Attraction and approach. Cheryl was introduced to nuclear weapons issues and nuclear
weapons activism by a fellow student. The money spent on aging nuclear weapon systems and
the inherent risk struck a chord with her:
Realizing at 20 years old I knew nothing about this was really an eye opening and
scary thing. This is my tax money. This is my parents’ tax money. Our lives are in
danger every day and I hadn’t known about it.
The opportunity to share her knowledge was appealing, “I didn’t join as much for the
policy as I did for the grassroots movement of spreading the awareness and spreading the basic
level of understanding with other people.” Her interest and education in language and theater has
shown her the power of communication, “One of the things that have become increasingly clear
to me is the role of word of mouth or that communication is the way, the only way that people
know about things.” Like others being interviewed, Cheryl took note of nuclear weapons being
displaced in national and individual consciousness, “It just trickled away I think as we had other
things to discuss, but the issue itself didn’t do that.”
We explored the variety of organizational methods in which Cheryl and her cohort spread
awareness around the topic of nuclear weapons. They utilized petitions to advocate world power
discussions of nuclear weapons. These petitions provided favorable conditions to talk about
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“nukes” as well. These petition drives took place on her college campus with tables outside of
the dining area, but also through the practice of “dorm storms” during “peak study hours” when
students were expected to be in their rooms. Cheryl’s organization had also made a widely
distributed video with celebrities taking different lines from President Obama’s Prague speech
about nuclear weapons. Another activity involved a large jar of M&M’s representing the money
spent on nuclear weapons and five smaller jars to which the M&M’s (money) could be
redistributed with the accompanying question, “How would you reallocate all this money we are
spending on nukes?” Activism, for different causes, was prevalent on Cheryl’s campus, so the
potential reallocation of funds resonated with possibilities. Cheryl’s group met weekly to come
up with new ways to impart awareness. One idea consisted of an innovative offering of food:
This year we started doing what we call the Yellow Cake Study Break. And the
joke is that nukes derive from yellow cake, so we go to the store and buy actual
cake, yellow, the grocery store version of yellow cake. We have finals week,
people are in the library studying and we wander around asking them if they’d
like a piece of cake and we talk to them about nukes.
Cheryl emphasized the importance relating the subject of nuclear weapons in different ways to
people and letting them see that “their very specific interests” may be affected by the topic.
I asked her how people reacted to these different messages. Due to other creative groups
on the campus, creativity was necessary to get this message across. In terms of opposition, “It’s
never discouraged.” People gladly signed the petitions, “but then they usually don’t take the next
step and ask how they can get involved.” The immediate goal was to get signatures, but the other
goal was perpetuation of the organization and recruiting new members. Speaking of new
membership, Cheryl acknowledged, “We are struggling with that a bit.” She saw that it was not
as “pressing” for her generation as environmental concerns. She also has encountered some
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students who saw nuclear weapons as necessary and offered counterarguments to her group’s
position.
Challenge and change. Cheryl has an organization mentor in Washington , DC who
assisted her in working through some challenges. Cheryl and her mentor covered the different
types of reactions to the organization—pro-nukes, apathy, and fixed policy solutions—and then
went over scenarios on how to work through each response. Cheryl described personally working
with somebody at the headquarters and the exercises as being very exciting and helpful.
Leadership and development played an important role in her time in DC:
One of the things that she said, that really struck me, was that one of the most
important things in an organization was that every member must feel that they are
personally progressing and personally learning more about themselves, about the
organization, and about why their work is important. I think that was something
that has been missing for a long time in a lot of different kinds of leadership.
Cheryl contrasted the leadership and atmosphere of her nuclear weapons group with concurrent
theater internship. When working within the nuclear weapons organization, she was asked about
her experiences, invited to attend other events, and valued. When doing theater work, she was
directed to do basic work and “I didn’t feel like I was learning, growing, or progressing through
that.” Performing nukes work, she felt energized, positive, and productive. Performing theater
work, she felt less positive and less energy. She attributed this to the nuclear weapons group’s
approach:
A much different environment and it was just based on the fact that they stopped
and asked me who I was and what I wanted. And it was helpful to them, because
listening to me gave them a new perspective.
The group was very receptive and intrigued by Cheryl’s visit, because it had been awhile since a
student leader had come into the office and been so forthcoming. For Cheryl, “It changed my
outlook on how to become a leader.”
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Cheryl also realized the power of the group’s methodology—“They are working together,
they set goals for themselves, and they go for it and they do it at a small group level.” It
reinforced her feelings about communication and the need to dispense message in a creative
fashion. She brought up a new organizational drive, “Right now our campaign is Break up with
Nukes: C’mon stop taking all my money. It’s not cool. I can’t believe I have been with you for
fifty years already. We need this to end.” “It’s not necessarily that it’s just changed my outlook
on nukes, it has definitely done that, but it has also changed my perspective of how to lead
people . . . how to be a member of society,” she concluded.
One area Cheryl found to be an obstruction was the dry content of the nuclear weapons
subject matter. She suggested finding a balance between education in fun as a way to attract and
retain interest. She looked forward to another organization event, Bike around the Bomb, as a
way to stimulate awareness. A bike ride would be conducted around an area the size of a
simulated nuclear explosion and during the ride, there would be clear demonstration of the
obliteration of both the natural and human-made world. Such an activity would be more
attractive to many (i.e., athletes and environmentalists) than sitting in a room hearing about
treaties.
Cheryl thought that political ideology, lack of education, or financial stability could
prevent interest in something like nuclear weapons reduction. “That’s an issue with many think
tank types of things. If their immediate needs are not being met, it could be a little bit more
distant and abstract.” Due to economic and/or academic privilege of those at her institution, that
is not something that Cheryl felt directly or perceived in her fellow students. In fact, she felt that
her school developed critical thinkers that were willing to take on and work through substantive
social issues. She held that discussion bred progress,
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It could eventually turn out better as long as it’s being discussed. Because people
are going to go around points on both sides and both sides are going to have to
give a little bit…and it’s going to come to a point where there’s more
understanding.
Cheryl related earlier how the experience of nuclear weapons activism has changed her.
Because of her age and newness to NWR, possible long-term change in a future context offered
promise of unmatched perspective. Cheryl talked at length of how this issue inspired her more
deeply than other activist issues in which she participated. Going to the headquarters in
Washington and witnessing the dedication has made her want to continue this work in some type
of capacity. “This particular issue, the lack of coverage that it has, the way that it affects
everyone, combines to make it super important to me, and I have to continue to work on it until I
feel satisfied somehow.” She understood it as a long struggle. “I don’t think I will live to see the
day that all the nukes are gone.” She talked of writing letters from her nursing home or being the
lady that hosts the meetings and provides refreshments. She punctuated this point, “I don’t know
exactly, but it’s not something I am going to give up on.
Interviews—Middle Phase
The next phase of interviews was predicated on several considerations. While all
participants were forthcoming, some interviewees were more free-flowing than others. As with
any human interaction, it may be that events around the interview, phrasing or tone on my part,
or external conditions around the timeframe could have facilitated or inhibited the flow of
information. All interviewees communicated a willingness to follow up, but, due to the timing of
events, accessibility was more immediate in some cases. Some interviews held greater emotional
intensity. Most importantly, second interviews came about from items that seemingly invited
additional exploration. Each salient area identified in the first interviews—competing interests,
maintenance of the status quo, message (“rallying cry”), and individual development
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(actualization)—held promise for additional exploration in the common purpose and leadership
contexts. These particular points resounded from applicability and force. They were
representative of the interview categories: Attraction/approach/challenge/change (competing
interests), attraction/approach/challenge/change (message), challenge/change (status quo), and
attraction/ change (individual development). All of the potential follow up items were expressed
in an impactful manner during the first interviews. James, when speaking of news disinterest,
said, “That for us is one of our major challenges at this point—how to get past this block on the
part of the media.” Isabel discussing US and Russian nuclear weapons on alert status a post-Cold
War world, “It is hard to imagine why we would be willing to take these risks when there is
nothing to be gained.” David mentioned the power of past objectives and the absence of a central
message, “We don't have that next thing to be rallying our supporters and our champions in
Congress.” And Edwin talked in varying ways of his development and an intertwining between
the common purpose of NWR and himself, “I continued to see the importance of this work and it
continued to grow inside of me how important it was.” He was moved and acted from the
prospect of doing something meaningful and lasting, “There’s this deep spiritual drive to do
something that is good and right for future generations.” At the end of his interview, he gave
credit to and aspired to the examples of those who had dedicated their lives and often their
personal freedom (due to periodic incarceration) to the abolishment of nuclear weapons:
Working with people like that has really helped me, helped me dedicate myself to
this work. Because I look at them and there's this spiritually about them that I
could never even reach. I have to have this deep respect for that and what they're
trying to do for humanity and their sense.
James. My second interview with James centered on competing interests. Besides seeing
the NWR message contending against other causes in many of the interviews, I continued to hear
James’ statement from our first talk, “People just have lots of other problems in life they have to
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deal with and this one doesn’t seem important enough.” When I talked with James the second
time, he had just got back from an international conference on nuclear weapons. I brought up the
prevalence of one message against many and his previous mention of the media’s role. He
reiterated that the media had much to do with the lack of progress. James went back to 1980s
when people were hearing about the problem on a regular basis. Having that overall awareness
provided a desire among the audiences to hear more and also established a context in which new
information could be heard and then assimilated. In today’s world, people may hear about it
once, dismiss it rather than assigning overall meaning, and then move onto the next story. James
concluded, “It just doesn’t resonate in the same way as it did back in the 80s.”
I asked James what had to happen for it to be able to resonate again on a broad level. He
stated a few worst case scenarios that would refocus people’s attention: Dialog between the US
and Russia akin to what occurred in the 1980’s, the use of a nuclear weapon, or acquisition and
testing of a nuclear weapon. He much preferred a different road:
Absent those very undesirable elements, I think it is really a question of those of
us in the nuclear community continuing to do the outreach, continuing to bring the
information forward and people in government and media more effectively
playing the role they should be playing of reporting this stuff.
He strongly felt that the media had a responsibility to report information the public
needed to know. James talked of the meeting he just finished that was attended by delegations
from 146 countries and ended with a statement by the sponsoring government: “It called for the
prompt commencement of negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, something that the
US government is very opposed to.” He doubted that US media would give the statement much
coverage. James perceived the media problem as deeper than an insufficient interest in the
subject; it also consisted of a lack of knowledge. When he talked with those in the media, “It

122
becomes clear they really don’t know all about it and they don’t know that they don’t know.” He
said such conditions made it difficult to move forward.
Based on ground we covered in the first conversation, I wondered if the media issue was
different in the US than in other parts of the world. He answered, in regards to the just concluded
meeting, that the Japanese media was most engaged, the French had put out a press release,
Germany covered the story as well as news outlets in South Asia; “AP and Reuters here in the
United States did not.” He offered two possible explanations for US media disinterest. First, “I
don’t know if it’s because the American news media, even more than most, has turned into sort
of entertainment type operations.” Then, “Or if it’s because Americans are just very parochial,
and the nuclear weapons problem as it’s perceived by people, the threat of war is seen as being
most likely outside of the United States.” In the end, he was just not sure of the answer.
Isabel. The first topic Isabel and I discussed in our follow up conversation carried a
possibility of great risk (nationally and internationally) and involved holding onto and acting
from an entrenched paradigm: The US and Russia continued maintenance of their land-based
missiles in a launch readiness state. Such a posture, in place during the Cold War as a way to
have time to respond in case of an incoming strike, heightened the chances for an accident or
unauthorized use. Isabel elaborated, “There are people in the Pentagon that think in the way we
did during the Cold War. A lot of the planning has not changed really. So there is a lot of inertia
in the system.” While Russia sees nuclear weapons as a way to offset US conventional weapons
superiority. She offered that, from a psychological perspective, Russia and the US continued to
see nuclear weapons as a status symbol. She suggested that until policies and relationships with
other nuclear powers changed, it would be difficult to eliminate nuclear weapons. Russia and
China had a level of insecurity that prevented disarmament.
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I sought to clarify whether the scope of US nuclear weapons utilization was being
expanded (in terms of deterring or responding to conventional, chemical, and biological attack)
to justify their continued existence. She reminded me that nuclear weapons had been seen as a
counter force to a conventional attack by Soviet Forces on Western Europe. Isabel proffered that
“in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review that Obama put out in 2010, they said the primary
purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons.” However, US nuclear
weapons can also be used against other nuclear capable countries that attack using conventional,
chemical, or biologic means. In other words, a nonnuclear country would not receive a US
nuclear response to conventional, chemical, or biological attack. Isabel offered that the attempt
fell short:
It’s a little convoluted and the way that the administration thinks about it is they
moved a step closer to having the only purpose of nuclear weapons be to deter the
use of other nuclear weapons, but they didn’t get there.
She thought of this response to varying weapons threats as another holdover from the
Cold War or she admitted, they are “trying to figure out what to do with these
things . . . trying to make them useful in some way.”
The other subject, conveyed with what I took as concern, related to a dwindling or
shifting interest in donors. She had said previously, particularly in terms of funding, “People get
tired of working on something for a long time” and that people looked for “new and exciting”
things. I asked her if there were ways to get to get people reinvested, not just with money, but
with time and effort as well. Laughingly, she replied that it was something they thought about
frequently and it was a hard subject. Isabel repeated, “It’s really hard, because there are other
things going on in the world.” She explained that not enough people in Washington were paying
attention and not enough of the public was engaged. She emphasized anew that it was a hard
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issue and the answers were not readily apparent. I commented that in this interview and the
previous interview, it almost seemed as if it was a preponderant concern. Suddenly she shifted
and offered several initiatives being considered or previously implemented. The first involved
web design whereby people would be attracted by one subject, drones for example, and then be
exposed to information on nuclear weapons. The second, a mixed blessing of sorts, was
collaboration by five foundations to inject a significant amount of money into an attempt to find
new approaches to NWR. The downside was that an existing organization like Isabel’s would not
benefit, “So the money is almost explicitly not for organizations that currently work on the issue,
but sort of an attempt to bring in new actors.” The last initiative was a campaign during the US
presidential election that, depending upon the targeted city, displayed ads in areas of public
transportation that showed a bull’s-eye on the community and posed a question around the need
for thousands of nuclear weapons. She concluded by saying the dearth of money was a limiting
factor, “Because I think we could do more creative things if we had more money.”
David. Initially, I had not planned to re-interview David. Listening to and rereading his
words for the third time, I was increasingly struck by their force and pertinence. This, to me, was
the power of the hermeneutic cycle. Upon additional reflection and reframing, the power and
relatedness (to this study) of his points were clearly in evidence. A good bit into our first
exchange, David had talked about a “rallying cry” in the context of nuclear freeze movement of
the 1980s and the New START campaign a few years ago. He then asked, “What's that next
thing?” We got back together a few weeks later to explore what it was like around the events of
the freeze and New START, Reagan rhetoric, and message.
I first asked David how the 1980s freeze movement and New START agreement helped
to motivate others and facilitate progress. He thought the freeze was a thoughtful response to
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concern around the nuclear weapons rhetoric of President Reagan—“I think the simplicity of it,
was what was so special about it, it wasn't a call for global disarmament, it was a simple call to
freeze, to stop.” The freeze concept made it easier for those who had not been previously been
involved to become newly engaged: “It gave people a focus—an organizing focus—and there
were tons of folks organizing at the local level going down to their town meetings, getting
resolutions passed by their city councils and their mayors and state legislators.” Regarding New
START, David said, “It gave a very specific thing to ask people to do.” That specificity was
embodied by a concerted ask for people to call or write their US Senator to support the treaty. He
made it clear that the energy levels between the freeze and the New START were disparate.
David attributed the higher energy around the freeze to a greater awareness of nuclear weapons
at the time.
Something I had heard from David previously and again this time had to do with the
impact of President Reagan’s rhetoric. The Reagan rhetoric had emerged on a number of
occasions throughout the interviews. I asked David if he thought the Reagan factor—the fear or
uncertainty possibly generated by his words—was a precipitating factor that drove people to
action. He agreed and then acknowledged that some have argued that Reagan’s words and
actions provided a position of strength and led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Making it
clear not to personally opine on whether Reagan’s rhetoric had the aforementioned results, “All I
know is that the end result was that two countries engaged in some serious discussions and
substantive negotiations around the efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear arms control and that
was a good thing.”
David then migrated to a present day examination of awareness around nuclear weapons
and a potential path forward. As an example, he thought that the general public was largely
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unaware that both the US and Russia kept large numbers of missile on full alert status (launch
ready); the implication being that “by some accident or human or systems failure, we could have
a nuclear exchange and really bad things could happen within an hour or so.” Yet, he was
doubtful that taking missiles off alert status would be seen as a rallying cry that that could bind
and motivate. And that was the rub; a rallying cry was needed, but not yet identified. Once the
rallying cry was identified, I inquired how it would drive things forward. He reflected and said
they needed to go back to “square one” first:
We have to get a national conversation going and to get a larger number of
people, and not just the person on the street, but opinion leaders and the newer
generation of policy-makers; the young people coming up the ranks who will
ultimately be in positions of influence both in the congress and in the executive
branch to get them to better appreciate the fact—this is really something we have
responsibility to address and to work toward reducing those risks.
After that, US-Russian relationship issues and by extension, each country’s weapons levels could
be addressed. Another potential objective was adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.
He reemphasized they will not “get movement on any of these things until more of the public
and more people in positions of influence start talking about this issue and demanding that we do
something about it.”
One thing David does not plan to do is wait on something bad to happen to drive the
conversation. He has heard some say that a nuclear detonation would wake people up to the
threat; “I don't personally buy that—I am not going to sit around waiting for something horrible
to happen with the hope that the world will snap out of it and do something about these things.”
Without passing judgment on guns in general, David alluded to the Newtown shootings as an
incidence where a rallying cry did not emerge in the wake of a horrific event. He has seen other
instances where policymakers remained unmoved by events. Instead, he saw adaption to
changing times and conditions as the most plausible course:
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We have to accept the fact that the environment that we are operating in now, the
culture and the way we exchange information, is vastly different than the 1980s.
If we want to engage people, we have to figure out how to effectively use social
media and all those things so that everything we do has to be different than the
things I was doing when I started this work many years ago. How do you get
people to care with their short attention spans and 24 hour news cycles and all that
business?
I clarified that it was not just the message, but also the delivery mechanism of the
message. “Absolutely,” he replied. He talked of the requirement to attract people, especially in
the absence of money, to social causes. Then he mused, “Yes, we have to figure out how to
engage young people.” He emphasized the need to make a direct connection with people and
their lives amidst competing interests:
If it's an environmental issue, that affects one’s community, but with nuclear
weapons, it affects everyone—but no one feels that effect until . . . you know. And
we are trying to prevent it from affecting everyone so that's very difficult when
people have other concerns in their lives and things that they're doing.
At the end of or exchange, David offered that this subject was one he had been thinking on as of
late, “I'm really, just now, thinking big thoughts about how to move this big rock up the
mountain.”
Edwin. During my first talk with Edwin, I heard many things on a content level, but in
addition, I heard something on an energetic emotional level—how his current NWR work
seemed to actualize him. In our second interview, I opened by asking him if this nuclear weapons
work was like a second career for him. He reflected briefly and talked about how, after his
retirement, he “dabbled in a lot of interesting things.” Then, “I really focused my attention here,
especially in these last few years, on this issue. I educated myself and immersed myself in this
work.” “So it wouldn’t be wrong to call it a second career. I am just not getting paid to do it. It is
something I love and I am passionate about.” I asked him if the NWR work was more intrinsic
than extrinsic motivation. As in the first interview, he said the work around nuclear weapons
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differed from a business that had immediate milestones, “It’s pretty long-term stuff.” He talked
of the satisfaction in relating to and hearing from people, “Each individual that I somehow reach
through the work, to me, is valuable. I don’t need a whole lot out there, but just doing the work
in the day to day is satisfying.”
This led to a central question. Over the years, Edwin had engaged in various activism
efforts before he had retired. I asked him if he could think about Edwin the activist then and
Edwin the activist now and describe any differences in the thinking and approach. During his
time working to make a living, Edwin provided that any activism was limited in terms of time
and energy. “The activist within me developed over time and matured and grew in a certain
direction, especially post-retirement.” Upon retirement, he had more time to read, to engage with
others, and see that there were other means of getting things done than in the “established
way . . . especially some of the really important things like abolishing nuclear weapons.” Despite
the practice of mainstream opposition tactics, he saw an irony that nuclear weapons continued to
exist and under the same rationale that had been in place for decades, “What really had happened
was that I started to evolve into this person that said I am going to try some newer things. I am
going to get engaged with folks who are doing nonviolent civil resistance.” That, in turn, brought
him to the organization he is part of today.
Throughout pre and post-retirement, Edwin espoused a theme, “Nonviolence as a core
value and practice.” He talked of education over time and aim, “So it’s been a learning
experience and a conscious choice to move in a particular direction.” I clarified that nonviolence
was a constant. He replied resoundingly, “Yes!” Yet, he made it clear that it was a work in
progress, a “practice.” He understood that it is not something he was likely to become expert at,
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but he would continue to work to achieve a greater understanding while putting the practice of
nonviolence into all aspects (personal, public, and work) of his life.
As I listened to Edwin, I had an image of tree transplanted from a forest to a meadow
where it would flourish in a greater openness. I communicated this image to Edwin and he
commented, “Yeah, a lot more sunshine.” He said, for himself, that it was not a linear journey
and he could not have imagined doing this current work. He was grateful to be financially secure
to do the work. He reiterated the need for time and energy to do activist work, “You really have
to be in a certain place to do it. So I am grateful to be where I am—to come to a choice of doing
what I am doing.”
Interviews—Closing Phase
For me, working with each of these folks was like walking on trails; all forks were richly
informative and yielded great insight, but then narrowed and eventually gave over to general
rather than specific conditions (as it relates to this inquiry). One particular track continued on a
bit farther. With each of the interviews, there was a feeling that we could go deeper in select
areas. Yet, with this forthcoming interview I got a stronger sense of looming profundity. Van
Manen (2007) recommended that phenomenology “must be thoughtful, and as much as possible,
free from theoretical, prejudicial, and suppositional intoxications. But, phenomenology is also a
project that is driven by fascination: being swept up in a spell of wonder, a fascination with
meaning” (p. 11). From start to end of the interview sequences, I had one foot planted in each of
Van Manen’s characterization; yet, I was most acutely aware of that stance during this phase.
Furthermore, the apparent constant of development for this individual lay more squarely in the
context of my question(s) around common purpose and leadership. The related aspect to this
study was the seeming progression of this participant through his own lifelong hermeneutic
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circle—without being subjective, I cannot say to what degree this ranges from being coincidental
or apropos.
Edwin. When Edwin and I talked the third time, our follow on topic was his gratitude
from performing NWR work. Incidentally, Edwin was fresh off an organizational presentation
the evening before and his sense of gratitude around that event was palpable. The presentation
featured a longtime antinuclear weapons protestor and peace activist Edwin knew from previous
work. Edwin was also thankful for the turnout for the event. Some gatherings, Edwin confessed,
did not always have a large turnout—this one did. While he is deeply appreciative of those who
regularly attend, there was a desire to see new faces:
We want people to become aware of the issue and hopefully want to know more,
hopefully to immerse themselves in the work along the way to one extent or
another. When I finished there last night, I was just feeling this deep sense of
gratitude.
Upon conclusion of the event, Edwin thought at the time, “This is good—another good positive
step!”
Edwin reflected and asked of his gratitude, “The question where does that come from?”
My spiritual journey has been a little schizophrenic,” he recalled. He grew up with little
emphasis on religion, studied comparative religion as a young adult, read on Gandhi and
Buddha, and later attended church. He characterized his spiritual growth as an “organic” process
over the last twenty years:
So there’s been some formal churchgoing, but through my study, meeting more
and more people over the past decades (slowly and then it’s grown
exponentially)—meeting people who are deeply spiritual, be they laypeople,
members of the clergy, or somewhere in between—slowly but surely that has
somehow touched me and I think helped me to grow in my work, but also in my
spiritual life in this sort of broad sense.
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His deepest influence seemed to come from individuals like the activist who had
presented the night before, “Their deep spiritual nature really continues to touch me working
with them. It’s almost like it rubs off.” He is both gratified and motivated by the work and
presence of those who do this work, “My understanding on a deeper plane of what they do and
an appreciation of that has continued to build something in me.” He did not confine himself to
select traditions to achieve affinity, “Kind of this deeper connection on a spiritual plane to
humanity, this is somewhat religious and it’s not pigeonholed into any one particular doctrine if
you will or dogma.” Edwin spoke of how, for him, prayer was self-transformative, faith
translated to action, and nonviolence ever-expanding. Edwin reiterated the need for continual
learning through deliberation and application, “The intrinsic rewards are coming from that deep
spiritual plane or place through that constant practice, study, and the work itself.”
Since nonviolence was a recurring theme throughout the three interviews, I asked Edwin
if we could examine two possible paradoxes related to their approach of nonviolence. The first
point revolved around the employment of nonviolence against what could be argued was the
most violent and calamitous weaponry in history. Edwin characterized nuclear weapons of “such
a horrific nature that is really the ultimate form of violence.” Yet, he saw no other way than an
ongoing act of nonviolence against nuclear weapons, “For nuclear weapons it is the ultimate
form of violence and you need such a dramatic nonviolent response to such a thing.”
He saw the paradox of the few against enormous odds, but also saw the promise of a shifting
balance:
Wow, it’s the most violent thing and here we are this tiny group of people
exercising some nonviolent resistance against this incredible monster out there. Is
that really going to make a difference? We try and hope that it somehow will
catch fire and there will be a wave of people engaged in the issue.
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The second point involved committing what, per the government, were illegal acts. Here,
he saw no paradox:
Looking at nonviolence resistance or civil disobedience more specifically, the
tack you are taking out there, and engaging in actions that are essentially illegal in
terms of the laws of society that have been established, in there is some cases jail
time and all that, I don’t see any difficulty or contradiction in that.
Rather, it was the establishment committing illegality, “Here we are breaking a particular law
because we believe the government is engaged in something illegal under international
humanitarian law, Nuremberg Principles, etc.” Another consistency involved the core of
nonviolence. Those who protested did it in a nonviolent manner. Those who went to jail served
their time with nonviolence. Concerning the continuum of nonviolent effort, Edwin affirmed, “I
mean it never wavers!”
Hearing his passion on the correctness of nonviolence, in this work and in life, I had a
sense of strong value congruence for Edwin; I inquired if this was so. Initially, he said, “Yeah.”
Then he amended, “Or who I’ve tried to be.” He admitted that he has lapses, manifested in
thoughts or speech, that he considered “mean/wrong.” He termed these lapses “tiny bits of, quote
unquote, violence.” Edwin has discussed anger with another in the movement who admitted, that
after years of nonviolent efforts, still gets angry after many decades of doing the work. Edwin
again talked of the requirement of ongoing practice and concluded that nonviolence did not stand
on its own:
When I really get down to it, there are a lot of other values that come into play
that I think make it able to work through the practice of nonviolence. A lot of that
has to do with the respect and a love for fellow human beings. A number of other
things, the nonviolence does not stand by itself I guess. Like so much in life, you
think about the complexity of our existence, just being human beings. There are
so many thoughts and facets that make up who we are and how we engage in the
world, I believe.
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He ended by expressing that nonviolence “hopefully will become a way of life.” Based on what I
had heard and read from our three times together, I interpreted that as a way of life for both
Edwin and humanity in general.
Conclusion
During this chapter, I related the experiences of eight people who have invested
significant periods of their lives and effort into the common purpose of nuclear weapons
reduction. For Chapter V, I will dive back into the interviews and my related notes. Through
listening, reading, and reflection, I will look across the continuum of the participant responses—
recurrence within an interview, recurrence across interviews, and emphasis (words and tone)—
for a basis to construct prevailing themes. I will then take those frequent and/or salient responses
and group them into categories that assist in interpretation of the common purpose of NWR and
associated leadership.
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Chapter V: Interpretations
Earlier in Chapter III, I offered that, per Van Manen (1984), one way to organize
phenomenological writing was around themes. Creswell and Clark (2007) provided an outline of
“qualitative data analysis” and talked of “representing findings in themes or categories” (p. 129).
Yet in presentation of those themes, I intend to go back to Wertz (2005) who suggested
considering collected data against theoretical writings. Overriding my approach was the
previously stated aim to provide a faithful and effective capture of the participants’ accounts—an
aim which carries over to analysis.
Thematic Elements
It is important that I employ a foundation and structure for emergence and capture of
themes. My initial groupings correlated to the areas of attraction, approach, challenge, and
change provide a starting point in the identification of themes. Ensuing thematic elements were
isolated by visual and auditory review of transcripts, interview notes (garnered during the
interviews and transcription process), and reflection. Saliency emerged via prevalence within
individual accounts, commonality across interviews as whole, and conveyed import. Van Manen
(1990) offered recurrence as a starting point from which to extract significant meaning.
Additionally, the category of emotion, a pronounced and variable constant within most of the
interviews, received consideration. Schwandt (2007) said that some scholars felt the need for
emotion in research and that emotion had the capacity to provide an in-kind response from
readers. Van Manen implied that meaning could follow from feeling and that feeling could aid in
the discernment of essential themes. For this study, emotion was conveyed and discerned by
words, tone, and context. Finally, I found that identification and interpretation of themes was
greatly nurtured by reflection and particularly by writing. Van Manen (1990) maintained,
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Writing mediates reflection and action…not only because phenomenology is a
certain mode of reflection done traditionally by scholars who write. But also
because a certain form of consciousness is required, a consciousness that is
created by the act of literacy: reading and writing. (p. 124)
Besides much in common across the interviews, there were several contradictions which added
perspective and contemplative value.
Attraction. There was a twofold consideration around the aspect of attraction: What
attracted these individuals to work towards nuclear weapons reduction and what made that
attraction hold fast for years, often decades? They came, in part, because of the threat. The threat
lay in the destructive power of nuclear arms. James, “It was just the enormity of the threat to
public health.” And Robert, “Basically I thought it was a very, very serious threat to the United
States and the world.” Brian stated that there “can't be probably a more important thing to do.”
Cheryl, the newest member to the cause, had said, “Our lives are in danger every day and I
hadn’t known about it.”
The threat magnified in urgency from a leader’s words which provided an attraction to
many around the world and several in this study. United States President Ronald Reagan, in
words and deeds, created a sense of alarm that, by extension, caused people to gravitate the idea
of doing something about nuclear weapons. James talked of the how Reagan’s message
promoted awareness of the threat: “I think Ronald Reagan, the very vitriolic bellicose rhetoric of
his administration, the casual discussion that we might under certain circumstances want to fight
a nuclear war, these things really terrified people . . . appropriately.” Robert mentioned that his
organization arose amidst the Reagan rhetoric and associated counter-movements. Isabel stated
that her main impetus for choosing her career work was the Reagan Star Wars Program. David
performed a study of that same Star Wars Program, talked of the nuclear freeze as a response to
the Reagan rhetoric, and mentioned how Reagan’s talk aided in coalescing others to take notice:
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“There was a significant interest again tied to people, certainly to a segment of the population, or
progressives—at least where Ronald Reagan scared the hell out of them.”
An awareness of nuclear weapons and accompanying concern began as early as
childhood. Robert recalled, “I was really very acutely conscious of all out nuclear war as a child
and a teenager.” Even at a young age, Leigh was aware of the “Cold War rhetoric” of the 1980s
and admitted, “I grew up terrified of nuclear weapons.” Social assemblages like academic
institutions, demonstrations, and professional gatherings each provided fertile soil for standing
against nuclear weapons. Coursework and a thesis related to nuclear weapons helped David
make a career choice. Edwin, while in graduate school, became acutely aware of the health
effects of nuclear warfare. Cheryl was exposed to the issue of nuclear weapons through those at
her college. James, Robert, Isabel, David, and Edwin all engaged in various forms of protest
activity as a prelude to a deeper involvement in nuclear weapons work. Vocation served as
another influence to take up NWR. James understanding of atomic warfare and his subsequent
course was enhanced by fellow physicians. Robert’s legal study and work convinced him of the
efficacy of law as a means to eliminate nuclear arms. Isabel spoke of her growing interest, “It
was nurtured by other physicists.” Edwin’s commitment was fueled by his time with other
activists.
The threat of nuclear weapons has kept them involved. Most implied, to one degree or
another, that the threat was still existent, significant, and motivating. James, Robert, Isabel,
David, Leigh, and Edwin all talked of the continuing menace of nuclear weapons. Isabel spoke of
the problem’s ongoing existence as “motivating” force. Brian and Leigh both alluded to the
fascinating aspects of the work. It was not only the study participants who had stuck with the
work, but others as well. “A number of the people who were involved in founding the
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organization in its early years are still with the organization as advisors or members of the
board,” Robert mentioned. James spoke of a member who had been in a pre-incarnation of his
group, served on the board of the existing organization, and retired “just last year.” Edwin
provided several instances of lifetimes invested in the elimination of nuclear weapons. The
attraction and hold was also demonstrated with David’s return to the work and Edwin’s fulltime
transition to NWR after retirement.
All participants expressed a degree of feeling about what they were doing. Brian
emphasized the paramount importance of the work itself. Edwin talked most of his ongoing
personal growth and reward derived from helping others. Cheryl communicated the energy she
obtained from doing the work. In a sense, it also took the nature of negative reward avoidance.
While talking of the cyclical highs and lows of antinuclear weapons work, James expressed the
need to stay the course, “You have to try anyway, because you can’t look at yourself in the face
if you don’t try to avert this danger.”
Approach. The respective approaches were a mix of commonality and variation. A
prevalent approach was bringing awareness. Regarding the nuclear freeze and New START,
David recognized awareness as a prerequisite to the success of those events. Edwin viewed
raising consciousness of nuclear weapons as a key component to his group’s strategy. Cheryl and
her organization made promotion of nuclear weapons awareness a central strategy, “One of the
things that have become increasingly clear to me is the role of word of mouth or that
communication is the way, the only way that people know about things.” That awareness needed
to resonate with personal meaning. James stated how to avoid having people hold the
information at arm’s length, “What you need to do is get people to take this data, learn it, and
sort of lodge it in a part of their brain where it affects their daily behavior.” Cheryl expressed a
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similar sentiment, in that her organization looked at “ways to make nukes a personal issue.”
Philosophy on bringing awareness varied. James emphasized that people needed to be fully
aware of the danger of nuclear weapons and be just as cognizant of the solutions to that danger.
Brian, “I think sometimes we have to just show people what needs to be done rather than just
telling people and trying to convince them.” Leigh made clear how important it was to present
problems in a straightforward and comprehendible manner, but also said, “It’s more than just a
communications issue, it's an ability to break down the problem into its component pieces and
see exactly what you are trying to influence.” Where Leigh had observed “success” was when
the problem was expressed as an “imperative” such as “the security of our citizens and country
are at stake unless we solve the problem.”
Many worked within established systems to inform and advocate for nuclear weapon
reduction. Robert saw international law and international institutions as the means to eliminate
and prevent the reemergence of nuclear weapons. A number of individuals worked through
government structures; the US Congress in particular. Cheryl navigated within her educational
institution’s structure to bring about a grassroots process. James talked of an intentional and
strategic approach when choosing those with whom to partner with and to empower, “We are
trying to specifically approach groups that we think might, in an organized way, take on the issue
themselves.” Edwin, in contrast, questioned the effectiveness of established systems and
processes to change the ingrained role of nuclear weapons in our world.
Collaboration occurred via entities, between organizations, and globally. Cheryl
envisioned debate and discussion from all sides as key to solving problems. Isabel, “I think we
really put a premium of getting our members to weigh in.” Edwin has worked with diverse
groups ranging from military veterans to environmentalists. Regarding interaction with other
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likeminded organizations, Robert said, “Being able to collaborate is a major amplifier of our
work.” Robert highlighted a “collegiate consultative approach” among all participants. For
James and his organization, international partnerships were central and he foresaw much promise
in future work with NGO’s at the national and international levels. Brian and his group worked
to heighten international cooperation. Leigh thought that increased international “engagement
and interest” offered the chance to move forward.
Time and again, the requirement for credibility was emphasized. Isabel talked of how
credibility opened the door to US policymakers. David felt that, without credibility for both
individual and group, the messenger would be marginalized and the associated message would
be discounted. Brian and David each mentioned how leaders like Senator Nunn played a key role
in providing credibility. Brian attributed his organization’s credibility in part because it “doesn't
have an agenda, but is really genuinely trying to make the world a safer place.” Leigh
emphasized that “institutional and individual credibility” was “especially important” in her field.
When asked what fostered that credibility, Leigh answered:
The easy answer is it's just the track record over time. But it's also a willingness to
listen to other views, it’s a willingness to sit down and be part of meetings when
other views are—not just present—but you can acknowledge them; it’s an ability
to modify your approach given where and how you are trying to be effective. It is
making it clear why you’re saying the thing you are saying and not just stating
absolutes.
Creativity occurred in a variety of manners and settings. James innovatively emphasized
the consequences of nuclear warfare in written and spoken terms. Isabel’s group’s efforts to
annually educate and possibly recruit new members offered a way to sustain thinking and effort.
Brian’s organization utilized the international index and table top exercises to educate in a way
that brought insight and solutions. David, with the help of outsiders, talked about reframing
nukes as a liability as opposed to the traditional view of being an asset. Cheryl’s example of the
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“Break up with Nukes” campaign made nuclear devices appear unattractive as well. Her other
organizational exercises, “Yellow Cake” and “Bike around the Bomb” illustrated nontraditional
and innovative ways of bringing awareness to a new audience. Edwin’s plan to target the
building of new nuclear weapon systems to replace aging devices took a proactive stance.
Challenge. Even if people and/or institutions were sufficiently informed about nuclear
weapons, getting people to take action remained a challenge. James called it “that last piece,”
getting people to realize that they themselves needed to do something. Cheryl and her
organization were tested when it came to getting others to do more than appreciate the message:
“Usually they don’t take the next step and ask how they could get involved.” One reason offered
was the subject matter. Cheryl and her peers found nuclear weapons to be a traditionally “dry
subject matter.” Edwin gave another view and portrayed nuclear weapons as a “politically
charged” subject for people. People preferred safer topics and per Edwin, “People can become
very alienated by the issue of nuclear weapons.” A further factor involved whom to address.
David viewed it as persuading those who could make a difference. Brian felt the best approach
lay in trying “to shift the opinions or the minds of ultimately large numbers of people in various
governments.”
Maintenance of the nuclear status quo manifested itself in old paradigms and the holding
onto of power. National security assuming primacy over global welfare appeared preeminently in
US, Russia, India, and Pakistan. This was deeply entrenched for the United States. Isabel cited
rooted thinking in a variety of US governmental departments as a prime inhibitor to further
progress on nuclear weapons. Robert, “To the United States, to lessen their reliance on nuclear
weapons is something that runs against the grain of decades of intense reliance on nuclear
weapons.” James said that Russia and Pakistan were especially tension filled for his
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organization’s affiliates. Robert offered that currently Russia was not interested in pursuing
further nuclear arms reductions. Isabel echoed that opinion about Russia’s disinclination for
additional reductions. A paradox for other nations—India, Pakistan, and China—involved being
asked to reduce nuclear weapons amidst the US and Russian maintenance of large nuclear
arsenals. Brian spoke of China’s reluctance to pare their nuclear levels, “They say that they are
for disarmament but they are waiting for the US and Russia to come down.” James said he has
been challenged while in India and Pakistan about the US nuclear weapons levels.
Moreover, perceived emerging threats (Iran, North Korea, and terrorists) fueled concern
and made some argue for the continued existence of nuclear weapons. James has heard the threat
of Iran as a counterargument against nuclear weapons reductions. David pointed to a shift in
attention by the media and the policymakers to Iran, North Korea, and terrorists: “The focus
seems to be what we can do to make sure that these bad guys don't get these things or use them
against us?” Isabel agreed, “People are much more concerned about terrorism and the potential
for nuclear terrorism.” And then there was the reinforcement of nuclear weapons advocacy by
sudden and unexpected events. Robert gave the example of almost a decade of multilateral
progress on nuclear weapons being derailed by the events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent
retaliation. Isabel had questioned the continued significant US and Russian nuclear posture in
today’s post-Cold War world. Concerning US and Russian nuclear arsenals, she had said, “We
are still at a level of obscene overkill.” “Both the US and Russia have their land based missiles
on high alert” with the result that “there is room for accidental or unauthorized or a launch in
reaction to a false warning of an incoming attack,” she had continued. Coincidently, similar
concerns about the maintenance of high levels of US and Russian weapons on alert along with
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the additional caveat that the US personnel manning those weapons had a poorly defined
post-Cold War mission was raised by both David and Edwin in their subsequent interviews.
Having sufficient means (expertise, personnel, and money) to conduct their work in a
sustained and effective manner posed a concern. Robert talked of accomplishment despite limits
in funding and staff. “Another sort of perennial barrier is not having enough resources and
money to do the work we want to do,” Isabel observed. Isabel spoke further of disinterest from
the public and policymakers in Washington along with the precarious nature of funding for
organizations involved in nuclear weapons reduction activities. She offered several creative
examples of work to reengage interest—web redesign, public ads, and an infusion of money to
find “new approaches” to raise awareness—the last somewhat dismaying, since the financial
resources would be for “new actors” not existing entities. She reemphasized funding as a critical
component for creative and expansive messaging. David stated that an absence of funding
prevented the kind of campaign that might generate the necessary awareness about nuclear
weapons. Per Leigh, it involved limited capacity at the international level, “There isn't a
non-governmental community around these issues of nuclear threats like there is in the United
States in any other country in the world. There isn't this idea that you can be an expert outside of
government.” Regarding technical expertise, Leigh added, “There’s also a waning capacity in the
United States, and limited capacity in other countries.” The aspect of personal capacity, how
much to give of oneself at the expense of other needs, came up in conversation with both James
and Edwin. One countermeasure to offset reduced capacity involved overall alignment within the
work of NWR. David saw the current antinuclear weapons forces as “fighting smaller battles”
rather than collectively coming “together to really make some progress in reducing the number
of these weapons on the planet.”
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The subject of competing interests was frequently mentioned, yet variant. James when
talking about the consequence of not getting people to see the danger of nuclear weapons and the
accompanying solutions to that danger: “People just have lots of other problems in life they have
to deal with and this one doesn’t seem important enough.” James, David, and Cheryl each
alluded to the role (or lack thereof) of media in the declining interest around nuclear arms. James
specifically assigned responsibility to the media, particularly the American outlets, for not
providing a sufficient conduit for information about the threat of nuclear weapons. James,
imperturbable throughout our talks, conveyed a sense of frustration whenever talking about the
US media’s inability to report on or see the risk of nuclear weapons. Because of the lack of
reporting, audiences had no context when James and others delivered their message—he did
provide positive examples of international media interest. David, in his second interview,
acknowledged “short attention spans” and “24 hour news cycles” as a problem and that different
methodologies (i.e., social media) would have to be employed to attract and retain people.
Brian gave two distinct examples of competition. Speaking of US “Congress leaders and
their staff,” his organization had the impression that “they're focused on other issues; they don't
have much time; they don't have much interest.” Regarding other countries, Brian related that
some nations understood the need for nuclear security, but it wasn’t a prioritized at the level of
something immediate like hunger. Then there are those who advocate keeping nukes in place.
Leigh, “It's the people who feel very strongly that the US national security interest is hurt and not
helped by any discussion of further of nuclear reductions.” Isabel provided a similar sentiment,
“There are a lot of folks lobbying on the other side.” Cheryl, as well, has heard the argument for
weapons retention from fellow students. Some participants mentioned environmentalism as a
competing interest. Isabel mentioned funding shifts to environmental and energy issues. Edwin
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worked with environmentalists who had trouble seeing nuclear weapons as an immediate
priority. Cheryl “Our generation, I think, sees environmental issues as a lot more pressing,
because of all the predictions of how soon the earth is going to be destroyed, by the way we keep
polluting it.”
Ongoing considerations around the systemic complexity of nuclear weapons and the
systemic effects of reduction surfaced. A common contention held that nuclear weapons could
not be easily separated from other military means. Isabel viewed Russia’s reluctance for nuclear
reduction being tied to US superiority in conventional military forces and that a similar situation
with China was beginning to emerge. Brian felt that there was linkage between the various
security issues and that to make progress “you have to consider conventional forces and all sorts
of other things.” Relationships between countries inhibited or fostered activity on NWR. James
was particularly concerned about relations between India and Pakistan, their burgeoning nuclear
arsenals, and their collective potential to induce worldwide catastrophe. Isabel saw a correlation
between the US relationship with Russia and progress on nuclear weapons reductions: “Our
relationship with Russia is not conducive to making further reductions.” Including China in the
mix, Isabel said, “It is hard to just pull out the issue of nuclear weapons from the overall
relationship between countries.” David said that the poor relationship between the US and Russia
along with differences on a number of other issues made further nuclear reductions improbable
for the time being. Edwin framed the problem in an old warning, but in a new manner, calling it
the “nuclear military industrial complex.” Edwin explained that billions of dollars were being
spent on complex and deeply tied nuclear weapons systems that were built and serviced by a
number of companies. These companies in turn employed many people whose economic
wherewithal depended on the sustenance of nuclear weapons. For Edwin, the elimination of
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nuclear weapons would have to be accompanied by job creation for those individuals being
displaced.
Change. The threat of destruction by nuclear warfare and the response to the threat had
degrees of continuity and change. The Cold War had ended. Yet according to some in this study,
the nuclear equipped dyads of the US and Russia, India and Pakistan remained heavily armed
and at odds. Additionally, North Korea, Iran, and terrorists embodied emerging or latent nuclear
threats. Still, many envisioned this current period as being tinged with possibility. Leigh said that
while the threat had changed, views around the threat had become more “sophisticated” offering
more avenues of working towards the threat: “I think that because there is a much more diverse
view in the field, there are a lot more opportunities for diverse work.” James felt that the climate
of the last few years had enabled his group to launch “a very rapidly growing international
campaign to abolish nuclear weapons.”
Like President Reagan, but in a vastly different manner, President Obama put attention
on nuclear arms and achieved some initial success in weapons reduction. James attributed “a
huge transformation on the situation around nuclear weapons occurring over the last four or five
years” in part to Obama’s “openness to the idea that we should get rid of nuclear weapons.”
Robert credited Obama for working to reignite efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, “The Obama
administration and Obama personally have been trying to reverse that and get back on track with
nuclear arms control, leading some day to the elimination of nuclear weapons and
nonproliferation.” Leigh provided the global impact of Obama’s words:
I think that especially on nuclear security, the change in the international
environment since President Obama's Prague speech in 2009 has been profound.
It used to be that there were very few countries that actually took an active
interest in nuclear security. I think there are now a lot more players.
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Different from earlier decades, the overall American political milieu was now more ill
positioned for making change. David, “There is a level of dysfunction and lack of bipartisanship
or a collective sense of ‘We need to govern’ and that feels very different for me.” David offered
a possible explanation for “this divisiveness and polarization and nastiness within the public
political sphere; I think one reason for that is the 24/7 information age that we live in and that
was different back in 1980.” Brian described how the political landscape had changed along with
the resulting ramifications:
There are certain topics like missile defense where people have rigid views that
are based typically on what political party they are in. And these are people who
don't actually take the time to understand the substance of the issue, understand
the broad repercussions of their position and so on, so we end up not having
substantive discussion on important topics like that because of the political
overlay.
From Cheryl’s perspective, nuclear weapons opponents and supporters tended to fall along the
respective lines of who was and was not an Obama supporter. James made a related observation,
“Some of our activists in areas that are politically more conservative have found it a lonelier
task.”
Overall interest in nuclear weapons has receded. James, “We’ve built these huge defenses
in our minds during the course of the nuclear weapons era to convince ourselves that despite the
danger out there, it just won’t happen, life will go on.” Cheryl, remarked on the dissipation of
interest in nuclear weaponry, “The fact that it just trickled away—I think as we had other things
to discuss—but the issue itself didn’t do that.” David echoed the evolving communal disinterest
and the need for reversal of that condition:
Today, that interest among policy makers and the public is virtually non-existent.
If anything has changed, it is this sense of urgency. People don't even know how
many nuclear weapons we have and no one seems to care. That is what's changed
and that is our biggest problem; is how to get people to continue to be concerned
and to do something about it.
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Isabel spoke of the problem in the public context,
In terms of lack of public support, there are so many problems and this is no
longer really on the radar screen, which is a good thing is some sense, but it also
makes it hard to make progress on it when you really want people to be pushing
their representatives and the administration.
Some saw a shifting from the public as the primary difference maker to government or
private parties. Leigh offered, “I think there has been an ebb and flow as to the role of the public,
and the role of influencing the public and public opinion.” She further elaborated that the public
should be engaged, “But decisions are being made really at the highest levels of government, and
in some cases the private sector. Unless you can influence that thinking, you can't really have an
impact.” Isabel also admitted that her “outward public facing work” had somewhat transitioned
to “more of an inward facing work” with the presidential administration and congress; she
attributed this partly to an increase in experience and relationships on the inward side. Yet, some
still saw the public as the main driver in lessening the nuclear weapons threat. Edwin talked of
writer friend who thought it was the public “who really brought enough pressure to bear on
presidents, world leaders, to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war on a number of key occasions.”
Cheryl and her group operated almost exclusively from a public focused strategy.
Finally there was the change element embodied by individual and purpose development.
This development could be looked at in four timeframes. The first group of James and Robert
came to the work, in part, because their respective professional callings of medicine and law
were deeply incongruent with the existence of nuclear weapons. Second, there was the group,
Isabel, and David, that came to the common purpose amidst the rhetoric and nuclear freeze of
the 1980s. Third, there were those, Brian and Leigh, which came to the work in a newly forming
post-Cold War environment. The last comprised of the recent entrants, Edwin and Cheryl, who
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had joined in the new millennium with serial events like 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
election of President Obama. Before and after they stepped onto the stage of nuclear weapons
reduction, each grouping was continually informed by their changing world: By Reagan, by the
Cold War’s end, by the web, by terrorism and rogue countries, by Obama, by social media like
Facebook, and by the retention of nuclear arsenals by the US, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan
(the named nuclear powers, not all inclusive). For all, there was a communicated sense of
lifelong learning, both in and out of the nuclear weapons context. While often wrestling with the
changing threat and the world’s flagging interest, they moved forward and sought to modify.
As I conducted the final three interviews, one with David and two with Edwin, potential
and actual transformation came more to the forefront. David in his first interview had articulated
the power of attraction and force in the nuclear freeze and New START initiatives—others had
outlined both events as being pivotal. I gained an impression of wistfulness to get back to that
condition where many gravitated to something of a tangible and accomplishable nature. My
second conversation with David zeroed in that concept of a “rallying cry,” what it felt like during
the freeze and New START, what a new central objective might be, and what might be
accomplished with a fixed aim. Regarding the freeze, David described it as a “simple concept” in
response to heightened concern that engaged people and led to outcomes. Concerning New
START, David again emphasized a focus that could drive action, but to a much lesser degree
than the freeze. When I asked him what a potential rallying cry would be, he admitted that was
the key unanswered and occupying question. When I asked him what a rallying cry would
accomplish, he cited a few possibilities such as improving US/Russian relations or “ratification
and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” Then he answered the first rallying
cry question (what a cry would be) in a new way: It really started with awareness, a “national
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conversation” as David termed it that would get all the key constituencies, public and private, to
appreciate and do something about the risk. This new, broad, and deeply entrenched awareness
was, in a sense, the horse that pulled the cart; the cart remained to be filled with specific
objectives on how to reduce or eliminate the risks of nuclear weapons. David voiced a deep
commitment in the midst and at the end of the interview to continue reflecting on this rallying
cry aspect of his work.
Talking with Edwin on three occasions allowed me the furthest travel to a point where I
could obtain a phenomenological objective, capturing the essence of the phenomenon (or at least
this particular aspect of the phenomenon). Throughout, Edwin exuded reverence for his calling
while concurrently demonstrating a deep sense of peace that came from doing this work. He
characterized the work as intrinsically rewarding, but a long process with no immediate success.
He was oriented to past, present, and future. He was informed by past because he studied and
learned from events and concepts through reading, observation, and conversing with others.
While in the present, he employed and honed his “practice” of nonviolence through the
antinuclear weapons work and drew inspiration from others in the movement. He foresaw the
need to look to and be responsible to “future generations” which aided his motivation to
eliminate nuclear weapons. After securing the capacity of time and energy to do the work on a
fulltime basis, Edwin was able achieve congruency with his values, continue his path to
actualization, and realize a deep “gratitude” for the opportunity.
Thematic Groupings
Van Manen (1990) proffered, “As we gain themes and thematic statements from our
various sources, we may wish to capture the thematic statements in more phenomenologically
sensitive paragraphs” (pp. 95-96). From the thematic elements in the participant accounts, I
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unearthed three endemic groupings—story, relationship, and evolution. Additionally, Van
Manen (1990) stated that within the discipline of phenomenology, it was critical to differentiate
between essential and incidental themes of the phenomenon in question; a criterion for
identifying an essential theme was expressed: “In determining the universal or essential quality
of a theme our concern is to discover aspects or qualities that make a phenomenon what it is and
without which the phenomenon could not be what it is” (pp. 106-107). Flowing from Van
Manen’s assertion, I determined the essential qualities (from the second and third interview
phases) of competing interests, status quo, rallying cry, and actualization could be examined
within the context of story, relationship, and evolution. Looking primarily (but not exclusively)
at those distilled aspects in the light of additional literature provided a manageable and focused
effort; otherwise the attempt had the likelihood of degenerating into a sprawling ramble. At the
same time, all elements were represented because the distilled elements were derived from or
augmented by a weaving in of the earlier elements in the opening of interviews.
Bentz and Shapiro (1998) said that within the hermeneutic approach that story was one
path to understanding, there was interconnectedness, and that understanding changes as we
traverse the process. What was heard, what was read from text, what was reflected upon, what
was written upon, and what was mediated by literature fell within story, relationship, and
evolution. For particular example, a thematic element of this study, creativity, made an
appearance in each grouping. The story of nuclear threat required creativity to be heard and then
retained. Creativity was necessary in identifying relationship and building efficacious
relationships. The element of creativity had to evolve for it to stay relevant to the changing threat
and the dynamism of overall global conditions. Additionally, story, relationship, and change each
had phenomenological connotation. Lastly, story, relationship, and innovation tied to the
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common purpose/leadership literature presented in Chapter II under the rubrics of narrative,
relational, and adaptation.
Story, relationship, and evolution afforded lenses with which to consider findings, but
they could not completely stand without an overlay of literature from Chapter II and additional
supporting studies. My way was intended to be consistent with Laverty’s (2003) earlier
referenced statement of hermeneutic phenomenology, “These interpretations arose through a
fusion of the text and its context, as well, as the participants, the researcher, and their contexts”
p. 21). Van Manen (1990) gave a perspective related to Laverty’s, “Composing linguistic
transformations is not a mechanical procedure. Rather, it is a creative, hermeneutic process”
(p. 96). While the vantages of story, relationship, and evolution along with related literature head
up the ensuing sections, the elements and the groupings had to be considered in the conjectured
framework of the common purpose and leadership relationship as well; a section which I present
at the conclusion of this chapter.
Story. Speaking of the differences between the vehicles of argument (focused on limited
events and set time periods) and story as a means for research accounting, Schwandt (2007)
wrote, “A story form for research reporting, however, is typically diachronic (dealing with
phenomenon as it changes over time). It contains surprises, coincidences, embellishments, and
other rhetorical devices that draw the reader in and hold in a different manner” (p. 201). Van
Manen made a similar assertion: “A common rhetorical device in phenomenological writing is
the use of story or writing” (1990, p. 115).
From the participant stories a collective account formed. There was the ongoing story of
massive and immediate world threat; a story that brought people of diverse backgrounds to work
against that threat and kept them invested for many years, in some cases lifetimes. It was a
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chronicle of individuals, groups, nations, and international community embracing and eschewing
the proffered information. It was a tale told in the face of arrested thinking and desire to maintain
the status quo. It was a narrative with systemic complexities of power, economics, pride,
security, and insecurity. It was a story competing to be heard among a litany of other stories. It
was a story that was previously loud and resonant and, while not receding in import to life itself,
yet was not given its former consideration. It was a story with a requirement to incorporate
ever-changing realities and creativity in such a way that new audiences would attend, spread
awareness, and ideally bring about monumental change. It was a history of leadership, both
formal and informal.
Returning to the literature review in Chapter II, a number of pertinent instances involving
story were present. Denning (2007) and Gardner (1995) prescribed telling story in such a way
that there was personal meaning along with an ideal destination for those listening; an approach
reminiscent of that taken by James and Cheryl. Gardner advocated suppleness in story so as to be
able to speak to varying audiences while Reason and Newman (2013) called for stories of
engagement, enchantment, inspiration, and community action—many of these characteristics
were inherent in the dissertation participants’ methods. James, Isabel, David, and Cheryl all
talked of the lack of awareness and attention to nuclear weapons along with competing
narratives; with James and David mentioning the more specific role of media as a contributing
factor. Senge (1994) mentioned the dissonance created by too much data and Wildcat (2009)
spoke of how technology kept us from attending to the world at hand. Gardner (1995) spoke
directly to the problem of competing stories, significant in this examination, and placed the
responsibility upon leaders to “transplant, suppress, compliment,” or use other means to reduce
“counterstories” (p. 14). Leigh’s prescription, setting priorities, for obviating competing
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interests was just such an example. Gardner stated that story must be crafted in accordance with
the listeners’ past and the times at hand. Fletcher (2004) provided that models may be valid yet
the words around them required “simple reconstitution.” These last two points may align to the
appearance of rising disinterest despite the never ceasing danger of nuclear weapons. Gardner
correlated leader impact with leader story (embodiment and telling) and resultant audience
reception—this was illustrated by the reactions and outcomes to the differing stories of
Presidents Reagan and Obama.
Taking a renewed look at the literature on story provided a mixture of reinforcement and
addition. Very much in line with the approach of James to share consequence and prevention of
nuclear war, Bruner (2002) wrote, “Stories reassert a kind of conventional wisdom about what
can be expected, even (or especially) what can be expected to go wrong and what might be done
to restore or cope with the situation” (p. 31). The competition of alternate tales was not
unnoticed. Or as Isabel had said, “I think people get tired of working on something for a long
time.” “Ultimately, certain types of stories will become typically predominant—in particular,
stories that provide an adequate and timely sense of identity for individuals who live within a
community or institution,” offered Gardner (1995, p. 22). Elements around the concept of a
rallying cry received interest. “Truly great stories blend head and heart” (Senge, 1994, p. 293).
Gardner (1995) concurred, “Stories speak to both parts of the human mind—its reason and
emotion” (p. 43). Put another way, narrative “must take heed of life as we know it, yet alienate
us from it sufficiently to think of alternatives beyond it” (Bruner, 2002, p. 94). Yukl (2006)
furnished three requirements for an emotional or value-based inspirational appeal:
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Basis for an inspirational appeal include patriotism, loyalty, liberty, freedom,
self-fulfillment, justice, fairness, equality, love, tolerance humanitarianism, and
progress;



Insight into the values, hopes, and fears of the person or group to be influenced;



An agent’s ability to use vivid imagery and metaphors, manipulate symbols, and
employ voice and gestures to generate enthusiasm and excitement (p. 167).

In terms of developing story and storytelling, Denning (2007) placed emphasis on continuous
practice, utilization of a burning platform (urgency), engendering dissatisfaction with the status
quo, and an image of the future. These elements from the literature spoke to David’s aspiration,
but were employed in part by James and Cheryl.
Relationship. Laverty (2003) commented on phenomenology, “Epistemologically, this
framework sees a relationship between knower and the known” (p. 13). From the knowers and
the known of the interview stories emerged a sense of other relationships between peoples,
concepts, issues, and solutions. There appeared a relationship between the participants and their
calling, an attraction that in many cases has held fast for decades. Relationships of people at
individual, organizational, and international settings were identified. There existed the issue of
national identity tied to nuclear weapons for India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US; an identity
fostered by the perception of power and real power related to nuclear weapon possession.
Ridding a country, not to mention the world, of nuclear weapons seemed to require capacity (in
terms of money, people, expertise, and time) and will. A connection between nuclear weapons
reductions and leaders use of fear (Reagan) and collective welfare (Obama) rose to the surface of
many accounts.
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Once again, Chapter II correlated in some ways with the interviews. Hersman and Peters
(2006) said that, for Taiwan and South Korea, economic wellbeing followed from each nation’s
decision to turn away from nuclear weapons. From the vantage of disparate contexts, Brian,
Cheryl, and Edwin each tied economics to nuclear weapons. In line with the international efforts
of James, Brian, and Leigh along with Robert’s example of the Middle Powers Initiative, Fry
(2009) saw a connection between joint efforts and peace amongst societies. Conversely, Robert,
Isabel, David, James, and Brian talked of how poor international relationships inhibited progress.
George (B. George, 2011) advocated the necessity of having a “safe place” for expressing
thoughts. James talked of several nations where the idea of nuclear weapons reduction was not
advocated or practiced in mortal safety. Both Isabel and Leigh made mention of the technical
aspects of their work and Hickman (2010) saw technology as a way to attract, retain, and foster.
James, Isabel, and Edwin each made reference to the longstanding nature of the effort to reduce
nuclear weapons. Kotter and Cohen (2002), Clark (2008), and Kegan and Lahey (2009) all
pointed out that meaningful change involved long measures of time. Both Senge (1990) and Kim
(2010) emphasized the importance of a systems approach, adding that when an element of the
system saw itself as independent, disharmony on a holistic scale ensued. Situated within the
interviews were multiple instances of systems thinking. Edwin gave the example of nuclear
weapons and corporate/worker livelihood being intertwined and needing consideration in the
event of nuclear weapons elimination. Brian expressed a nuanced view on how the problem of
nuclear weapons could neither be considered nor solved in an isolated fashion. James tying
nuclear weapons to a health threat and Robert framing nuclear weapons in legal terms illustrated
systemic consideration. There were also several participant references to the US holding its
individual interests and nuclear weapons arsenal above consideration.
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A further look at external literature revealed more insight from the angle of relationship.
Vaill (1996) employed a term, “Cultural key,” that helped to consider and take into account
different views:
A cultural key is an understanding of the meaning of a given situation from the
point of view of the cultural representatives who are involved in it in any way,
both those of the culture in which the situation is occurring and those of other
cultures. In addition, because the meaning of any situation is essentially
unbounded, no one cultural key can be, or needs to be, a complete understanding
of the meaning. (pp. 157-158)
Such a key can be considered when James, Robert, or Isabel talked of Russia, but it was also
applicable to Brian’s point about countries that may be prioritizing immediate needs like hunger
alleviation over nuclear materials security. Vaill did not confine the cultural key concept to
nations; he suggested applicability to self, group, and institutions. The cultural key can be one
explanation for the challenging theme of competing interests, but it can also be contemplated
when dealing with impasse in relationships or thinking. Senge (1994) offered two useful
conceptions which could be applied to the nuclear weapons problem of status quo maintenance.
The first, “The primacy of the whole,” was briefly mentioned in Chapter II of this paper, but not
in depth—The premise “suggests that relationships are in a general sense, more fundamental than
things, and that wholes are more are primordial than parts” (Senge, 1994, p. 25). Senge
continued, “In the West, we tend to think the parts are primary, existing somehow independent of
the wholes within which they are constituted” (p. 25). This type of thinking, parts as primacy,
could account for some of the stagnancy around nuclear weapons elimination efforts; particularly
on the US side as mentioned in the interviews. Marion and Uhl-Bien (2002), within a complex
systems framework, provided an efficacious leadership model that correlated with participant
activity:
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Complex Leaders, acting as Complex Adaptive Agents, also capitalize on
situations that create conflicting constraints and foster conditions that permit the
interaction of a complex of constraints (i.e., indirect leadership), thus enabling
aggregation, innovation, and fitness. That is, they foster network structures that
present complexly interactive challenges, create atmospheres that “empower”
others to deal with constraints, and enable network relationships that can work
through constraints and use them as springboards for creativity. (p. 26)
James, Robert, Leigh, Cheryl, Edwin provided examples of complex leadership in enabling
others and navigating constraints. According to Senge (1994), the relationship of self and self’s
growth can be tied to a larger whole “The community nature of self: Seeing one’s self in relation
to the community, operating on that premise, and enlarging the breadth of opportunity for
development of self and others” (p. 26). The participants of this study as a whole saw themselves
as part of something bigger and acted correspondingly; Edwin most notably articulated the
feeling of inspiration and actualization that came from working with others and acting in the
community interest:
There are people like that who are so dedicated and they would literally give their
lives. I mean they are willing to go to prison and whatever happens, they are
willing to give up everything for what they believe in and I forgot to go into that
subject a little bit. Working with people like that has really helped me, helped me
dedicate myself to this work.
Evolution. Bentz and Shapiro (1998) wrote, “We are living through a major
sociohistorical turning point now” (pp. 16-17). This turning point manifested itself in “at least
five major aspects:” An emerging global market, an accelerating information society, an
environmental limit to human activities, a post-Cold War setting, and a burgeoning voice from
previously disenfranchised parties. Coming from their individual and collective experience of a
number of years, the interviewees reflected the change of the world and respective change in
their selves. The threat, ever present into a third generation, bore as well the earmarks of change.
Since the first atomic detonation in 1945, nuclear weapons have, until recent years, increased in
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numerical scope, technological prowess, and global habitat. In addition to Russia and the US,
India and Pakistan were a dyad of nuclear power and tension. Lately, rogues and terrorists had
become a prominent concern. Counteracting the threat was an alternately evolving and fixed set
of responses at the individual, group, national, and international levels. Innovation was displayed
in the form of the freeze, New START lobbying, and threat portrayal on one level and yet
stopped in time on another plane as evidenced by Russia and the US still being engaged in Cold
War like postures.
The Chapter II writings discussed development and associated effects. Laverty said,
“Hermeneutic research is interpretive and concentrated on historical meanings of experience and
their developmental and cumulative effects on individual and social levels” (2003, p.16). Shamir
et al. (2005) echoed Laverty and proposed that life stories played a role in the development of
leaders and those they influence. Each of the study participants, leaders in their respective
manners, reflected change through the course of their life stories and the time of the interviews,
these changes were viewed with from varying points to include dismay, interest, and deep
contemplation. The idea of innovative creativity offered by James, Isabel, Brian, Edwin, and
Cheryl was mirrored in nuclear weapons writings by Dunn (2006), Langewiesche (2007), and
Clayton (2010). The evolving and continuous nature of the nuclear threat was largely prevalent
among participants and authors alike. There was also the topic of arrested development and
stagnant thinking conveyed where, in the aftermath of the success of the nuclear freeze, major
inroads were few and far between. James mentioned the stagnancy of American media while
Isabel talked of similar inertia in Washington government. Yukl (2006), Keller (2009), and Jervis
(2010) covered the propensity of leadership to rely on familiar thinking and the pitfalls of such
an approach. Senge et al. (2000) suggested an alteration of course in the face of shifting
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circumstances. Gardner (1995) attributed the success of Gandhi and his movement to an evolving
philosophy.
A fresh dive into the literature around development, adaptation, and change yielded
valuable insights. Yukl (2006) opined on the complexity and length of bringing about the advent
of change, “The interlocking nature of social systems creates tremendous inertia...it often takes
years to implement significant change” (p. 286). Yukl’s notion dovetailed with Robert’s points
about achieving change over time within institutions. Hickman (2010) said that “climate, timing,
and threshold points are essential factors in prompting change” (p. 18). She then associated
emerging conditions of change with those factors: Climate (passive to threatening), timing
(premature to opportune), and threshold points (lacking to prevalent). Hickman’s concept can be
applied to the story of NWR. During the time of Reagan’s rhetoric, the climate became
threatening and the freeze commenced. After the end of the Cold War, the timing was opportune
for Senators Nunn and Lugar to introduce the Cooperative Threat Reduction. The election of
Barack Obama was a threshold point that enabled the passage of New START. Pertaining to
aspect around nuclear weapons status quo maintenance, Vaill (1996) intimated for progression to
take root, unlearning might be necessary—towards that end he provided sequential steps that can
be employed in unlearning and development of future courses:


A phenomenological reduction is a decision to try to let the thing we encounter be
what it is, separate from our perception of it. This entails a recognition of our natural
tendency to impute meaning to it, to have already decided what it means.



Imaginative variation is the almost playful combining and recombining of the
various modes of the situation’s being. What is called brainstorming, for example, is
actually a form of imaginative variation.
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Out of this process, we could provide interpretations of the likelihood and desirability
of the various scenarios. (pp. 161-162)

Those aforementioned steps seemed relevant to the struggle in determining the shape and
employment of a rallying cry around the threat of nuclear weapons. Bennis (2003) discussed
ways that leaders learned from experience and consequently developed: Integration of early life
events, seeking avenues of challenge and growth, the taking of risks knowing the possibility of
failure, and viewing the future (for self and the world) as an opportunity (not a trial) to do the
things that need doing. Such points were clearly present in the life stories and leadership growth
of the interviewees.
The Common Purpose/Leadership Relationship in NWR
I entered into this study wondering about the nature of the relationship between common
purpose and leadership. My additional sense was that there might be a unidirectional or
bidirectional influence between common purpose and leadership. I focused upon the
phenomenon of nuclear weapons reduction as a manageable and meaningful setting for
considering my interest. Suggestive of the nature of NWR work, Van Manen (1990) talked of the
relational aspect of phenomenon exploration:
As we meet the other we are able to develop a conversational relation which
allows us to transcend our selves. In a larger existential sense human beings have
searched in this experience of the other, the communal, the social for a sense of
purpose in life, meaningfulness, grounds for living, as in the absolute Other, God.
(p. 105)
I utilize this passage, because as I engaged (listening, reading, and writing over time) with those
I interviewed, I did, without getting into the question of God, gain a sense of quest for
meaningful purpose and collective transcendence. Through an exploration of the phenomenon of
nuclear weapons reduction, through the hearing and consideration of the stories of those engaged
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in a purpose that has the potentiality to touch all we know, I come now to the questions I posed
at the onset of this dissertation: What is the relationship between the common purpose of nuclear
weapons reduction and respective leadership? Is there a mutually in-forming (influencing)
relationship between common purpose and associated leadership? While answers to these
questions may have been hinted at somewhat over the course of this chapter, a more specific or
conclusive response is required. Following are some examples rooted in the interviews, the
global environment of NWR, and then supplemental literature. Each case offers potential
influence, judged by reader interpretation, between the common purpose of NWR and
leadership.
As stated at several points in this dissertation, leadership was said to have originated from
many sides. While not all of the interview participants had formal leadership titles, they met
heretofore stated leadership criteria. Looking at Rost’s (1993) espoused definition of leadership,
all sought to influence, intended real change, and worked to develop mutual purpose.
Additionally, Heifetz (1994), Hickman (2010), and Hickman and Sorenson (2014) remarked on
the efficacy of informal leadership. Therefore to reiterate, all participants of this study were
considered leaders, be they positional or non-positional, constituted or non-constituted, formal or
informal, titled or untitled.
Randall Forsberg, the freeze, and the study participants. A genesis of influence that
ran from leader to purpose and back to leaders (to include some of the participants) involved
Randall Forsberg, also known as Randy, and the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s. Forsberg
was prominent in the earlier profile on Helen Caldicott. David brought her efforts up in his
second interview, “Randy Forsberg, who sort of was the originator of the freeze” and added, “I
think it made it easier for some people who perhaps hadn't been involved.” Caldicott (1997) also
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referred to Forsberg as “the founder of the nuclear freeze” (p. 205). Similarly, Redekop (2010)
called Forsberg the “main architect and proponent of the nuclear Freeze proposal” (p. 278).
Besides David, Isabel got involved at “the time of the nuclear freeze movement.” James talked of
the massive awareness that was generated during the 1980s. Leigh referred to the influence of the
1980s as well. As to the freeze’s global weight, David said,
There's certainly a lot of debate as to whether or not what impact that had on
subsequent nuclear arms control efforts with the Soviets. That's for history to
decide I guess, but it certainly engaged a whole heck of a lot of people in the issue
and I think more so than anything since then.
Redekop (2010) for one thought the freeze helped “push the Reagan administration towards
disarmament talks with the Soviet Union” (p. 278). Randy Forsberg’s thinking about nuclear
weapons was influenced by her work at the Swedish Peace Institute and her subsequent graduate
studies at MIT (Caldicott, 1997; Redekop, 2010). Forsberg then translated her knowledge to
action or as Redekop (2010) stated “She united people from across the social and political
spectrum—business people, politicians, academics, and other professionals, the non-profit sector,
and everyday Americans—in a common quest to begin backing away from the nuclear abyss”
(p. 282). Not only did the freeze play a possible role in influencing participant thinking and their
attraction to the purpose, it still plays a role in the minds and words of the interviewees as an
ideal of what could and can be achieved.
Barack Obama, New START, and the study participants. Here again, a cycling of
influence between purpose and leadership can be advanced. A number of interviewees
referenced Barack Obama’s efforts over the last few years: attempts to change the views
surrounding nuclear weapons and an actual reduction in the form of an agreement between the
US and Russia. Robert credited Obama personally with trying to reverse the post-9/11 inaction
around nuclear weapons “and get back on track with nuclear arms control, leading some day to
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the elimination of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation.” Senator Lugar, who worked with Sam
Nunn to safeguard Soviet nuclear weapons in the wake of the Cold War’s end (the earlier
discussed Cooperative Threat Reduction), coauthored a weapons bill with then Senator Obama
(Lugar, 2008; Obama, 2007). Later and referencing Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Senator
Obama wrote of nuclear weapons, “Our current measures are not sufficient to meet the current
threat” (2007, p. 8). Obama then went on to outline an approach that secured nuclear weapons
and materials from terrorists, deescalated nuclear postures bilaterally with Russia, and contained
the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. After his presidential election, Obama and others
were able to negotiate an agreement with Russia, New START, which limited strategic nuclear
warheads to 1,550 for each country (Baker, 2010; Lee, 2011). President Obama, unlike Reagan,
did not engage the Russians in an adversarial manner, yet in a White House Press release, Obama
was compared to President Reagan when it came to reducing nuclear weapons (Baker, 2010).
President Obama was influenced by his association with those like Senator Lugar (and by
extension Senator Nunn) who had been working for many years to reduce nuclear weapons and
improve nuclear security. President Obama in turn greatly impacted the purpose of NWR
through public voice and the New START treaty while also giving energy and direction to those
who worked against nuclear weapons to include some of the interviewees.
Although President Obama was able to secure the New START agreement with the
Russians, it was a near thing as to whether the treaty would receive ratification in the US Senate.
Without the efforts of many individuals around the world, New START may not have happened.
As David had said, it truly was “all hands on deck” to lobby and target key Senate votes. Per
Taubman (2012), Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn all pushed for ratification as well as
national religious organizations. Obama also enlisted the aid of the first President Bush, US
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military generals, and European leaders in pushing for ratification (Baker, 2010). Augmenting
those efforts were the actions of study participants and their organizations. Besides David, Isabel,
James, and Cheryl spoke of the efforts made during the push for New START.
The instance of New START held plausible illustrations of mutual influence and waning
or arrested influence. This study’s participants and/or their organizations made great efforts to
assist in the treaty’s passage and were reciprocally affected in such a way that they highlighted
the event as a positive and powerful example several years later. However, near-term additional
progress on nuclear arms control seemed problematic after the arduous process of the New
START ratification and countries like China were unlikely to consider trimming their own
nuclear arsenals until the US and Russia reduced their operational warheads under the threshold
of 500 for each country (Taubman, 2012). The interviewees, heartened by the initial efforts of
the Obama administration, had adopted a more sober view over the last few years. Isabel talked
of Obama, despite his commitment to the issue of nuclear weapons, being “stymied” by the
“national security community.” James made a similar assertion, citing Obama’s openness on the
topic of nuclear weapons accompanied by a lack of progress since the New START treaty.
The development of purpose and participants. Aside from the freeze and New
START, the exemplification of mutual influence was seemingly apparent in the words and deeds
of the interviewees. The influence manifested itself in the attraction and retention to the purpose
of NWR, the development of the participants from their work, and the participants’ evolving
impact on nuclear weapons reduction efforts.
There were the collective years (in the hundreds) of work the interviewees have
performed in service to the many inhabitants of earth. Looking at the eight participants, six
respondents had been engaged in their work for two decades or more while four had been with
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the same organization for more than twenty years. Another respondent had been involved for ten
years while the newest participant saw NWR activism as something they would do to the end of
their days. Superficially, such a bond was an anomaly in today’s US where, per the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (2014), individuals who stayed the longest at their organizations, those in the
public sector, had a median tenure of 7.8 years. Another study showed that average tenure at US
non-profit organizations averaged 6.5 years (Hrywna, 2013). For most people in this study, it
could be argued that it truly was a life’s work. Returning to the words of those interviewed, a
sense of why they stayed can be found. For instance, Brian asked if there was any work that was
“more important.” Robert saw nuclear weapons as an unabated and “very serious threat to the
United States and the world.” Isabel acknowledged that there was a “lot of work left to be done.”
Both Brian and Leigh highlighted the interesting nature of the work. David left the field for a
time, but returned out of “desire to really address this issue.” And then there was Cheryl’s
impassioned reasoning behind her efforts against nukes:
Every detail, everything I hear about it, makes me that much more determined to
help in any way I can. I don’t have the policy background. I don’t have these
other things, but this grassroots movement and explaining what I do know to
people. It’s kind of lit a fire in me.
Lastly, there was Edwin’s sense of gratitude in working to reduce nuclear weapons.
Their lengthy time spent working against nuclear weapons has encompassed and
impacted events like the freeze, START I, the end of the Cold War, and New START. Each has
gone about the work in different ways, but with a similar aim. Dependent upon the reader, their
respective stories can be interpreted as representations of being influenced and influencing.
Throughout their individual journeys, they have communicated personal development while
seeking to educate others for the attainment of their chosen common purpose. Briefly returning
to each participant provides a reminder of how they have been touched and/or how they have

166
touched others in their work. James and his fellow physicians started out to curb nuclear power
and then altered purpose, based on peer testimony and articles, to work against nuclear arms. In
his latest strategy, he is working to involve NGO’s like the Red Cross and Rotary to work against
nuclear weapons. Robert has engaged throughout his life in ongoing legal study and advocacy to
find ways to eliminate and prevent the reemergence of nuclear weapons. Isabel described her
transition from outward (public) to inward (Washington) influence and in doing so had gained a
better sense of how to work with individuals in the presidential administration and congress. She
also told of her organization’s annual effort to educate and recruit new members to the cause of
NWR. David continued to ruminate on a rallying cry that would attract and sufficiently unite
peoples to bring about large-scale nuclear arms reduction. Brian provided innovative
methodologies that facilitated nuclear security and international cooperation. Leigh saw her
calling as “important” and has had the continuous opportunity of being able to work on the
nuclear issue from a variety of angles. She articulated two concepts that she found helpful in her
approach. The first was to “break down the problem into its component pieces and see exactly
what you are trying to influence.” The second involved the term coalesce: “That means having
the right people in place, the right leadership authority, political space to move, budgets, drawing
in of outside expertise where necessary, and engaging in a broader discussion.” Edwin married
his personal quest for nonviolence with the common purpose of reducing humanity’s most
violent force. Finally, Cheryl portrayed the role NWR had in bringing insight, “It changed my
whole idea of leadership” and “it also changed my opinion of what one voice can do” while
igniting her passion as no cause had before.
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What May Lie Under the Surface?
Proceeding up to this point, I had seemingly focused on what was apparent and prevalent
in the interviews. I paused and took the time to truly think about what lay deeply within the
accounts of the interviewees or even what was left unsaid. Such an effort was consistent with the
hermeneutic phenomenological approach and in the end, helpful. Stepping back and clearing my
mind, three aspects emerged: Perseverance (mentioned sporadically, but pronounced), tacit
selflessness (absent verbally, yet present in deeds), and a conspicuous nonexistence (to my
senses) of competitive mindset. Concerning any of these aforementioned areas, the possibility
existed that I did not ask the right questions at the outset or follow a given lead that might have
uncovered relative information on these three aspects.
Although not expressed with the regularity of other thematic elements, the quality of
perseverance, as in Chapter II, coursed throughout the interviews. Kotter (2002) outlining a
principle, “Don’t Let Up,” about what it took to achieve significant and sustained change,
advised, “Simple courage and perseverance help” (p. 147). The study participants, for the most
part, have endured over a number of years, world shaking events, and an ever-changing political
clime. This was evidenced by the experiences of James and Robert who had seen the up and
down nature of purpose accomplishment over the longest period. David and Brian talked of the
increasing difficulties between Washington leadership. Isabel echoed their points and expressed
a developing concern about funding risk. New variants of the threat like rogue states and
terrorism had emerged and taken root. Now, they are collectively working through quite possibly
their largest barrier of widespread disinterest. Yet despite these challenges, they continued to
strive for their aim. Badaracco (2002) provided one explanation for why leaders kept trying
despite difficult odds, “They didn’t act because they thought they should—they felt they had no
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choice. This sense of moral, emotional, and personal urgency accounts for their tenacity—and
for much of their success” (p. 177). Efficacy in process and outcomes might come from such
perseverance. Senge reinforcing, wrote “commitment to common purpose” invited the
contributions of others and increased the quality of decisions (1994, p.71).
After reflection, I was and continue to be cognizant of each interviewee’s selflessness.
Other than the inner reward they garnered from going about their duties, their focus was
exclusively on the greater good, the global welfare. Never did I pick up a hint of desire for
position, wealth, or power in the actual conversations, recordings, or transcripts. The only
frustration I was able to glean had to do with the inability of others to understand or respond to
the gravity and the immediacy of the threat. I would offer three applicable pieces of literature in
an attempt to triangulate the selfless leadership of these individuals. Bell (2002) provided, what I
think, is a partial glimpse of the study participants:
An activist life, an ethical life, is more often than not an adding to, not a taking
away. In other words, we can be ambitious, strive for success, if our ambition is
powered by a passion for the good and the just that may include your personal
comfort but goes far beyond it. Let our sense of success be far broader and deeper
than us and our kin. Let it inform the choices we make, big and small, public and
unseen. (p.177)
Another way to view the participants involved Collins’s “Level 5” leadership: Individuals who
paradoxically “blend extreme personal humility with intense professional will” and who
“channel their ego needs away from themselves and into the larger goal” (2001, p. 21).
Badaracco (2002), espousing on the importance of leader modesty, further touched upon the
nature of the participants’ leadership approach:
Don’t inflate the importance of their efforts or their likelihood of success. In fact,
this is why they often buy time, drill down into problems, and escalate gradually.
They are generally modest about how much they know and their role in the
scheme of things. (p. 174)
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As I typed this last piece, I was back in the interviews and could again hear their voices.
The proponents of NWR are facing longstanding and, at times, intense opposing forces.
Gardner (1995) spoke of the prevailing factor in competing narratives, “My study provides
abundant evidence that, more often than not, the less sophisticated story remains entrenched—
the unschooled mind triumphs” (p. 49). It is the sophisticated story, the higher purpose of a
world with less or no nuclear weapons, competing against what may be the less sophisticated
stories of nationalism, economics, and status quo. James gave examples of the unfavorable, even
dangerous, environments for NWR proponents in Pakistan and Russia, and to a lesser degree in
parts of the US. Isabel referred to a number of “folks lobbying on the other side.” There were
accounts of the infertile political environment of the United States where decisions were often
predicated on party affiliation as opposed to the weight of evidence. Several participants
mentioned the competition for interest and/or funding between NWR and other groups (e.g.,
environmentalism). And Edwin made a cogent argument that nuclear weapons removal would
result in the loss in organizational income and jobs, thus requiring new investments in industry
and training. Within the aforementioned segments are elements that have strong reasons for the
maintenance of nuclear weaponry along with funding, savvy, and connections to perpetuate the
status quo.
Senge (1990) proffered, “In the long run, the only sustainable source of competitive
advantage is your organization’s ability to learn faster than its competition” (p. 11). Yet with all
the forces arrayed against NWR proponents, I did not pick up a corresponding competitive
mindset from the respondents. This was not to say that such thinking was not present or had been
tried and found wanting—I just did not perceive evidence of it. However, I did hear a contrasting
view from one interviewee. Edwin mentioned in two different interviews how unlike antinuclear
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weapons activism was from a regular job, “It’s not like you establish a business plan and you got
these specific goals.” Denning (2007) proposed that social responsibility was not incompatible
with a company’s desire to improve its bottom line; it may actually be an enhancement to
financial return. Flipping Denning’s assertion, I wondered if a business mentality was compatible
with a group’s aim of social responsibility. Presupposing it does not exist in NWR, I pose the
question: Was there a place for competitive mindset? Or something along the line of a corporate
model that pushes nearly improbable goals that are often just met. After all, the stakes of nuclear
warfare are much higher than obtaining first quarter earnings targets and a few opponents (i.e.,
North Korean political leadership) are in some instances arguably more ruthless (or at least have
the means to be more ruthless) than a corporate board. Furthermore, Northouse (2007) offered
that organizations were increasingly focused on how to compete globally. Do corporations have
knowledge or relationships that would offer bridges for NWR efforts? There is an inducement:
Nuclear war has the capacity to be very bad for business. Isabel did talk of business support in
terms of foundations.
There were two other related areas, coalition and mass movement, that might assist in
competing against or offsetting NWR’s opposing forces. Clark (2008) touted coalition as a
means to mitigate hindrances to change initiatives. Robert talked of formal coalition with other
likeminded organizations, other than that, the specific subject largely went un-broached.
Although James was seeking coalition with organizations like the Red Cross and David alluded
to a desire for coalition to achieve significant change. I also considered whether nuclear weapons
reductionists could benefit from study of past mass movements. Edwin and his group followed
established practices of civil disobedience, but it was not on a pervasive scale. Considering
Gandhi and King, neither practiced violence, but they employed a very assertive method of
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widespread nonviolence (Gardner, 1995). I reiterate that all or some of the aforementioned may
have been tried or practiced by the participants or their organizations, but it was not perceived on
my level, other than the singular points about coalition and nonviolence.
Still We Balance on the Edge of a Precipice
Despite START I and New START, a plethora of nuclear weapons still exists, as
Schneidmiller (2011) mentioned in Chapter II, and those thermonuclear devices have the
capacity to inflict great harm to our planet. Additionally, Schneidmiller and James both made it
clear that a limited exchange of nuclear arms would bring worldwide catastrophic consequences.
Not only does the threat continue to exist, it also continues to evolve. An example of this lay in a
recent statement, not the first, from a representative of the Saudi Government, Saudi Prince
Turki al-Faisal (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014): “Our regional security requires that
we . . . work to create a real balance of forces with [Iran], including in nuclear know-how.”
Based on the history of conflict and current events in the Middle East, much ill can be
conjectured if the nuclear club expands in that volatile region.
Even though this mortal global danger remained assiduous, public (and sometimes
private) awareness, per the interviews was at a nadir. Returning to Fletcher’s (2004) assertion, a
return to what worked in a reframed module might be necessary to generate large-scale interest
and, as importantly, the desire to overturn the status quo. Going back to the conversation with
David, it was akin to getting a large worldwide representation (along with key inhibitors/enablers
to include the US) to the nuclear weapons awareness station a la the freeze of the 1980s. From
that station, the destination or destinations of worldwide benefit could be selected and then
mapped out.
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If a hypothetically compelling rallying cry was found, it is not as if there was an absence
of arguments (furnished by the interviewees)—health, legal, scientific, public interest, global,
fiscal, and moral—to impel others to take the next steps and reduce nuclear weapons. And
following from the interviews a number of techniques were available for utilization. Where a
deficit may exist is in leadership, not from a Nunn or Obama (especially at the time of New
START), or the participants of this study, but from others who may be distracted by competing
interests, who might be clinging stubbornly to the status quo, who have yet to take note of an
inspiring rallying cry, or who have commenced only partway down their own road of personal
development.
Culmination
This concluded section identified the thematic elements inherent in the participant
interviews. Utilizing literature from Chapter II and additional texts, I looked at the interview
content in the context of story, relationship, and evolution. Utilizing literature and the interviews,
the relationship and mutual influence between NWR and leadership was reexamined from three
vantages. A consideration of what might have been less apparent or left unsaid was furnished. A
brief passage on the continuing danger around nuclear weapons was provided. The next chapter,
the sixth and final installment, covers implications for common purpose and leadership,
influence on my leadership, and gaps in the research.
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Chapter VI: Implications for Others, Self, and Research
Implications for Common Purpose and Leadership
A starting point would be to ask: How do the efforts of those engaged in the reduction of
nuclear weapons crossover to other endeavors? The answer may be that within the participant
accounts there are utilizable aspects for not only higher purpose, but many workplaces.
Attraction and retention, competing against and the (re)crafting of stories, awareness and
engagement, a systems approach, the overturning of entrenched status quo, and adaptation are
potentially transferrable components supported by literature. While I offer that the common
purpose of nuclear weapons reduction and associated leadership has the potential to inform other
purposes and their leadership, I would also propose that, given additional examination from other
vantages, it may be conceivable that NWR could benefit from external enterprises.
Similar to NWR, leaders in other settings and their associates face the competing stories
of adjacent purposes or businesses. For instance, charities, similar to Isabel’s example, strive for
funding against the competing stories of other worthy causes. Competition, as it did with the
interviewees, begins with the choice individuals make, based on the power of attraction, on
which vocation or organization to join. Previously referenced in Chapter II, both Cho (2002) and
Sorenson and Hickman (2002) ascribed deep attraction and motivating force to common
purpose. Depending on the retaining strength of the original story or the pull of a new story, a
decision may arise as to whether stay on or exit from an undertaking. Be it NWR or another
enterprise, how well the organization sustains narrative performance can have the ability to touch
lives. Though they may not have the impact of nuclear weapons, such a failed competition by
other assemblages may lead to catastrophes of a personally immense nature such as job loss.
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Again, as with NWR, how well the leader, formal or informal, crafts the story, relates the
story through word of mouth and lived example and then adapts the story to changing conditions
and evolving media may predict failure or success. Gardner (1995) stated that leader
effectiveness stemmed from a consistency between story and embodiment. Denning (2007)
argued the importance of storytelling for leaders while at the same time emphasizing the need for
leadership to understand how to effectively deliver story. Given the economic conditions of the
last few years and participant responses, part of that story may be convincing others how and
why it may be necessary to move forward in light of constrained means—refinement or
replacement of past story might be in order. Then there are the internal vying narratives that
occur in the day to day workplace. For example, the manager who works to inspire others to
meet a mission goes up against the internal talk of worry over a sick child or plans for
advancement. As Kurtzman (2010) made clear, “Individuals are much more than cogs in the
wheel of commerce. They have hopes, fears, ambitions, dreams, and wide-ranging talents" (p. 8).
There also comes into play the idea of credibility, oft mentioned in the interviews. Bennis
(2003) speaking of the concept of “leading from voice” through speech and action wrote, “I
believe that trust is the underlying issue in not only getting people on your side, but having them
stay there” (p. 150). The credibility might be fostered by the leader’s past work to develop
relationships and history of previous accomplishments of meaning and sustainability;
accomplishments that demonstrated the leader’s fortitude and skill against challenges not easily
surmountable. Brian and David spoke of how Senator Nunn’s credibility, derived from respect
for his long standing character, facilitated nuclear weapons reduction efforts. Kotter reinforced
that notion of credibility derived from integrity (1998, p. 46). Credibility could also take the form
of taking into consideration and communicating what truly needed doing; not an attempt at
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manipulation or crying wolf—genuine exhortations applied necessarily instead of at or for a
whim. Heifetz (2000), discussing the requirement for leaders to be forthright about taking on
challenge stated, “I don’t think it’s leadership when you help people avoid facing reality” (p. 61).
A leader may misdirect others away from the questions around nuclear weapons and another
leader may divert employees away from questions about the workplace. Such leader attempts at
subterfuge are reminiscent of the worst examples of leadership manipulation of common purpose
mentioned in the earlier review of literature.
In accord with the interview accounts and a number of sources in Chapter II, leaders have
a role in generating awareness. Yet leaders may also have a responsibility to enhance their own
awareness by becoming and remaining involved; to be plugged into the setting in such a way that
they know their people and their problems. Burke (2008), as referenced in this dissertation’s
literature review, suggested that leader self-awareness was required to effectively facilitate
change. Bennis (2003) maintained, “True understanding derives from engagement and from the
full deployment of ourselves” (p. 39). Insularity and ignorance, either uninformed or willful, has
the potential to lead to issues in industries across the spectrum. Ignoring the looming threat of
nuclear weapons, while global and deadly, is analogous on a much smaller scale to a leader that
looks past unsafe infrastructure, a toxic employee, or an ineffective IT system.
Like NWR, an attempt at a proactive prescription involving systemic components might
be employed. Kim (2002) argued that we had an ethical duty as leaders to lead through foresight;
foresight being defined as “being able to perceive the significance and nature of events before
they occurred—which is achievable” (p. 2). A similar type of foresight might have factored into
the absence of nuclear warfare for a period of nearing 70 years. Nuclear weapons are tied to a
myriad of considerations, so are many other efforts. Utilizing systems thinking to understand
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issues, communicate, and select and implement solutions offers a chosen and somewhat defined
pathway. Considering the missed opportunities by Kodak and Xerox in Chapter II, a CEO or
business owner may get one critical chance (like nukes) and they must get it right to avoid
disaster.
Relating to the interviews, the overturning of stagnant or harmful status quos has
remained an ongoing challenge for many leaders in many arenas. The desire to have something
stay the same could originate, like those who possess nuclear weaponry, from the unwillingness
to relinquish power, the potential risk of insecurity, and either not realizing that change is
necessary or how to go about change. “Resistance to change is not merely the result of ignorance
or inflexibility, it is a natural reaction by people who want to protect their self-interests and sense
of self determination” (Yukl, 2006, p. 286). Additionally, the necessity, willingness, and ability
to change are acutely necessary in our frenetic age. Yukl (2006) stated, “Innovative change is
more important when the external environment is volatile and uncertain, which is likely in
situations of rapid technological change, political and economic turmoil, or new threats from
competitors or external enemies” (p. 369)—conditions applicable to the world of nuclear
weapons and corporate settings alike. The phrase, adapt or die, holds a literal connotation for
NWR, but it also could hold application to individuals in terms of career progression and an
organizational entity in relation to long-term viability.
How then to generate widespread awareness and resultant adaption? It may start with
leadership. According to Bennis (2003), “Unless the leader continues to evolve, to adapt and
adjust to external change, the organization will sooner or later stall” (p. 135). Within the nuclear
weapons context, Leigh emphasized the necessity to modify approach depending on setting and
aim—a prescription that could be applied elsewhere. Like NWR, a rallying cry or general aim

177
that holds over time could be a useful complement to leadership in various locales. Denning
(2007) described how a rallying cry or “Burning Platform” story worked:
It’s now used as a metaphor to describe a situation where people are forced to act
by dint of the alternative’s appearing far worse. Doing nothing will result in
disaster, so that ceases to be a viable option. In a burning platform study, the
disaster scenario is described in such shocking detail that by comparison even
disruptive change looks safe. (p. 180)
From NWR, methods imbued with creativity, cognizance around changing audiences,
innovative thinking, and fresh partnerships might all present in varying degrees for other
settings. The study participants conveyed the need for continuous development of self and
purpose; something that quite possibly exists in different contexts. Overlaying the common
purpose work and adaptation of NWR were demonstrations of perseverance over a long period.
The quality and necessity of perseverance in the face of challenge is not unique to NWR. Bennis
(2003), for one, saw adversity as the paving stone on the road of leadership growth. Besides
supporting common purpose, fortitude may afford a leader, formal or informal, the opportunity
of experiential learning.
Implications for my Leadership Practice
After being a witness to these eight intriguing and instructive stories, it is now time to
look anew at common purpose and leadership within my own narrative. I reconsidered why a
common purpose approach resonated with me and why I considered it efficacious. Based on my
experience, common purpose offers a way to bring disparate individuals together in a collective
effort to accomplish something of import, ideally of service to the common good. I suspect
gravitating towards a common higher aspiration can strip away the restricting veneer we develop
from insularity and unite many in achieving the previously unimagined. I realize now that
common purpose was part of my leadership repertoire from my first leadership role as a
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teenager, but became permanently ingrained as part of my philosophy during an initially difficult
transition from military to civilian leadership—a time when I was mystified why my new
coworkers were not working together and frequently put their individual needs ahead of our
patients’ requirements. Around that period, I had the good fortune to attend a management
seminar and I asked the presenter his opinion on my dilemma. He referred to Stephen Covey
(2004) and suggested we (my staff and I) write a collective mission statement to focus our effort
and use it as a means to hold each other accountable. We followed his advice and it worked. Yet,
there’s so much more, on both a personal and global plane. When I now come to a juncture
where difficult decisions need to be made and there are contrasting views of what should be
done, something quite incredible happens when I discard what I think must happen and instead
ask what is in the interest of the greater good and how can we support that approach: When
striving for a common purpose, people engage, incredible ideas emerge, and we all become a
little closer and in a sense, a little better.
My common purpose leadership has had the potential to benefit from both the method
and the content of this research. Concerning the hermeneutic phenomenological course I chose, it
was interesting and gratifying to see the results that came from the process. While involving a
great deal of writing, reviewing, and reflecting, the path felt natural and it yielded a trove of
information beyond what I would have imagined; such a course is quite similar to my most
patient and effective leadership. I did not feel forced by the methodology nor did I feel that I was
forcing it; rather it was as if we were travelling together, me and an interactive evolving map.
Relating to content, there was confirmation, questioning, and enrichment of my leadership. Jarvis
(1999) talked of practitioner-researchers “developing a personal theory” (p. 131). This research I
have conducted over the last few years informed my personal and integrated theory of leadership
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and life. Prime components of my theory are that the learning is never done and that learning can
come from anyone, anytime, and any manner…should I be open and reflective. Or as Vaill
(1996) offered, “Continual learning entails the difficult psychological achievement of
open-mindedness” (p. 80).
“When examining evidence relevant to a given belief, people are inclined to see what
they expect to see, and conclude what they expect to conclude,” Gilovich (1991, p. 50) posited.
Because I worked from the outset and throughout to not have a given belief around NWR or its
relevant leadership, I sense that my bias was kept at a minimum. Where I admittedly fall short on
ingrained belief has been in my own leadership practice. Many times throughout this research, I
read or heard about salient points—meaningful work (higher purpose), story, adaptation,
credibility, systems thinking, and capacity (personal and group)—that resonated or reinforced
how I went about things. Still, there was an opportunity, should I reflect appropriately and make
a concerted effort to challenge or enhance my leadership thinking and practice. And this acts in
concert with another point, because it is again (and continues to be) about the hermeneutic
method of constantly taking in new material through the experience of interacting via written,
auditory, and visual experience . . . the living accompanied by incorporation and reflection. The
rub being, am I continually taking in sufficient new or contradictory information followed by
critical thinking and then application of that input?
When it comes to what I already believe or apply, there is the ever-present gift of being
able to continually refine chosen qualities. I continue to be enthralled with the idea of higher
purpose, a probable reason for my ongoing presence in healthcare. That presence is accompanied
by the understanding that the US care delivery system is embarking upon change of massive
urgency and scope—previously I would have been weighed down by such a prospect and now I
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want to embrace it, learn from it, and collectively weave it into a new and better world. Through
the accounts and literature, I have gained a deeper sense of the import and employment of
meaningful, resonant, and adaptive story. Two other areas of reinforcement involved adaptation
and systems thinking—I am more further convinced that should a leader/change agent bypass
consideration of these two aspects, they invite at worst disaster and at best mediocrity.
Areas where I need continued development involve times when I hold the perception that
my personal credibility is at risk or when individual/collective capacity is waning. Credibility is
an area that may function as an overplayed strength for me; while I do not eschew conflict and I
think it yields progress, I sometimes over worry about how disagreement affects my ability to
engage over the long-term. When my capacity is overtaxed, my leadership has been
diminished—I have seen a similar pattern in those around me. I am slowly becoming more
conscious of recognizing and adjusting to times of high demand/low resources (both of an
internal and external nature). The ongoing awareness of a common purpose offers a means
(personal and collective) to mitigate or possibly even to eliminate being at odds with others
while also infusing energy during periods of great challenge or uncertainty.
A significant insight I had from this research was in the area of perseverance. Looking
back, I do see that perseverance intermittently asserts itself in my consciousness, but more often
I am not overtly cognizant of the striving nature of progress and I sometimes catch myself doing
the opposite in being daunted by the length or difficulty of the work ahead. These just concluded
examples of people giving their lives in terms of years and effort was deeply illustrative and
personally motivating. It makes me see that when a cause is just and necessary, it is important to
keep moving forward even if just to stay relevant and capable for future circumstances of
favorability. I go back to James describing his organization adjusting and steeling itself for the
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periods of lean activity. I realize that when I think and talk of perseverance, it buoys not only me,
but, in addition, those I lead—making it smoother and more fruitful when navigating adversity.
My greatest personal epiphany came from hearing Edwin discuss nonviolence;
specifically when he provided that an ill thought about another person construed an act of
violence. As I was hearing that passage, I literally had to put on my researcher face to stay on the
task at hand. Yet, this concept of thought as a precursor to action has been resident over the ages
and in my personal aging. It is inherent in the writings of Marcus Aurelius (1997), “We ought
then to check in our series of thoughts everything that is without purpose or useless, but most of
all the overcurious feeling and the malignant” (p. 14); Shakespeare (1908), “For there is nothing
either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” (p. 822); and Frankl (1984), “The last of the human
freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way”
(p. 75). Such anticipatory nonviolent thinking translated to nonviolent means amidst internal and
external violent counterforces with Gandhi and King (Gardner, 1995). It never hit me with the
force and the clarity of hearing Edwin describe it and then considering it over time. From a
personal vantage, I feel that one takeaway, mitigation of violent thinking, can help me better my
leadership and humanity more than any other principle…should I master the ability (or
“practice” as Edwin would say). I wonder too if large-scale thinking of the same would assist in
the winnowing or eradication of nuclear weapons; something Edwin and his fellows seemed to
believe. Maybe it is time for that lesson of nonviolent thought, personally and globally, to finally
begin to take root (I know they have been planted enough) or as Simone Weil (2001) said, “Even
if our efforts of attention seem for years to be producing no result, one day a light that is in exact
proportion to them will flood the soul” (p. 59)—a sentiment that seems pertinent to my journey
and the phenomenon that I have had the honor of witnessing, considering, and chronicling.

182
Gaps and Opportunities
This study focused on the common purpose of nuclear weapons in a literature review and
an employment of hermeneutic phenomenological methodology. A number of opportunities exist
to contrast, compliment, or expand this research:


My interview population is very confined and may offer incomplete findings or miss
out on additional implications. This could be offset by targeting other individuals
within NWR, environmentalism, healthcare, or another venue of common purpose
with the same or similar methodology. Even within weapons reduction efforts, there
is the option of looking at chemical, biological, and conventional forces (or a
combination of all to include nuclear weaponry).



My methodology may hold the opportunity for augmentation or confirmation.
Therefore, employ focus on a same or similar NWR population using a qualitative
method that involves coding, a quantitative method, or a mixed methods approach.
Creswell and Clark suggested coding, the grouping and labeling of accounts and ideas
into themes, as an analysis adjunct to qualitative research (2007). Concerning
mixed-methods, McMillan and Wergin (2006) wrote, “The reasoning is logical: why
not design studies that capture the best of what both quantitative and qualitative
studies have to offer?” (p. 6). Relating to a quantitative or mixed-methods approach,
a couple of possibilities come immediately to mind. Along the lines of Bass and
Riggio (2006), one option would be to use an established instrument like the
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) for self or external assessment of the
NWR participants’ leadership. Another possibility along the broad terms proposed by
Northouse (2007) would be use of the Global Leadership and Organizational
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Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) survey to understand NWR leadership from the
variety of ways it is viewed around the world. Because nuclear weapons is an
international issue imbued with different national and cultural considerations, value
could come from viewing the purpose and leadership from globally diverse
standpoints.


I have not taken into account organizational factors and their impact on my study’s
respondents. One could look at NWR from an ethnographic standpoint to see what
role organizational culture and setting has in the common purpose leadership
relationship. Schwandt (2007, p. 97) emphasized the aspects of “fieldwork” and
“participant observation” as a means to know and portray culture. As an example,
were I to redo this study, I might physically imbed myself in one of the organizations
where the participants worked and examine the NWR phenomenon amidst that
particular institution’s environment.



Following from my study, there are side roads offering investigation. Specifically,
further explore aspects of this paper: Long-term retention to a common purpose,
nonviolent efforts to reduce the institutions or practices of violence (Gandhi and/or
Martin Luther King as a specific possibility), actualization of self within purpose,
efficaciousness of a rallying cry, and common purpose within a competitive
environment are possibilities.

Conclusion
I undertook this research to get a glimpse of the phenomenon of the nuclear
weapons/leadership relationship. Secondarily, I posed the possibility of lessons for other arenas
of leadership. Conversely, there may be lessons from other workplaces, nonprofit and profit,
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which have potential to benefit NWR and associated leadership. Going forward, I have the
opportunity to apply my individual learning from this dissertation to my venue(s) of common
purpose and to my leadership practice.
“So let us be alert—alert in a twofold sense: Since Auschwitz we know what man is
capable of. And since Hiroshima we know what is at stake” (Frankl, 1984, p. 154).
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Appendix A: IRB Approved Study Information
Antioch University Study Information
Study on the Relationship between Common Purpose and Leadership
A Researcher at the Antioch University PhD in Leadership and Change
Program is asking you to participate in a study on common purpose and
leadership.
The Researcher wants to know about your experiences regarding nuclear
weapons and associated leadership. The purpose of this research is a partial
fulfillment of a dissertation requirement and to see if findings can be utilized in
other endeavors of common purpose and/or leadership. The researcher will be
conducting interviews with one to three individuals at several organizations
involved in work to reduce nuclear weapons. There are no risks to you in taking
part in this research, because your name will be kept anonymous and
identifying information will be kept to an absolute minimum. The interview
will take place by phone and be audiotaped. The interview responses will be
maintained in secure files. The interview will take about 30 to 45 minutes to
complete. A follow up interview may be necessary for clarification or
elaboration of responses.
Taking part is voluntary.
If you choose not to participate in this research, there will be no penalty.
If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Chuck Powell,
Investigator, at telephone # (XXX XXX-XXXX) or via email at
cpowell@antioch.edu.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you
may contact Dr. Carolyn Kenny, Chair of the Antioch University PhD and
Leadership Change Program IRB, ckenny@antioch.edu, XXX XXX-XXXX.
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Appendix B: Antioch University Consent Form
Project Title: Nuclear Weapons Reduction and Leadership
Project Investigator: Chuck Powell
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Philomena Essed
I understand that this study is of a research nature. It may offer no direct benefit to me.
1. Participation in this study is voluntary. I may refuse to enter it or may withdraw at any
time without creating any harmful consequences to myself. I understand also that the
investigator may drop me at any time from the study.
2. The purpose of this study is: To examine the relationship between common purpose,
nuclear weapons reduction, and associated leadership.
3. As a participant in the study, I will be asked to take part in the following procedures:
a.
A series of questions will be asked about my experience around nuclear
weapons and related leadership.
b.
Depending upon responses, there is the potential of a shorter follow up
interview.
Participation in the study will take approximately one hour of my time and will take place
by phone. A follow up interview of up to one half hour is possible. Responses will be
audiotaped.
4. The risks, discomforts and inconveniences of the above procedures might be:
a.
In order to minimize risks to confidentiality, names will be kept anonymous
and other identifying information will be safeguarded.
b.
There is the inconvenience of providing 60-90 minutes of time.
5. The possible benefits of the procedure might be:
a.
Direct benefit to me: None
b.
Benefits to others: Partial fulfillment of a dissertation requirement and
potential implications for other settings of common purpose and leadership.
6. Information about the study was discussed with me by Chuck Powell. If I have further
questions, I can call him/her at XXX XXX-XXXX.
7. Though the purpose of this study is primarily to fulfill a requirement to complete a formal
research project as a dissertation at Antioch University, there is the possibility of
including data and results of the study in future scholarly publications and presentations.
The confidentiality agreement, as articulated above, will be effective in all cases of data
sharing.
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If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Chuck Powell,
Investigator, at telephone # (XXX XXX-XXXX) or via email at
cpowell@antioch.edu.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you
may contact Dr. Carolyn Kenny, Chair of the Antioch University PhD in
Leadership and Change Program IRB, ckenny@antioch.edu, XXX XXXXXXX.

Date:___________________________

Signed:_____________________________
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